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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines prospects for the development of Chinese-Russian strategic
relations. It addresses an interpretation that is prevalent, if not predominant, in current
literature on the relationship - that the two countries appear to be moving toward
alignment or alliance, and that the evidence for this movement is in the increasing
security-related cooperation between the two sides since 1990. This paper addresses two
questions that are central to this interpretation: (1) Is cooperation between the two sides
in fact deepening over time9 and (2) Is this cooperation likely to lead to alignment?
The issue of whether various forms of cooperation between the two sides are
properly seen as elements of a new, closer security relationship are addressed in three case
studies, each of which compares an important facet of bilateral cooperation in the 1990s
with cooperation in the same field during the 1950s. Cooperation in defense technology,
economic affairs, and territorial relations are examined. These studies find that
Chinese-Russian cooperation is likely to continue for the foreseeable future, but that it has
fallen off since the early 1990s and is unlikely to develop beyond current levels in the near
term. They find no causal link between cooperative relations and the emergence of
alignment or alliance between these states. The limited scope of current bilateral
cooperation between these countries, the absence of mutual favored treatment in their
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This thesis examines prospects for the development of strategic relations between
China and Russia. It addresses an interpretation that is prevalent, if not predominant in
the literature on this relationship: that China and Russia appear to be moving toward
alignment or alliance, and that the evidence for this movement is in the increasing
security-related cooperation between the two sides since 1990. This paper addresses two
questions that are central to this interpretation: (1) Is cooperation between the two sides
in fact deepening over time7 and (2) Is this cooperation likely to lead to alignment?
This thesis argues that the connection drawn between cooperative relations and
alliance building is based mainly on a structural interpretation of world politics in which
Russia and China are seen to be balancing against the United States' perceived role as
unipolar hegemon in the post-cold war international order. Declarations by Russian and
Chinese national leaders have described an emerging "security partnership" between the
two countries, prompting many analysts to identify the existing cooperative relations
between the two countries as indicators of progress toward this "partnership," which is
seen as a euphemism for alliance It is argued here that neither theory nor the
declarations of Chinese and Russian leaders provides a reliable basis for assertions of
alignment between these countries.
xi
The issue of whether various forms of cooperation between the two sides are properly
seen as elements of a new security relationship are addressed in three case studies, each of
which compares a facet of bilateral cooperation in the 1990s with cooperation in the same
field during the 1950s. Cooperation in defense technology, economic affairs, and
territorial relations are examined. These studies find that Sino-Russian cooperation is
likely to continue for the foreseeable future, but that most evidence suggests cooperation
has fallen off since the early 1990s and is not likely to develop appreciably beyond its
current levels in the near future. They find no reliable basis for drawing a causal link
between cooperative relations and the emergence of alignment or alliance between these
countries The outlook for such a result based on current forms of cooperation is poor
because of the relatively limited scope of the cooperation in all three fields, because of
evidence that China and Russia appear not to treat one another as favored partners in any
of these fields, and because of historical factors, observable in both the 1950s and 1990s
relationships, that will tend to further restrict cooperation
These findings appear to have some implications for international relations theory.
First, fear of "cheating" in cooperative relations is shown to represent a major obstacle to
xn
the growth of such ties, particularly in a bilateral relationship Second, it appears that the
frequent use of case studies in economic and technological cooperation to test the validity
of realist versus neo-liberal theories may be less telling than some authors believe:
economic cooperation breeds dissension among the strongest of modern allies because it
offers such fertile ground for the growth of suspicions and resentments. Yet
developments in cooperative spheres seldom have a serious effect on security relations.
The issue of whether countries are more likely to "bandwagon" with or balance against a
perceived hegemon is also addressed in this paper: at least in the Sino-Russian case, a
false form of balancing appears to occur when conflict is a distant threat; bandwagoning
appears to be the pattern when a real threat appears.
Implications for U.S. policy are fairly straightforward: First, the national security
community should not rush to judge these countries as embarked on a journey toward
alliance; second, the United States may wish to encourage cooperation in the form of
confidence-building measures between these Asian neighbors, recognizing their
self-declared "strategic partnership'!. for what it is, third, the United States should continue
to do what it can to promote Russian and Chinese integration into the world economic




The dynamics of the Cold War and especially its frostiest variant, the Sino-Soviet
conflict, inspired considerable scholarship on the historic and contemporary relationship
between the Chinese and the Russians. A common finding in much of this scholarship is
that the USSR-PRC relationship, apparently so close at its outset in 1949, declined
precipitously by the late 1950s because of differences between the Soviet and Chinese
leaderships over basic ideological issues. The Chinese portrayed the Soviets as status-quo
powers with no real interest in actively promoting world revolution; the Soviets, on the
other hand, shied away from the Chinese as reckless adventurers who seemed perfectly
willing to risk global conflagration by promoting wars throughout the developing world.
Within the confines of this generalized portrayal of the Sino-Soviet split, however,
there exist many different interpretations ofhow this fundamental ideological conflict
arose. The question ofhow various factors operated in the relationship to bring about its
downfall make for some of the most interesting reading available on the bilateral
relationship. Some argue that the ideological split was in fact strongly impelled by
disagreements over areas of cooperation that were not directly related to a clash of
political visions. In this interpretation, cooperation in such fields as economic
development, arms modernization, and territorial affairs were not the victims of
ideological differences, but rather crucial threads in a tapestry ofgrowing mutual enmity.
It was this aggregate ill will over perceived slights that found expression in the virtual
cessation of cooperative relations after 1960, followed by the open vitriol of Chinese and
Soviet propaganda campaigns that challenged the right of the other country to a position
of leadership in the international communist movement.
This thesis explores the scholarship on the "tributary" sources of the Sino-Soviet
split in the late 1950s and compares these findings with the development of Sino-Russian
relations in the 1990s. This study recommends itself for at least two reasons. First, much
has been written in the 1990s about the potential for (or the perception of) an emerging
alliance-like relationship between China and Russia. Such a security relationship would
obviously lack the ideological basis of the 1950s, but many observers see other strong
imperatives toward alliance-building. For example, many adherents of the "realist" school
of international relations theory posit a natural tendency for two states recently demoted
from world-power status to unite and "balance" against the West in general and the United
States in particular.
Second, in the absence of an ideological basis, an expanded security relationship
between China and Russia would presumably derive from more practical concerns. It is
precisely these concerns that have informed the scholarly writing on the Sino-Russian
relationship following the demise of the Soviet Union. A survey of the literature identifies
three areas of bilateral cooperation-already cited above in discussing the 1950s
relationship—which are seen as most salient to the growth of bilateral security ties:
economic development, arms modernization, and territorial issues.
The basic questions which this comparative study seeks to address are the
following:
- On balance, is the combination of persistent factors observable in the 1950s
relationship and those new factors unique to the 1990s relationship suggestive of
growing or diminishing cooperative ties?
- Based on these findings, what inferences can be reliably drawn regarding the
prospects for Sino-Russian security cooperation in the 1990s and beyond?
The following chapter discusses the theoretical bases and empirical evidence
supporting the claim that China and Russia are forming a strategic alliance in the 1990s. It
argues that the theoretical frameworks that have emerged in the study of the Sino-Soviet
relationship do not function well in explaining or predicting the course of Sino-Russian
relations at present. An empirical survey ofwhat the two sides have said and done
regarding strategic alignment or alliance in the 1990s concludes that there is insufficient
direct evidence to confirm or discount a contention of alliance-building. Finally, a survey
of scholarly literature concerning the 1990s relationship finds both a growing consensus
that a strategic alliance is emerging between these two countries and growing reliance on
the three areas of bilateral cooperation already specified as evidence for such an alliance.
Each of the three succeeding chapters compares Sino-Soviet cooperation in a
particular field in the 1950s with Sino-Russian cooperation in that same field in the 1990s.
At the end of each chapter, that particular field is assessed in terms of the first question
above in order to weigh its potential contribution to (or detraction from) the prospects for
Sino-Russian security cooperation. The concluding chapter summarizes these findings and
offers an answer to the second question.
The basic findings of this thesis are that Russo-Chinese cooperation in various
fields, while likely to continue for some time at low to moderate levels, is unlikely to
develop significantly for the foreseeable future because of fundamental bilateral conflicts
and non-complementarity. Lackluster cooperative relations between the two states will
not be conducive to alliance formation, which is in any case largely precluded by many of
the same factors that make the development of long-term cooperation so difficult for these
countries. An absence of trust is likely to keep the two governments strategically
separate, even as sub-state level entrepreneurs seek ways to carry out limited cooperation
in defense technology, economic relations, and border management.
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H. THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND ANALYSIS
This chapter examines the main approaches that have been taken by scholars and
security analysts to the Sino-Russian security relationship over the last fifty years. It seeks
to answer two questions. First, how well is the current relationship explained by the
theoretical approaches that have been taken toward the relationship during this period, and
by direct evidence and scholarly analysis of those ties in the 1990s? Second, how have
these approaches contributed to the development of a near-paradigmatic interpretation of
Sino-Russian cooperation in various fields as a transitional stage in the establishment of an
alliance?
Considerable space is devoted to a review of the tenets of international relations
theory that have been applied to the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Russian relationships since the
end of the Second World War. These theories are broadly categorized as system- and
state-level approaches. System-level interpretations have been dominated by the "realist"
school, which has made important contributions to the interpretive study of Sino-Soviet
and Sino-Russian relations. As a theoretical school that addresses the phenomenon of
security relations directly, the contributions of "realism" to the study of security ties
between these two countries is discussed at some length. Although not as influential, the
applicability of a competing approach which draws upon both system- and state-level
factors~"neo-idealism"~ is also assessed. Finally, prominent among the state-level
interpretations is an ideological school of analysis, which has at various times sought to
explain Sino-Soviet and Sino-Russian relations in terms of the ideological agendas
pursued by the two states and the relationship between those ideologies. It is argued here
that although these schools of interpretation fail to explain or predict the course of
Sino-Russian security relations in the 1990s, they have nonetheless made important
contributions to understanding the former relationship and shaped the response of most
observers to the emergence of the new bilateral nexus.
Next, this chapter reviews statements and behaviors by the two sides since the
collapse of the Soviet Union to determine what examination of direct evidence (i.e.,
official pronouncements) concerning the relationship might reveal about the prospects for
growing security ties. It is argued that both sides have used secrecy and obscure wording
to keep the nature of the developing relationship as ambiguous as possible. It is further
argued that there is no direct evidence in these pronouncements that any significant
alignment has taken place between China and Russia in the 1990s, nor any indication that
there is an increasing tendency toward alliance-building.
The chapter ends with a review of observations by scholars and security analysts
about the nature of Sino-Russian security ties in the 1990s. It identifies three basic stages
in the security community's assessment of the newly cooperative relationship: an attempt
to place Sino-Russian relations in the context of a multipolar post-Cold War security
environment, followed by analyses—strongly influenced by realism's "balance of power"
model—that found evidence of balancing and a strategic alignment (against the United
States as a unipolar hegemon), culminating in a general expectation that some form of
strategic alliance was "under construction" between these states. This most recent
interpretation has been given added credibility by the explosive growth of scholarship on
the "China threat" and the inevitability of clashes between the United States and China;
strategic alignment with Russia is viewed as a supportive corollary to the threat argument.
The argument that China and Russia are seeking an alliance-like relationship finds its
evidentiary basis in the various forms of cooperation that have grown up between China
and Russia in the 1990s, and these are the subject of the comparative studies that follow.
Comparing these categories of cooperation in the 1990s with their 1950s incarnations is
the central analytic task of this paper; establishing the theoretical and critical basis for that
task is the focus of the present chapter.
A. THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE RELATIONSHIP
"Realism," the theoretical framework which has dominated international security
studies in the post-World War II era, was introduced by Hans Morgenthau in 1948 in his
classic work, Politics Among Nations: The Strugglefor Power and Peace} In response
to the failed idealism of the interwar years, Morgenthau and other members of the realist
school argued that a drive for power animates international politics. Although
"neo-realists" modified this argument to emphasize a quest for "security" rather than raw
power, the basic orientation of international security studies in the post-World War II era
had been set. In a Hobbesian international environment, national security was a function
of military force and the "balance of power" among competing states in an international
system; realism downplayed the importance of other influences on relations among states,
arguing that it was the use of force or the potential use of force that was crucial to
understanding how states behaved.
Among the factors supporting the longevity of realism as a dominant tradition in
international relations theory was the example of political figures such as Richard Nixon
and Henry Kissinger, whose realpolitik approaches to the practice of foreign affairs
seemed to confirm the salience of realist precepts in the world of international diplomacy. 2
Most international relations courses at U.S. universities began with the basic elements of
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the realist world view, and the growing field of "defense analysis" both inside and outside
government tended to reinforce the realist emphasis on military force and the security of
arms as the criteria by which international relations should be understood.
Scholars took different tacks within the realist framework, and one of the most
well-known and influential variants of the basic realist paradigm was "structural realism."
John Lewis Gaddis points out in a 1992 article3 that the first major contribution to the
structural explanation of international relations was Morton Kaplan's 1957 work, System
and Process in International Politics* in which Kaplan "identified six distinctive
international systems, only two of which had actually existed in modern history." These
were the pre- 19 14 "balance of power" system and the post- 1945 "loose bipolar" system.
The outlines of this systemic interpretation were widely accepted, for, as Gaddis points
out, "multipolarity and bipolarity are real conditions in international affairs, despite the
fact that no state's policies deliberately create them; it makes a difference which of these
conditions prevails at any given time." 5 Most significantly for the study of Russo-Chinese
relations, Kaplan also posited other potential systems which could arise in succession to
the "loose bipolar" arrangement.
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The structuralist school is most commonly associated with Kenneth Waltz and his
1979 book, Theory ofInternational Politics 6 As described by Paul Schroeder in a critical
1994 article, this "neo-realist" school argues that "the broad outcomes of international
politics derive more from the structural constraints of the states system than from unit
behavior." 7 In Waltz's influential interpretation of the international system, Russia and
China may be seen as two large state units interacting within an international "balance of
power" system.
The growth of the structural interpretation in international relations theory may
also be seen reflected in a theoretical interpretation of Sino-Soviet relations which gained
great popularity in the 1970s, the "strategic triangle." As Lowell Dittmer notes in his 1992
book, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, this
most fecund line of analysis... fastens on the entrance of the other
superpower, the United States, into the [Sino-Soviet] fray, thereby erec-
ting a 'strategic triangle.' First to take this tack seems to have been the
eminent Soviet scholar Donald Zagoria, followed by a spate of studies in
the 1970s. The strategic triangle had its heyday, both as an analytic tool
and as an operational policy, in the early to mid-1970s, when there was
much talk of playing various "cards." Since that time, it has been aban-
doned as a policy (at least ostensibly) by all putative players and has
come under fire as an analytic tool. 8
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Despite this critique, it would be hard to overestimate the influence which this
structural interpretation has had on thinking about Sino-Russian relations in the U.S.
national security community. The realist "triangle" model offers a persuasive explanation
for the unusual alignment between China and the United States in the late 1970s and early
1980s. Critics of this approach might argue that this alignment was short-lived because it
failed to meet the requirement for agreement on goals, values, and interests—internal state
attributes~that characterize stable alliance relationships. However, at least for a time, a
U.S.-Chinese strategic condominium was very much in place and aimed directly at
countering the international activism of the Soviet Union.
To the extent that one credits the U.S.-China rapprochement with having placed
intense pressure on Soviet foreign policy in the 1980s, the fading of this "special
relationship" in the 1990s creates a worrisome trendline for the United States. The
relative change in China's position from being an "ally of convenience" in the last decade
of the Cold War to closer cooperation with Russia in the current period leaves an
impression that U.S. stock in the international security environment has fallen. It seems to
make little difference to many observers of Russo-Chinese cooperation that it may
represent greater stability for Asia than did the decades of Sino-Soviet confrontation. The
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fear is that these two Asian giants are realigning with one another in a classic "balance of
power" move to counter the perceived "unipolar hegemony" of the United States.
In assessing the explanatory value of "realist" approaches to the Sino-Russian
relationship, one must keep in mind that realist theory per se does not purport to offer
predictions regarding bilateral relationships. Realists argue that many factors can
influence the behavior of one state toward another, and although the international balance
of power will tend to shape foreign policy in rational ways over time, any particular
relationship at any particular time may be at great variance with the dictates of this
power-centered model. However, realist concepts have informed the approach of most
scholars and security analysts who have taken up the question of Sino-Russian relations
and are therefore essential to a discussion of how these relations have been interpreted in
the 1990s.
The two most important ideas that realism has contributed to the study of
Sino-Russian relations over the past several decades are the concepts of "national interest"
and the "strategic triangle." Determining the national interest perceived and pursued by a
country's leaders is an important first step in understanding a country's international
behavior. In the case of Sino-Russian relations, a strong argument can be made that the
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decade-old rapprochement between the two sides has been the result of a recognition by
both that better relations are in their common interest. Lowering the animosity that
persisted for decades after the Sino-Soviet split has been mutually beneficial in a number
of ways: a reduced military threat along their shared border, enormous cost-savings from
the accompanying troop reductions, and an improved trade relationship are some
examples. However beneficial this cooperation may be, though, it does not necessarily
require any movement toward a strategic alignment or partnership.
Many observers see the requisite motivation for such an alignment in a revival of
the "strategic triangle" described above. In its current iteration, this "triangle" is an
implicit part of an argument that Russia and China are, in Nguyen's terms, "two
continental powers unified by their real or imagined grievances against the West."9 In the
current instance, China and Russia are seen to be mobilized by the same realist
imperative—balancing against a common hegemonic antagonist—as the United States and
China were in balancing against the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s. The difference,
of course, is that the roles are now occupied by different actors, with the United States
viewed as a post-Cold War hegemon intent on imposing its own designs on the
international system.
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The emergence of a new strategic environment in which Russia and China would
necessarily seek to balance against the West in general and the United States in particular
does not lack for detractors as a theory-based prediction. As cited by John Lewis Gaddis
in his 1992 article on international relations theory, Stephen Rock has pointed out at least
two important cases in which great powers have "bandwagoned" or sought accom-
modation with an emerging world power rather than "balancing" against it: the British
abandonment of efforts to counter the rising power of the United States in the 1890s and
the four decades of European peace that followed the unification ofGermany in 1871. 10
There does not appear to be an historical imperative for existing great powers to balance
against another that has gained apparent strategic advantage.
An argument that at least partially accounts for these two cases also presents
additional criticism of the "balancing" scenario as a theoretical concept. As Ralph Cossa
pointed out in a March 1997 lecture, states historically have formed alliances on the basis
of three common attributes: shared interests, shared values, and shared objectives. 11
While the Sino-Russian relationship of the 1990s does arguably derive from shared
national interests, Russia and China do not appear to share similar values, nor do they
seem to have common geopolitical objectives. Beyond agreeing to limit or cooperate in
16
activities that could otherwise be deemed threatening, the two countries have very
different sets of regional security interests. For example, Russia and China have separate
and distinct interests regarding trade, arms sales, and territorial integrity with the
surrounding states of East Asia, Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the South China
Sea littoral.
In his book, Rock presents a menu of attributes that make states less likely to
confront one another militarily. As a litmus test of a Sino-Russian alliance's survivability,
it suggests that the recent rapprochement between these two states should be considered
with a healthy dose of skepticism. Rock points out that states whose geopolitical interests
do not clash tend not to clash militarily (with the world's longest border and competing
visions of their place in Asia, this condition clearly does not apply to Russia and China);
that complementary economies discourage war (with overindustrialization in both
countries and mismatched agricultural sectors, Russia and China have two of the world's
least complementary large economies); that states resembling one another tend not to fight
(in a 1994 article, Charles Zeigler highlights just how unalike Russia and East Asia are); 12
and that a cataclysmic event may be required to set the process of reconciliation in motion
(this condition may apply: the startling collapse of the Soviet Union had not occurred
17
when the rapprochement began, but the event may have made further cooperation
easier). 13
In addition, the "national interest" of each of these two countries is not readily
definable. If China's post- 1949 history is any guide, domestic politics often intervene
decisively in setting the course of foreign policy. The analyst who sets aside the influence
of idiosyncratic leadership personalities in accounting for Soviet and Chinese foreign
policy in the Maoist, Stalinist, or Khrushchev eras can hardly be said to have studied the
subject in a thorough or realistic way.
This touches on a central element in the critique of realist theory, one that Stanley
Hoffman states directly in response to a neo-realist preference for bipolarity over
post-Soviet multipolarity:
Structural factors do not cause or explain outcomes themselves. In
anarchy, any structure can lead either to peace or to war; it depends on
the domestic characteristics ofthe main actors, or their preferences and
goals, as well as on the relations and links among them. 14
It is also difficult to understand how Russia and China could be expected to work
out the issue of "division of labor" within an alliance relationship. This was one of the
fundamental weaknesses of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s, or at least one of the
first to show itself clearly. Even if Russia were to manage such a turnaround in its current
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fortunes that it again became a global power, this is far enough beyond the current horizon
that China is just as likely as Russia to be a global power—and competitor—by that time.
In the near term, China could hardly be expected to accept a "regional subaltern" role in
some overarching Russian geostrategy: China is simply too proud of its own recent
success for that. And, despite their troubles, Russia's leaders at present appear incapable
of accepting a real strategic partnership in which Russia cannot portray itself convincingly
as a senior partner.
Russian and Chinese leaders themselves have suggested on a number of occasions
that they regard existing, confrontational models of alliance or partnership as outmoded.
Commenting on discussions with the Chinese in July 1994, Russian Defense Minister
Grachev said
that he had discussed setting up an Asian-Pacific system of collective
security with his Chinese counterpart. Grachev would only say that
this system of collective security would not be the same as European
structures....
15
In fact, Grachev expanded on this theme during 1995 consultations with the Chinese,
proposing a "Northeast Asian security system that would include Russia, the United
States, China, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea." 16 Suisheng Zhao, discussing the
Chinese strategic view of the international situation at the end of the Cold War, cites a
19
number of Chinese analysts who identify the goal of Chinese diplomacy as a multipolar
system.
17 As Bonnie Glaser pointed out in 1996,
I don't think anybody in Beijing is seriously considering any kind of strategic
collaboration with Moscow against the U.S.. Chinese interlocutors admit
that close cooperation with Moscow is designed in part to get Washington's
attention.
18
Ambivalence regarding the formation of alliances reflects a theme in international relations
theory that is outside the realist paradigm. Michael D. Wallace noted in 1979 that
alliances rarely bring security: "most of the evidence seems to be against those who see
military alliances as necessary to peace, and on the side of those who see them as a
danger." 19 As historical evidence appears to demonstrate that alliances are not conducive
to security, a trend away from such arrangements can be expected.
There has also been considerable criticism of the "strategic triangle" model as a
tool for analyzing U.S. -China-Russia relations. The most obvious problem is that Russia
is no longer the Soviet Union, and that it no longer has the same ideological and
geostrategic imperatives, nor the resources to pursue them. Dittmer noted in 1992 that,
even in its heyday, the triangular model was subject to challenges on at least two related
counts: that the triangular relationship was not of strategic centrality to the world system,
and that the distribution ofpower among the three sides was unequal. 20 At least two
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other criticisms of this model appear applicable in the late 1990s. First, the orientation
and focus of the Chinese and Russian military forces is predominantly internal, making
them poor candidates for partnership in a competitive international security model.
Second, by other measures of national security—such as economic ties—China's integration
with the West is far stronger than with Russia. Although realist theory might dismiss
economic relations as marginal or irrelevant to the real (i.e., military) security concerns of
state governments, China and Russia have no illusions regarding the cogency of the
relationship between economic performance and the security of the state.
The realist interpretation of international relations arose in response to the
perceived failings of an earlier approach, the idealist school. While this school fell out of
favor because of its association with the League ofNations and other failed efforts to
reform the society of nations after World War I, many idealist concepts regained
popularity with the collapse of antagonistic international structures at the end of the Cold
War. For the purposes of this chapter, three characteristics of this "neo-idealism" or
"neo-liberalism" seem particularly appropriate to consideration of the Russo-Chinese
relationship.
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First, idealism held that flawed international arrangements such as secret treaties
and alliances were largely responsible for World War I. By making diplomacy an open
and organized practice through such institutions as the League of Nations, it was hoped
that the causes of war could be undone. In the United States, a reborn faith in the
potential efficacy of international institutions accompanied the end of the Cold War, with
U.S. presidents and others calling for greater activism by and reliance upon the United
Nations. To adherents of this stream of idealism, persistent alliances in the post-Cold War
world (such as NATO) are sometimes seen as die-hard remnants of a confrontational
order. In this view, the prospect of a new alliance between China and Russia is a troubling
indicator that the world is again slipping away from the promise of international peace and
security.
Second, idealism in both its early and late twentieth-century variants may take
either a system- or state-level approach. As the editors of Classic Readings of
International Relations put it,
There were, of course, differences of emphasis: where some idealists
focused on the organization of the international system, others believed that
the nature of states was crucial. Members of this latter group believed that
democracies were inherently less aggressive and less likely to go to war
than authoritarian states.
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This was perhaps best reflected in Wilson's "Fourteen Points." It is a
belief, however, which finds many echoes in contemporary thinking. 21
This belief, substantiated by considerable research, is also reflected in Michael
Doyle's 1983 and later writings on "the democratic peace," which qualifies the finding of
peacefulness among democracies with the caveat, "if only with other democracies." 22 The
important application of this argument to the question of a Sino-Russian alliance is this:
developments within a state may be as powerful an influence in determining a state's
international behavior as its place within the international system.
Third, idealism holds that international relations depend largely upon advantages
that states perceive in cooperating with other states in the international system, whether to
achieve collective security or other goals. This aspect of the idealist interpretation raises
at least two questions regarding Sino-Russian relations: How well have China and Russia
realized their potential for mutual benefit; and has their pursuit of this benefit taken place
in coordination with or at the expense of their broader international relationships?
Subsequent chapters of this thesis will argue that cooperation has allowed for improve-
ments in the overall relationship, which conduces in a general way to pacification of a
formerly antagonistic and confrontational relationship. However, it is also argued that this
cooperation has developed at the expense of the two states' potential for building broader,
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more rational ties with the rest of the international community. This is especially evident
in the continued reliance on communist bloc-style countertrade arrangements between the
two states and in proclamations of a growing "security partnership" between the two sides
in response to NATO expansion and the perception ofUS. "containment" around China's
periphery.
How have these concepts contributed to the interpretation of Sino-Russian
relations in the 1990s? First, alliances are widely viewed within the idealist tradition as an
outmoded means of seeking national security. As has already been mentioned, there are
strong indications that Russian and Chinese leaders share this view. Second, factors
internal to states—whether social, political, or economic—can be powerful factors in a
state's international behavior. This suggests that a policy of rapprochement between
Russia and China may derive in large part from the perceived benefits of that
rapprochement to internal groups; factions, or organizations outside the context of
strategic considerations and national security policy. Third, Kantian cooperation might be
easily mistaken for alliance-building if rapprochement is seen only through the lens of
politico-military strategy. While these are largely normative findings and do not point to a
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particular prediction for the Sino-Russian relationship, they are worth bearing in mind in
considering the various types of cooperation discussed in this paper.
Cooperation among states is the subject of many case studies aimed at testing the
applicability of realist and neo-idealist principles. In Cooperation Among Nations:
Europe, America, and Non-TariffBarriers to Trade, Joseph Grieco describes the basic
distinction between the realist and neo-idealist (here termed "neo-liberal") schools on the
issue of international cooperation:
Neo-liberals argue that states find cooperation in mixed-interest situations
difficult to achieve primarily because of fears of cheating, and they suggest
that management of this cheating problem opens the way to successful
joint action. Realists argue that states are inhibited about cooperation in
such situations because of fears about cheating and, in addition, and in
greater or lesser measure, because of fears about relative achievements of
gains. From a realist viewpoint, if the problem either of cheating or of
relative gains arises but is not resolved, cooperation is likely to fail. 23
This paper does not represent a good test of these precepts because cooperation
between two states is not the global, institutional cooperation that neo-idealists argue can
provide assurances against cheating. However, the simpler question ofhow suspicions of
cheating work to limit cooperation is clearly relevant to the prospects for continued
growth in bilateral cooperation, and will be discussed in the conclusion of this paper,
drawing relevant examples from the various forms of cooperation discussed herein.
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Another school of thought on Sino-Soviet relations that emerged during the early
years of the Cold War was ideologically-based. In this interpretation, communist ideology
was first seen as a systemic force which bound the Soviet and Chinese states to one
another, not only for purposes of national security but across all functions of a monolithic
international communist movement. For a time, communist ideology did appear to serve
as a powerful force binding these two states together, but its greatest usefulness to
scholars as an explanatory factor came during the development and flourishing of the
Sino-Soviet split from 1960 onward. In a reversal of its function in the 1950s as a
factor guaranteeing the longevity of close strategic cooperation between the two
sides, ideology was reinterpreted to serve as a causal factor yet again in the 1960s,
this time as the fundamental source of growing enmity between the two sides. The two
most often-cited examples of this reversal are the disagreement between the Chinese and
Soviet party leaderships in the late 1950s over the communist movement's role in Third
World revolution and the outright attacks, first against the Soviet Embassy in Beijing, then
against Soviet territory, during the Cultural Revolution. At this point, ideological
distinctions had become a dominant factor at the state level, making foes of erstwhile
allies.
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Ideology has also done service as an explanatory factor in theories seeking to
explain Chinese and Russian territorial behavior vis-a-vis one another. Many authors have
argued that Sino-Russian relations are best understood (even during the Soviet period) as
a series of clashes between the Chinese and Russian national projects of territorial
expansion. In his 1995 book, The Difficult Border, Alexei D. Voskressenski points out
that Russian and Chinese social scientists and historians have sustained contradictory
models of bilateral relations in which each side blames the voracious land hunger and
duplicitous dealings of the other for the many conflicts between them. Each side assigns a
hostile ideology to the other to explain the historical pattern of confrontation. It is only in
the 1990s, he argues, that these neighbors have begun to "reject most of the ideological
deformations and misunderstandings regarding their history that developed over the
years."
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How does ideology work as an explanation of the 1990s relationship? The short
answer appears to be that it cannot explain much. Most obviously, ideological affinity is
not responsible for the perceived rise in Russo-Chinese security cooperation in the 1990s.
There is a consensus that, barring a dramatic change in the political orientation of one or




rejection of the Marxist-Leninist political program, so painful for China to watch, should
be sufficient to rule out the emergence of a shared ideology in the foreseeable future.
Failing that, the lessons of their last attempt to subordinate differences to the imperative of
a world revolutionary mission should hinder the growth of a shared vision In assessing
the prospects for relations with China, Russian analysts tend to speak, like their Western
counterparts, about the limits of cooperation between states with fundamentally different
orientations.
Some authors have argued that ideology played an important role in bringing the
Soviet Union and China back together at the end of Soviet rule. Nguyen, for example,
points out in a 1 993 article that it was conservative communists in Moscow that pushed
hardest at the close of the Soviet era for a strategic alliance with China. 26
More importantly, it appears that—at least in terms of bilateral relations—the most
significant ideological influence in both China and Russia in the 1990s is probably
nationalism. This nationalist reawakening takes at least two forms in both countries:
nationalism propagated by political leaders as a means of forging state unity; and
"bottom-up" nationalism spontaneously generated through historical processes and deeply
fixed in the minds of a nation's people, whether or not that "nation" exists as a state in the
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modern world. At the level of political elites, the first form of nationalism was evoked by
Deng Xiaoping during Gorbachev's 1989 visit to Beijing as a way of clearing accounts
with the Soviet Union:
Mao's Soviet policy, stripped of its relationship to the repudiated leftward
shift of the late 1950s, would then benefit regime legitimacy by resonating
with the powerful—and popular—currents of twentieth-century nationalism.
Mao the nationalist, rather than Mao the Marxist ideologue, clearly served
his successors' political need to associate their regime with the Communist
Party's success in making China a respected global power. It was this
aspect ofMao's Soviet policy to which Deng and his colleagues sought to
make themselves heir in their meetings with Mikhail Gorbachev. 27
In both China and Russia, this "twentieth-century nationalism" retains considerable
force at the end of the century. In China, state-sponsored nationalism has found
expression in such works as the popular 1995 book China Can Say No, an "ultra-
nationalist bestseller" that calls for a xenophobic rejection of foreign influence and
confrontation in response to U.S. pressure. 28 In Russia, a resurgent nationalism, freed
from the political constraints required to maintain the Soviet Union's multinational empire,
has emerged at the level of state politics. It has produced figures such as the ultra-
nationalist Zhirinovsky and plays upon traditional themes of empire and grand destiny to
mobilize citizens marginalized by the new Russia. While state-level nationalist politics
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function differently in these two countries, it is most likely in both cases to cause friction,
not amity, between them.
Popular nationalism is also problematic as a factor in Russo-Chinese relations
because both countries' frontier regions are largely populated by the same minority
peoples. The extensive lands occupied by these minorities represent a potential source of
conflict between Russia and China, since these two overland empires appear not to share a
unified or cooperative strategy for dealing with nationalist insurgencies in their abutting
territories. For example, there are ongoing efforts by Uigur nationalists—involving
strategies ranging from terrorism to the formation of pan-Uigur political organizations—to
establish an independent state comprising areas of western China and Asian Russia. This
nationalist activism has obvious implications for Chinese and Russian security, not least
because of the potential for violations of territorial sovereignty as the states attempt to
independently quash a transnational phenomenon.
B. DIRECT EVIDENCE: DECLARATIONS CONCERNING THE
RELATIONSHIP
If international relations theory does not offer convincing arguments about the
future of Sino-Russian security cooperation, the next field of inquiry would logically be
assertions by the leaders of the two countries regarding the relationship. What evidence is
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there in the verbal or written statements of Chinese and Russian leaders that an alliance
may be in the cards? Is there a commonality in the views expressed by the two sides
regarding the prospects for an alliance?
The simple answer appears to be that such direct evidence does not support the
hypothesis of an emerging bilateral alliance. The texts of formal agreements between the
two sides are not helpful, since every major bilateral agreement that might yield real
insight into the level of strategic cooperation obtaining between the two sides has been
kept secret. For example, S.C.M. Paine points out in her 1995 book, Imperial Rivals, that
the border agreement signed between China and Russia in 1991, perhaps the most
important document on territorial relations ever signed by the two countries, is treated by
both governments as a state secret:
Although the Chinese are currently in the process of negotiating boundary
protocols with the bordering former Soviet republics as well as with Rus-
sia itself, the contents of these agreements have remained secret, so it is
unclear to outsiders whether the key territorial disputes have actually been
resolved or whether both sides simply want to give that impression to the
rest of the world. 29
Post-summit declarations are similarly obscure, confirming no more than mutual
commitments not to target each other with strategic nuclear weapons, to pursue exchange
and cooperation "not targeted against any third country," and to reduce the numbers of
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troops on both sides of the common border. 30 Such security assurances and
confidence-building measures are not only a meager basis for any assertion of alliance
building; they also mirror in part arrangements that both countries have also made with the
United States.
Informal assertions of a possible alignment between the two sides are seen more
frequently, but they also frequently take the form of unreciprocated overtures. High-level
visits have been the usual background for these overtures, beginning as early as 1990
when Soviet Defense Minister Yazov reportedly "suggested that China and the Soviet
Union should enter into a strategic partnership against the West." 31 Chinese Foreign
Minister Qian Qichen reportedly observed in late 1992 that the current state of
Sino-Russian relations "rules out confrontation and at the same time does not rule out an
alliance." 32 Russian Foreign Minister Grachev, referring to the planned expansion of
NATO, recently observed that "ifNATO goes east, we will go east too," an obvious
assertion that Russia "could use China as a counterbalance." 33
While they may appear to represent evidence of willingness on both sides to work
toward an alliance-like relationship, these remarks should be viewed in their proper
context. First, these assertions are generally unilateral in nature, and are rarely expressed
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as a common goal. When they are described as a mutual undertaking--as in a summit
communique-they typically refer to a "security partnership," a term that Yeltsin also used
at a March 1997 summit with President Clinton to refer to the U.S. -Russian relationship.
Second, a close reading of Russian press accounts dealing with Yeltsin's visits to Beijing
reveals a distinct pattern, at least prior to 1996: while the Russian leader has invariably
brought with him proposals of greater security cooperation, these have typically been
received with indifference by Chinese authorities. For example, during his December 1992
visit to China, Yeltsin reportedly broached the idea of a nonaggression pact between the
two countries. The Chinese responded that their "current diplomatic practice rules out the
signing of such far-reaching agreements." The two sides compromised on a much weaker
and less binding declaration. 34 The 1996 Yeltsin-Jiang summit in Beijing did result in
mutual recognition of a security partnership between the two countries but, as already
noted, this is the same term that Moscow uses for its security relations with Washington.
All of this suggests most strongly that representations of a Sino-Russian "security
partnership" are actually most useful to the two sides as a form of propaganda directed at
a third party, the United States. It allows Russia and China to "play" one another as a
geostrategic "card" against Washington, but this does not mean that the two are actually
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moving toward an alliance. Russia may well hope that, as NATO expands toward Russia's
western borders, the appearance of growing Russian security cooperation with China will
be seen in Washington as a sign that the West's expansion of Cold War institutions is not
without costs. From China's perspective, a perceived effort by the United States to
"contain" the PRC can best be answered with a demonstration that Beijing has its own
worrisome options.
Perhaps the strongest argument that neither Moscow or Beijing is serious about a
military alliance with the other is that foreign policy-making in both capitals is subject to
powerful contradictory influences. This was stated succinctly for the Russian case by
Eugene and Natasha Bazhanov in a January 1994 article:
Russia frowned at the Chinese 1 993 nuclear test , and while it stepped up
its sale of conventional weapons (e.g., fighter planes, tanks) to China, the
Kremlin paid more attention to complaints from various quarters and
pledged "not to allow things to go back to the old days when the U.S.
armed Taiwan and Russia armed the PRC." And Russia determined not
to allow itself to be drawn into any kind of alliance with China, but this
posed no problems as the Chinese did not want to jeopardize relations
with other countries by moving too close to Moscow. 35
For the foreseeable future, Russian foreign policy will continue to be the product of many
varied political perspectives, probably preventing it from becoming overly committed to
and entangled with China. Although its foreign policy-making process is not subject to
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the same levels of internal dissension and press criticism as in Russia, Beijing too has
varied interests, many of which it is probably not willing to sacrifice for the questionable
return on a security pact with Moscow.
C. ANALYTIC ASSESSMENTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP
In the absence of a sound theoretical or authoritative empirical basis for asserting
that a Russo-Chinese alliance is emerging, what have security analysts had to say about
the relationship and on what basis have they offered assessments of the relationship's
development? In the early 1990s, especially in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's
collapse, a number of analyses posited the emergence of a multipolar world system to
replace the bipolar system of the previous forty years. As Suisheng Zhao put it,
it may be asserted that because the multipolar system is its goal, Beijing
'perceives' it. Beijing has in fact perceived a unipolar reality in the post-
Cold War era and has accommodated to it while also working hard to
keep open all options and to encourage multipolarity. 36
In this country, predictions of a multipolar system were offered to some extent as a
corrective to self-congratulatory declarations of victory in the Cold War. Events also
contributed to a sense that the unipolar crown to which the United States fell heir in 1991
would not rest long or easily upon her head. NATO, the country's most important
overseas military commitment, was suddenly a security organization in search of a threat.
35
Portrayals of Japan as the rising power of the next century placed the future of U.S.
economic pre-eminence in doubt. And resistance in many quarters to a U.S. role as
policeman of the "new world order" appeared to point to a future in which the United
States would be just one player among many.
During the first years of the 1990s, as security analysts sought to regain their
footing in a reordered international environment, the Sino-Russian relationship was
generally viewed as a continuation of the gradual warming seen over the last years of the
Sino-Soviet relationship. In year-end assessments of the bilateral relationship in 1992 and
1993, the Bazhanovs discussed increasing trade in military technology, strengthening
economic ties, and improvements in territorial issues as aspects of the relationship distinct
from the possibility for strategic cooperation. 37
Shortly thereafter, however, two themes began to emerge that have characterized
scholarship on the Sino-Russian relationship ever since. The first, exemplified by
Nguyen's March 1993 article, "Russia and China: The Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo," 38
argued that China and Russia were made natural allies by Russia's reversals in Europe and
China's perception of U.S. pressure in Asia. Although borrowing its model from an earlier
period in the century, this argument appears to owe a great deal to the same realist
36
"balance of power" model that informed "triangular" thinking in the 1970s and later. The
second theme was an increasing analytic emphasis on the significance of cooperation
between Russia and China in various fields. For example, in year-end surveys of Russia's
activities in Asia for 1994 and 1995, Tsuneo Akaha highlighted economic relations,
military technology, and progress on territorial issues as the central pillars of the
relationship. In the latter survey, Akaha explicitly related these areas of cooperation to
the future of the strategic relationship, noting that disputes over territory and trade were,
at least for the time being, retarding the progress of the "security partnership." 39
Many analyses have related progress in these three facets of the bilateral
relationship to the prospects for alliance-building. A 1994 article by Gerald Segal on
Chinese regionalism draws the connection between cooperation and security relations as
early as the 1980s: "Well before the Soviet Union collapsed, Sino-Soviet economic
relations were leading a developing detente."40 In a December 1994 article, Sheldon
Simon found evidence for a potential alliance in both territorial and military technology
cooperation, arguing that China might be
moving toward a new, nonideological alliance with Russia - a process that
may already have begun as the two countries have recently negotiated a
treaty that sharply limits the number of troops stationed along their exten-
sive frontier. The two have also signed a five-year military cooperation
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agreement paving the way for the transfer of military technology to the
PRC. 41
Cooperative treaties and agreements between the two sides are treated as independent
variables in many analyses, driving the relationship forward toward strategic alignment. A
May 1996 Far Eastern Economic Review analysis argued that "the score of agreements
that were to be inked during Yeltsin's late April [1996] China tour lay the groundwork for
cooperation between China and Russia in a wide range of areas, cooperation that could
one day result in a shift in Asia's strategic balance."42 Even Nguyen's previously cited
article relates "steady movement toward a strategic alliance" in the late Soviet period to
"military cooperation ranging from arms sales and sharing arms technology to
coproduction of military hardware."43
The high tide in mutual cooperation claims has not subsided significantly through
the mid-1990s, and analyses that find correlates of alliance-building in various forms of
bilateral cooperation remain plentiful, even predominant, in the literature. It is natural for
observers to acknowledge claims by both sides to a "strategic partnership," and to seek
evidence for that partnership where it may be found in the overt channels of cooperation.
Responsible analyses must take account of indications that a future challenge to the
strategic balance in Asia is developing.
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What is not precisely defined in these analyses, however, is the mechanism by
which the strategic relationship is advanced toward alliance by cooperation in arms
technology, economic affairs, and greater territorial cooperation. It is the thesis of this
paper that such a mechanism does not exist, and that cooperative relations—if closely
studied and placed in an historical context—turn out to be no more than mutually beneficial
cooperation between two states with no real proclivity toward alliance-building. The
evidence for this thesis is taken up in the next three chapters.
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DDL. COOPERATION IN DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY
This chapter is a comparative study of Soviet cooperation in defense technology
with China in the 1950s and Russo-Chinese defense technology cooperation after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. It finds that the present cooperative relationship
is neither indicative of or conducive to a nascent security alliance between the two
countries; indeed, parallels with the dynamics of cooperative relations in the 1950s
strongly suggest that current technology cooperation may soon run up against its inherent
limits.
This chapter first examines Sino-Soviet defense technology exchange in the 1950s
from an historical perspective, establishing the parameters of the exchange relationship as
it developed from the Korean War era to the withdrawal of Soviet military assistance in
1960. In the course of describing the developments, events, and technologies of the 1950s
relationship, certain key features are highlighted which are particularly appropriate to
comparative analysis in the context of post-Soviet developments. Before examining the
post-Soviet period, the interim period of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s is reviewed,
primarily for the purpose of maintaining continuity in a longitudinal comparative study but
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also to provide necessary background for the takeoff of defense technology cooperation in
the 1990s.
At least with respect to sales and potential sales of weapon systems to China by
Russian interests, the exchange relationship of the 1990s is richly documented. Of greater
relevance to this study than the volumes and types of weapons involved, however, are the
discernible outlines of the relationship as a form of intergovernmental cooperation. In
order to examine this broad, basic question about the exchange relationship, cooperation
between the two sides is examined across a set of factors affecting its prospects:
- factors favoring, promoting, or allowing for further cooperation;
- factors unfavorable to or limiting such cooperation; and
- areas of debate over whether the outlook for the relationship is positive or
negative.
Following this assessment of the exchange relationship in the 1990s, the chapter
concludes with an analysis of comparable characteristics for the 1950s and 1990s
relationships. These characteristics are assessed with reference to the central questions of
this thesis: is Russo-Chinese cooperation durable, and is it conducive to the formation of
a bilateral alliance? The oceans of ink spilt over the last five years seeking to establish a
link between Russian arms sales and the possibility of an alliance with China make this
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limited area of inquiry a legitimate one for seeking at least partial confirmation or rejection
of the alliance hypothesis. 1
A. THE 1950S RELATIONSHIP: DEFENSE COOPERATION ON A
MASSIVE SCALE
"...the most comprehensive technology transfer in modern industrial history"2
In discussing Soviet defense technology cooperation with China during the 1950s,
it is important to recognize that this cooperation was not entirely new in the history of
Sino-Soviet relations in the 20th century. Within the framework of the Communist
International (Comintern) organization, the Soviet Union had provided military aid to the
Chinese Nationalists—rivals of the Chinese Communists since the 1920s~for decades as
part of a policy of support to "national bourgeois" movements. This assistance, along
with the tactical decisions of Soviet advisors that contributed to the Shanghai massacre of
Chinese communists in 1927, 3 laid the groundwork for latent resentment by the victorious
Chinese communists in 1949. However, as James C. Bowden observes in an article on
Soviet military aid to the Nationalists, this earlier aid relationship served Soviet national
interests at the time, not least because of the favorable terms of payment that the Soviet
Union was able to establish. 4 During the first year of the subsequent Soviet-PRC
relationship—that is, before Chinese entry into the Korean war—the USSR provided the
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new Chinese government with older, generally outmoded Soviet and Japanese equipment
that remained in the Chinese theater of operations following World War II. A number of
authors point out that this marginally useful assistance reflected a pattern of ambivalence
in the overall relationship: while costing the Soviets almost nothing, the obsolete weapons
did serve a symbolically useful function as a gesture of fraternal benevolence. 5
Raymond Garthoff, in an article on Sino-Soviet military relations during the first
two decades after the end ofWorld War II, notes that China's entry into the Korean War
was the starting point for transfers of modern Soviet weapons to the Chinese. One of the
most important characteristics of the arms transfer arrangements between the two
countries during this period, Garthoff argues, was that the Chinese were compelled to
purchase Soviet arms at considerable cost, especially to a Chinese economy in the midst
of reconstruction. 6 Such arrangements were to allow the Soviet Union to maintain a
certain degree of control over Chinese defense technology throughout the 1950s. As
Garthoff states:
The Russians could not directly prevent the Chinese Communists from
building their own military industry, but they could withhold their assis-
tance while arguing that it was more economical to buy Soviet-
produced weapons. And, by saddling them with outlays as heavy as they
could bear, the Russians further held back the Chinese from building an
independent military establishment. 7
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However, it is also true that production capability was transferred to China by the
Soviet Union in the early 1950s:
The modernization and mechanization of the Chinese armed forces
continued after the armistice of July 27, 1953, which ended the war.
The Chinese produced heavy artillery and tanks copied from Soviet
models, and later began producing MiGs under Soviet license, whilst
the small Chinese navy was equipped with submarines, at first supplied
by the USSR and later produced in China. 8
The defense technology assistance which the Soviet Union provided China in the
Korean War era is generally regarded as a crucial ingredient in the Stalinist formula of
using China as a proxy to confront the United States, as described in the recent book by
Goncharov, Lewis, and Xue, Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War. 9
These authors—and Harry Schwartz in his previously cited work—argue that the heavy
sacrifices undertaken by the Chinese in this war effort were made particularly onerous by
the increasing dependency on expensive Russian military support which these sacrifices
entailed; Soviet demands for repayment of wartime loans were particularly irksome when
China saw itself as having fought alone in Korea on behalf of the international socialist
movement.
It can be argued that the post-war period saw the overall defense technology
relationship moving from a one-sided aid program to greater actual cooperation as defense
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technology began to flow to the Soviet Union from China. Garthoff notes that top
Chinese atomic specialists were employed at the atomic research center at Dubna on
behalf of the Soviet nuclear program until 1965. 10 As already mentioned, "Moscow's
position was that China could have what it paid for" 11 in terms of defense technology.
This mercantilist stance expanded to the overall economic relationship between the two
countries, as the Soviets not only reduced their exports to the Chinese in favor of Eastern
Europe after the mid-1950s but at the same time kept pressure on the Chinese to repay
previous Soviet loans through increased exports. The Chinese were thus indirectly
providing the Soviet Union with some of the resources it needed to meet its increased
commitments in Eastern Europe. 12 Finally, Lewis and Xue point out in China Builds the
Bomb that "the Chinese were major suppliers ofboth lithium and beryllium to the Soviet
Union" in addition to operating uranium mines on behalf of the Soviet nuclear program. 13
Looking at the conventional weapons technologies involved in the Soviet
assistance program at its height in the mid-1950s, GarthofF suggests that the flow of
modern Soviet weapons actually began to taper off during this period, partly because
target strength levels had been reattained by the Chinese in the wake of Korean War
losses, but also because Chinese production capabilities were maturing. For example, the
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first Chinese-manufactured jet fighters were flown in September 1956. 14 During this
period of close cooperation, such Chinese capabilities were seen on both sides as
contributing to overall Soviet bloc strength. By the mid-1950s, Garthoff notes, the
Soviet "military mission in Beijing turned to problems of production facilities in more
modern armaments." 15 As Khrushchev would later complain with reference to Chinese
disgruntlement over not receiving its promised prototype of an atomic bomb:
All the modern weaponry in China's arsenal at the time was Soviet-made
or copied [from the Soviet Union]. We'd given them tanks, artillery, air-
craft, naval, and infantry weapons. Virtually our entire defense industry
had been at their disposal." 16
During this period, the authors of China and the Soviet Union point out, a "joint
commission of Soviet and Chinese technicians and scientists would meet at least twice a
year to discuss Soviet technical aid to China." 17 In addition, an April 1956 agreement to
build 55 new factories in China based on Soviet technology brought to over 200 the
number of such cooperative ventures, many in dual-use (i.e., military and civilian)
technologies.
Turning to Sino-Soviet cooperation in nuclear technology during this period, there
were both open and secret covenants on nuclear exchange. A 1955 agreement outlined a
program of cooperation in fissile materials, equipment, training and experimental reactors
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that was geared to the establishment of a nuclear industry in China.
18 As already noted, a
material quid-pro-quo involving Chinese mineral resources was an essential if unpublicized
aspect of this agreement. In a secret "New Defense Technical Accord," dated October 15,
1957, the Soviet Union promised to provide China with the requisite technology to
produce an atomic bomb as well as a prototype device and nuclear missile technology. 19
This agreement proved to be chiefly significant for its abrogation less than two years later.
Khrushchev describes the Soviet decision to renege on its commitment in a highly
dramatic fashion:
[Soviet] specialists suggested we give the Chinese a prototype of the
atomic bomb...They put the thing together and packed it up, so it was
ready to send to China. At that point our minister in charge of nuclear
weapons reported to me. He knew our relations with China had
deteriorated hopelessly... In the end we decided to postpone sending
them the prototype. 20
This famous episode in Sino-Soviet relations is particularly interesting from the
perspective of defense technology cooperation, for many of the factors that affected the
decision to provide the atomic bomb to China and the subsequent Soviet repudiation of
the decision are relevant to the patterns of technology exchange in the 1990s, as I will
demonstrate at the end of this paper. For now, it is necessary only to examine—as many
authors have done—the Soviet rationale for first offering, then not providing the weapon.
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Why did the Soviet leadership agree to provide the Chinese with an atomic bomb?
First, as argued by Lewis and Xue, the Soviet Union had reason to be confident that the
Chinese were following the Soviet military's doctrinal shifts toward an emphasis on the
possibility of a nuclear conflict with the United States. 21 Furthermore, they argue,
The parallel developments in Sino-Soviet doctrines reflected another reality,
the growing cooperation between the Soviet and Chinese military establish-
ments, and the broader Chinese campaign to learn from the Soviet Union.
The toll of the Korean War provided the fundamental motivation for that
cooperation. The convergence and articulation of security interests between
the two Communist powers in turn profoundly influenced the Kremlin's
decisions to support the Chinese nuclear program. 22
At the same time, they note, the Chinese Academy of Sciences was becoming
thoroughly integrated into the Soviet military scientific and technical system, reinforcing
the doctrinal convergence described above. 23
Second, it is frequently pointed out that Soviet Politburo politics made
Khrushchev—engaged during this period in a struggle from which he would emerge as
paramount Soviet leader—anxious to secure Chinese support within the international
communist movement, especially in light of the 1956 turmoil in Eastern Europe. At least
one Chinese involved in his country's nuclear program at the time suggests that
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Khrushchev became "more flexible on the matter of giving sophisticated technical aid to
China" at just this time. 24 As Alice Hsieh suggests, the 1957 struggle within the Soviet
Party Presidium may have made it necessary to appease a pro-China faction within the
Soviet leadership for a time. 25
Third, Lewis and Xue argue, the Chinese believed that the importance of their
contributions to the Soviet nuclear program placed pressure on Moscow to reciprocate
with nuclear weapon technology: "For example, further advances in the Soviet nuclear
program depended on obtaining uranium ores from China, and to get those ores the
Soviets, in the winter of 1955-56, had pledged unofficially to provide China with full-scale
assistance." 26
Why, then, did the Soviets repudiate this agreement? Of course, many of the
circumstances under which the offer of nuclear weapon technology was originally made
had changed within a matter of months. For example, the crisis in Eastern Europe and
Khrushchev's vulnerability within the Politburo had diminished considerably. More
generally, it appears that the Soviet leadership had come to the conclusion that the benefits
of fulfilling this agreement were far too potentially costly to Russia's national security.
For example, in the formal notification issued to the Chinese Party's Central Committee in
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mid- 1959, the Soviet Party cited the current negotiations on a test ban in Geneva in
explaining why it would not supply the bomb or relevant technical data. 27 In fact,
Khrushchev's desire for better relations with Washington and his proposal of an Asian
nuclear free zone are seen as signs that Khrushchev was looking for ways to step back
from confrontation with the United States, possibly at Chinese expense. 28
Another possible factor in the Soviet decision was a recognition that the earlier
perceived convergence of Chinese and Soviet doctrine had turned out to be a mirage.
Soviet proposals of a joint naval command and air defense system had been rejected by the
Chinese, 29 as had proposals for a Soviet radio station on Chinese soil for communicating
with Soviet submarines in the Pacific. 30 Some Western authors suggest that the two sides
also had a falling-out over command and control arrangements for nuclear weapons which
the Soviet Union had proposed placing on Chinese soil. 31
Another possible explanation is that a shift occurred in Soviet thinking about the
relationship with China at about this time. As the need for Chinese support receded in the
Soviet calculus, serious concerns about the dangers of strategic cooperation with the
Chinese came to the fore. There was a growing concern about the "bellicose tendencies of
China's foreign policy." 32 On a practical level, GarthofF points out, "Soviet leaders in the
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latter half of the 1950s were torn between wishing to improve relations with China and
seeking to prevent Chinese acquisition of nuclear and other advanced weapons." 33
Schwartz notes that in 1963 when the Soviets responded to Chinese accusations of
duplicity in promising but failing to deliver nuclear weapons technology, they adopted
both implicit and explicit lines of argument. The implicit line clearly involved fears that
the Chinese might use the bomb against the Soviet Union or to initiate a general
conflagration. The explicit line invoked a number of arguments against Chinese
acquisition of nuclear weapons: the undesireability of nuclear proliferation, China's
inability to produce "safe" stockpiles, China's need to develop its economy first, and an
argument that China should rely on the Soviet Union's nuclear umbrella. 34
In any event, Sino-Soviet cooperation in defense technology—both conventional
and nuclear—was dead by the summer of 1960. In a "drastic, sudden, and virtually
complete" cessation of all technical aid, 35 Soviet technicians were withdrawn from China
en masse. This withdrawal was both preceded and accompanied by a programmatic denial
of technical information aimed, in the Chinese view, at maintaining "a considerable gap
between China and the Soviet Union in scientific research on the development ofnew
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types of weapons and military equipment." 36 The Soviet Union would not again share its
weapon systems technologies with China for another 30 years.
B. THE INTERIM PERIOD (1960-1990)
In the absence of Soviet aid over the next three decades, the Chinese defense
industry did not, of course, languish in inactivity. Despite its relative isolation, the
Chinese military-industrial complex remained dynamic and innovative. Part of its ability to
survive and develop through the disastrous effects of the Great Leap Forward and the
Cultural Revolution was its massive size and differentiation: perhaps part of the legacy of
the decade of Soviet aid in the 1950s was the development of an industrial economy that,
despite China's poverty, was complete, producing a full range of industrial goods. This
extended to defense technology, where China fulfilled its own requirements and met
international market requirements for many types ofweaponry, although certainly not in
either case at an optimal level from the perspective of Chinese interests.
Still, in the absence of an exchange relationship with the Soviet Union, China's
defense technology certainly suffered. First, there were the galling developments that
accompanied the end of cooperation with Moscow: the Soviet Union, after denying
MiG-21 technology to the Chinese, provided India—China's bete noire in the early
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1960s—with a MiG-21 factory. Also during this period, the Soviet Union sold cruisers,
TU-16 bombers, and missiles to another of China's regional neighbors, Indonesia. 37
Second, as already noted, Chinese economic and political campaigns took a heavy toll on
the performance of its defense industry. During the 1960s, China pursued a "People's
War" doctrine that called for "luring the enemy deep" within China, where "Third Line"
defense industries in remote parts of the country would provide the decisive advantage to
guerrilla forces, reprising the Chinese Communists' successful war of liberation. In
practice, writes Carol Lee Hamrin, this ill-advised program "required an enormous
expenditure of political and financial capital. In retrospect, it could be seen as detrimental
to both security and development goals." 38 Unlike the Soviet Union, which some would
argue was a middling economy progressively impoverished by its military build-up, China
has been throughout virtually its entire history an exceptionally poor country in which
autarkic development strategies effectively short-circuited economic development, this
despite technological progress that was in some fields consonant with world standards.
There is considerable evidence to the effect that, despite the cessation of Soviet
defense technology cooperation in 1960, there remained in China's large defense
establishment numerous factors and influences favorable to a renewal of the inactive
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relationship. As Harold Hinton wrote in the 1960s at the height of Sino-Soviet hostility.
"Some elements of the Chinese military, possibly to the displeasure of their civilian
colleagues, might be interested in obtaining spare parts for military equipment, particularly
jet fighters that had been acquired from the Soviet Union in earlier years." 39
More significantly, China was at the same time acquiring some Soviet weapon
systems (for example, the MiG-21) from other Soviet arms customers. This practice
allowed for the development of many Chinese systems that were closely related in whole
or in part to contemporary Soviet arms technology. As Edmond Dantes observes in a
1992 article on the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF): "The PLA, having
stopped procuring Russian military hardware since the Sino-Soviet rift in the early 1960s,
has nevertheless continued reverse engineering Russian weapons which it has been
procuring clandestinely from Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq, and now Iran, and is therefore
well-positioned to induct the newer Russian weapons that it is scheduled to procure in the
near future."
40
It must be noted that technical upgrades to a basic MiG-21 airframe, such
as advanced avionics, can elevate its performance to fairly current levels. However,
despite Chinese procurement of systems from many countries for integration into its
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MiG-21 -derived and indigenous aircraft designs, its own capacity for developing such
advanced subsystems remained weak from 1960 to 1990.
Preconditions for the renewal of defense technology cooperation on the Chinese
side included the ascension ofDeng Xiaoping, who as early as the mid-1970s identified
China's primary national goal as modernization, highlighting defense modernization as one
of the four essential elements of his development plan. Even though the military aspects
of the modernization process were pursued at a lower priority than the agricultural and
industrial aspects, the inclusion of defense as a national focus for modernization saw
immediate results in the openness with which Chinese specialists "went shopping" for
modern technology in the West. Although not as well-publicized, Bin Yu has pointed out
that there was a growing Soviet component in the Chinese defense procurement program
during the 1980s: "Even without official relations between the two military forces, China
reportedly bought arms worth U.S. $310 million from the Soviets between 1982 and
1986, almost four times the amount spent on arms purchases from the U.S."41
Finally, it should be pointed out that military technology has been characterized by
some scholars as a major avenue of rapprochement between the Chinese and Soviets in the
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late 1980s. As Hung P. Nguyen argues in a retrospective on the growth of Sino-Soviet
cooperation during this period:
After the 28th Party Congress, Soviet policy toward China became more
and more a reflection of the rearguard battle by Gorbachev and Shevard-
nadze to beat back and slow down the steady movement toward a strategic
alliance with China instigated by conservative opponents. Even before the
Congress, Sino-Soviet relations had taken a disturbing turn in the direction
of closer military cooperation...By September 1990 negotiations were
underway for the sale to China of advanced Soviet aircraft such as the
SU-27 Flanker. 42
In fact, the purchase of 26 Su-27s in 1992 is one of the few Sino-Russian arms
deals that have actually come to fruition in the post-Soviet period (See Table 3.1). This
point is important to bear in mind when assessing the significance of defense technology
cooperation as a reflection of progress toward a security alliance. Great interest has been
generated within the security community by proposed (or rumored) high-technology arms
transfers to China from Russia, including aircraft carriers and all types of fighter planes.
These Sino-Russian "deals" have so far produced far more discussion in the West than
actual movement by the principals. This suggests that the "burgeoning alliance" to which
these deals are tied in cause-and-effect relationships may in fact be similarly insubstantial.
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Table 3.1: The PLA's Purchases from Russia in the Post-Soviet Era43
(From Ron Montaperto, "China as a Military Power," in National Defense
University Strategic Forum, No. 56, December 1995, p. 3.)
Aircraft Su-27 Bought 26 in 1992, with up to 25 more to
follow
Ilyushin Transports Purchased 10
Naval Kilo-Class Submarines Imported one in 1995, at least three more
on order
Missiles Air Defense Imported the S-300 air defense system
(about 100 missiles) in 1993
An even less knowable value, but one still deserving of consideration, is the extent
to which Russian defense technology is being shared outside official or semiofficial
channels. Russian press reports from the first half of the 1990s have decried the siphoning
offby China of top scientists from Russian defense research institutes. In some cases,
Chinese employment of Russian specialists is alleged to involve electronic transfer of
technical data from the desktop computers of scientists still working at Russian institutes 44
Although this gray- or black-market trade in Russian defense technology is impossible to
gauge accurately—and, as unofficial trade, is beyond the scope of this paper—it is easy to
see that no more than a few well-placed scientists could, within a very short time, raise
the level of Chinese defense technology to equal Russia's. In any case, such exchanges are
62
likely to undermine rather than support the development of governmental security
cooperation.
C. COOPERATION IN THE 1990S: POSITIVE FACTORS
Turning now to the defense technology exchange relationship of the 1990s, it is
clear that many factors support the continuation and development of cooperation in this
field. First among these is China's primary practical motivation: by upgrading its weapon
systems to world standards, it dramatically improves its national security posture. As
Sheldon Simon pointed out in a 1994 essay, the PLAAF has, by dint of acquiring modern
Russian aircraft, "leaped two generations. When these forces become operational, China
will be able to dominate the airspace over the South China Sea against any of the littoral
states."
45 Put somewhat more broadly by Bin Yu in a 1993 essay, Sino-Russian military
cooperation offers enormous potential "for the PLA to elevate significantly its defense and
projection capabilities."46
An important aspect of this upgrading process is that transfers of complete Russian
weapon systems such as the Su-27 represent many subsystems, technology from each of
which is applicable—and applied—by the Chinese to many different planes in the PLAAF
inventory. These fleet-wide improvements also, of course, make Chinese weapons
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incorporating these advanced technologies more attractive and competitive on the world
arms market. Economically, it may also allow China to partially meet the development
challenge of moving from being a net technology importer to technology exporter status,
at least in military goods. This transition, however, is not likely to occur in the immediate
term, if it occurs at all.
47
A companion feature of the increased Chinese defense capability which these
Russian systems offer is their affordability. As Chinese traders have remarked on Russian
technology in general: "Russian goods are ugly, bulky, heavy, but very practical."48
Western equivalents to Russian weapon systems such as the Su-27s and Kilo-class
submarines, even if available to China, would be much more expensive than the cut-rate
prices at which Russian arms manufacturers are offering their products. A related factor is
that rising research and development costs for new weapon systems make it essential for
China to "leapfrog" whenever possible by acquiring cheap Russian defense technology. 49
Another factor facilitating the development of defense technology exchange is the
"genetic" relationship of Russian and Chinese weaponry. As mentioned earlier in this
paper and highlighted recently by a Russian observer, many Chinese "arms systems. ..were
developed on the basis of Soviet samples and are 'genetically' related." 50 Although the
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provenance of many Chinese systems cannot be so easily attributed, there is a general
accuracy to this observation. Both PLA aircraft and naval vessels show strong elements
of Russian heritage which make cooperation between Russian arms producers, design
facilities, and maintenance providers somewhat easier than in many countries that are
newcomers to the market in ex-Soviet arms. 51
The increasing sophistication of China's military system is another important factor
facilitating the Russo-Chinese arms transfer relationship. The modernization of tactics,
operations, and strategy in the PLA since the mid-1970s make it more similar to a modern,
professional military able to apply combined arms doctrine and, more relevantly to this
paper, successfully induct the appropriate weaponry. 52 In its military modernization
program, China has placed an emphasis on acquiring specialized capabilities consistent
with world-class defense capabilities, including "early warning and control, aerial
refueling, electronic warfare, large transport, and surveillance and reconnaissance" units. 53
Thus, the Chinese have both an unmet demand for advanced technology and the ability to
apply it quickly in an operational context.
Another aspect of this increasing sophistication that facilitates cooperation is
compatibility not just between weapon systems of similar "genetic" heritage, but also
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between Russian and Chinese advanced research and design establishments. Russian and
Chinese defense research institutes share a number of characteristics, not least of which is
a shared set of problems such as a worrisome loss of top scientists to foreign employment
and Western restrictions on high technology exports, which seem to move in lock-step for
these two countries. 54 Some Russian and Chinese institutes also rely on the same
computer-assisted design and manufacturing systems, 55 and enjoy that advantage of
interoperability and technology sharing that is so worrisome to Western software
designers: near-complete disregard for intellectual property rights. 56
Yet another aspect of increasing Chinese sophistication that favors the continued
growth of cooperation in defense technology is the PLA's down-sizing effort in the 1990s.
Higher levels of technology simultaneously drive, allow, and complement these force
reductions, creating a virtuous cycle in which the PLA is able to free funds previously
used to maintain large numbers of outmoded aircraft and ships in order to purchase a
smaller number of new systems that require fewer crew and service personnel. 57
Looking next at areas in which defense technology exchange serves both countries'
interests, there appears to be considerable potential for reciprocity and mutual advantage.
From the standpoint of China's international security strategy, the acquisition of advanced
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Russian technology allows China to reinvigorate through renewed weapon sales the
process of creating additional power centers (for example, in the Middle East). This
"multipolarization" process is regarded by some scholars as the hallmark of China's
strategy vis-a-vis U.S. strategic hegemony in the 1980s and 1990s. 58 Given the attention
paid to the Sino-Russian defense technology relationship in the West as a possible
harbinger ofrenewed military alliance, both countries perversely gain increased status in
the international community by virtue of concern expressed over their relationship in the
West, whether or not that relationship has any potential for broader security cooperation.
From Russia's perspective, China remains a bright spot in its post-Soviet
diplomacy, a situation that defense technology transfer has helped to create. Russia may
also perceive improvements in its international standing by virtue of a "special"
relationship with China that allows it to serve as an interlocutor for Western interests. As
one analyst writes of the Western response to defense technology cooperation, "the
reaction tends to be one of acceptance of any Russo-Chinese cooperation, especially if it
means that China will sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty." 59
On a more practical level, one defense analyst has pointed out that Russia has
followed a new arms sales policy in the post-Soviet period: "In order to capture external
67
markets, Russia is increasingly willing to break old patterns of arms supply and compete in
technology transfers as a means of ensuring minimal market share." 60 This author goes on
to cite an observation by then-Defense Minister Grachev that Russia's "sales push would
concentrate on products where Moscow believed it was more cost-effective than the
West." 61 At the same time, it appears that Russia and China will not necessarily compete
for identical markets. For example, Russia's exclusive defense technology arrangements
with India have left the Pakistan market for low-cost military aircraft largely open to
China. 62
The pattern cited in these passages is part of a larger set of interests posited by Bin
Yu in a previously cited article on Russo-Chinese military relations in the 1990s. From the
Russian perspective, he notes, selling hardware to keep Russian factories operating offers
temporary relief to a military-industrial complex in serious economic difficulty. Then, too,
with equipment reductions required to meet CFE treaty provisions, Russia was better off
selling than scrapping its large excess inventory of weapons. In addition, he notes, Bush
administration efforts to prevent proliferation ofRussian conventional weapons after the
disintegration of the Soviet Union only made the Russian defense establishment more
aggressive in its marketing.
68
From the Chinese perspective, Bin Yu suggests, several factors made a
Russo-Chinese defense technology relationship especially attractive. First, the GulfWar
had shown the limits of a doctrine that relied on low technology and massive manpower.
Second, the Chinese could use barter arrangements with Russia, an unusual situation in
the international market for high-technology weapons. Third, Russia's instability
prompted an effort to obtain arms and technologies quickly before the country could fall
apart.
63
What might China offer Russia in terms of true defense technology cooperation (as
opposed to arms sales characterized as "cooperation" for external consumption)? While
Chinese defense technology per se is seen to offer little to the Russian military-industrial
complex, many observers have suggested that there are bases from which true technology
cooperation could develop:
- Just as the Su-27 deal advanced China's defense technology, Russia stood to
make similar gains through the effective use of the proceeds from the deal as
well as defense conversion technologies from China;64
- Chinese defense technicians could reciprocate information-sharing and training
provided by their Russian counterparts by introducing to the Russians some of
the dual-use technologies acquired through technology transfer from the West;65
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- China's more advanced level of computer technology and more widespread
applications (including supercomputers and networking) offer potential for
reciprocal technology sharing;66
- China's experience in attracting overseas Chinese technical talent could provide a
useful model for Russian industry, although strong expatriate nationalism and
technological achievement within that community may not be advantages that
Russia enjoys to the same extent within its emigre community.
Finally, many observers have suggested that the opportunity provided by the
defense technology relationship to "teach the United States a lesson" is not an insignificant
element in the Sino-Russian rapprochement. From the Chinese perspective, acquiring
high-technology Russian systems gave the United States its comeuppance for the
niggardly and expensive defense technology program it had pursued with China in the
1980s and the suspension of the program after 1989. 67 The initial deal for the Su-27
aircraft in 1990 effectively communicated to the West that China has alternatives.
From a common outlook, both Russia and China benefit by demonstrating that
each has a powerful friend outside the West. In some ways, this commonalty of interest is
borne out by the development of technologies in the West that are equally threatening to
either country, such as the Theater High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system which
some see as the basis for Chinese interest in the Russian S300 air defense system. 68 Both
countries can also benefit through joint technology projects with other countries, such as
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an experimental thermonuclear reactor which they have agreed to develop with Iran and
India: such multilateral initiatives make it more difficult for the West to oppose sensitive
technology transfer deals. 69
D. COOPERATION IN THE 1990'S: NEGATIVE FACTORS
A host of factors militate against progress in the cooperative relationship, although
they appear—at least for the time being—to be outweighed by the strength of the dynamic
that is moving the relationship along. Among the arguments offered by various authors
on the potential limits and obstacles to continued cooperation, one of the most common
themes is that Russian surplus inventories ofweapons—especially those that China
wants—will dwindle over time. On the scale of the international system, Charles Ziegler
argues that Russian weapons may only be attractive for a short while:
...the increasingly costly process of producing sophisticated weaponry will
confer a natural monopoly position on the United States over the next
decade. Russia will become even more hard-pressed to compete success-
fully with the United States in the international arms trade. 70
China's procurement patterns may also begin to emphasize systems in which Russia
has no competitive advantage and may even lack competitive systems for export. For
example, a September 1995 article in the Asian Defense Journal points out that China is
focusing on advanced command and control system technology, computer-driven
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communications, artificial intelligence applications, and precision weapons. 71 China will
probably seek to develop much of this technology on its own, and will turn to
world-standard providers in the West for the transfer of dual-use technology to solve
crucial development problems.
Other aspects of this potential problem include the obviously limited future
prospects for some of the most highly-touted (but ultimately unconsummated) defense
technology "super-deals" between other republics of the former Soviet Union and China;
the obvious example is the long-discussed sale of the Ukrainian aircraft carrier Varyag,
which remains partially completed and decaying in Ukraine. More importantly, the
Chinese are purchasing weapon system components from so many sources in the
post-Cold War era—Germany, Israel, and Sweden are major suppliers of aircraft
technology—that Soviet technology is far less important to weapons upgrades than in the
past.
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Finally, to the extent that the Chinese are, as suggested earlier, obtaining design
data directly from Russian defense research institutes, they will be able to reduce the
Soviet technological lead very quickly.
Despite the ambitious modernization of the Chinese military described above, the
Chinese success story requires considerable qualification when discussing large,
72
high-technology integrated systems such as an aircraft carrier. Many observers have
focused on this particular weapon system as an example of how far China has yet to go
before it can be said to have a modern navy: Chinese analysts in particular focus on the
extremely high cost of a viable aircraft carrier group and how marginally useful it would
be to China's needs as a regional power. 73 In his assessment of Russo-Chinese military
cooperation, Bin Yu notes that
it will take several years before the PLAAF can adequately handle the
newly acquired weapons and technology from Russia. Although some
technology transfers will eventually give China a significantly stronger
military, it will require a long time for China's backward defense-related
industries to absorb, digest, and reproduce its own indigenous versions
of these advanced Russian arms74
Sheldon Simon rounds out this assessment of the prospects for a Chinese aircraft carrier
by noting that Chinese planning calls only for constructing relatively small Kiev-class
STOL (stationary take-off and landing) carriers, conservatively scheduled for completion
in 2005. This long lead-time, he argues, "reflects the absence of expertise for
carrier-based aircraft, antisubmarine protection, and phased-array radar ~ all of which
would be essential for a carrier group. 75
In more general terms, China may be unable to function effectively as a defense
technology partner for Russia because its technical level is judged to be at or above
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Russian standards in only a few areas and far behind Russia in most fields. As Scott
Parrish argues in an OMRI Analytical Brief:
Closer ties with China, then, are no substitute for trade with the more
developed West. For while China may provide a market for many
Russian products, it cannot supply the technology that Russia needs to
upgrade its industrial base and eventually claw its way back into the
first rank ofworld powers. 76
There is also considerable evidence that Russian sentiments toward China may
eventually make defense technology-sharing politically unpalatable. Suspicion that arms
deals are benefiting China far more than they benefit Russia have been a constant theme in
the Russian press in recent years, and has intensified unease over China already present
within the Russian leadership because of past enmity and historical resentment. In fact,
resentment over perceived Chinese ingratitude was clearly expressed not only by
Khrushchev in his previously cited memoirs of the 1950s relationship but by a Russian
academician describing China's arms program in 1995. He repeatedly asserts that China
could never have developed its arms industry without infusions of Soviet defense
technology. 77 Another such impediment, based on Russian national security concerns, is
the apparently real threat of defense technology espionage in Russia and the former Soviet
republics. A minor flap occurred in early 1996 when it was reported that Ukrainian
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authorities had expelled Chinese nationals from the country for attempting to acquire
SS-18 ICBM missile technology from on-site technicians at a plant in Dnipropetrovsk.
Although Ukraine officially discounted the seriousness of the incident, both Russian and
Ukraine were demarched by the U.S. State Department on the proliferation threat posed
by the potential transfer of this technology. 78
Another important inhibiting factor in the growth of the defense technology
exchange relationship from Russia's perspective may be the perceived perils of
competition with China in the international arms market. The simultaneous lifting of Cold
War-era controls on the export of computers and telecommunications equipment to both
China and Russia will free both countries to acquire and develop indigenous equivalents of
the latest-generation military equipment in these and related fields. 79 Given the
comparative advantage which both countries enjoy over the West in manufacturing costs,
it is quite likely that an economically rejuvenated Russia could go head-to-head with China
in marketing many similar defense products in the coming decades. 80 Competition
between the two countries for low-cost space launch services is a definite possibility for
the near future. 81 Many authors argue that the near future will also see sales competition
between these two countries in the very technologies that Russia is currently transferring
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to China, such as advanced aircraft. As Dantes argues in his article on the PLAAF
build-up: The PRC, having acquired the requisite technologies... for fulfilling its domestic
requirements and helping fill in the vital blanks in the R&D projects of some of its weapon
systems (such as avionics and metallurgical expertise [for] the B-7 and J-8 II), is likely to
emerge as the dominant weapons exporter in [the] Asia-Pacific... 82
Referring to the Su-27 deal, one Russian analyst points out the potential for
self-induced competition:
...the deal will enable the PRC to independently produce at least 40 Su-27
combat aircraft annually by the year 2000 (nothing prevents the customer
from quickly increasing this initial capacity). If production at that level is
reached, then, even if the Chinese make a more primitive version of the
plane, they can provide considerable competition for Russia in the combat
aircraft market. 83
Naturally, these observations—and many others included in this discussion of
potentially negative factors—contradict the contents of the previous section, which
detailed factors favorable to the development of the defense technology relationship. The
next section takes up the most important of these contradictions, those relating to the
potential for a long-term relationship supportive of broader security cooperation.
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E. ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS ON THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY
RELATIONSHIP
This section treats four general questions on the long-term viability of
Sino-Russian defense technology ties: a) How long will Russian goods remain attractive?
b) Is China a special customer? c) Is Russia withholding its most advanced technology
(and if so, what does this mean for the future of the relationship)? and d) How valuable is
Chinese technological expertise to Russia? These questions are argued positively or
negatively on the strength of the available evidence, with a summation at the end
evaluating the significance of these findings for the overall strategic relationship.
How Long Will Russian Goods Remain Attractive to China?
For quite some time.
As noted already in assessing the factors favorable to a growing relationship,
Russian defense technology exchanges with China do not just provide the latter with one
complex weapon system at a time: advanced weapon components such as the Su-27's
ZHUK airborne radar are usable in virtually every other aircraft of the huge PLAAF
inventory. 84 Long-term service contracts and upgrade arrangements for these systems
promise to be a particularly strong factor in keeping the exchange relationship going.
Then too, new Russian weapon designs are still pouring out, including fighter jets and
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other advanced systems that may hold Chinese interest for decades to come. 85 Moreover,
just as some countries are currently upgrading older aircraft such as the MiG-21 with
modern avionics and other systems, aircraft and ships sold to China now can probably be
kept from obsolescence for an extended period with similar upgrades. 86
Certain dynamics of the cooperative relationship also militate for the longevity of
that relationship. For example, at least one journal has noted negotiations between the
two sides on economic cooperation in the sale ofjointly developed defense products. One
such project may be the licensing of Russian subsystems for inclusion in the Chinese FC-1
export fighter.
87 The attractiveness of such joint development projects may be enhanced
by the comparative advantage of employing inexpensive Chinese labor in assembling the
systems, making Russian products even more "cost-efFective" vis-a-vis their Western
equivalents. China's ability to use barter trade in its payment schemes with Russia will
probably remain in effect for some time, giving China an advantage in the exchange
because of the value-added nature of many of the Chinese manufactured products
involved. 88 This will provide the Chinese with greater funds to purchase Russian arms
than they would otherwise have available.
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The simple availability of Russian weapon systems is another significant positive
factor in the relationship. Unlike many customers for Russian advanced arms, China has
no access to U.S. weapon systems. This fact, added to the "genetic" similarities of the
Russian and Chinese military-industrial complexes and Chinese satisfaction for the time
being with less than cutting-edge designs, makes the Russian and Chinese military systems
fit naturally with one another in a cooperative relationship. 89 Finally, the guarantees
offered to Russia's customers of continued servicing and upgrades (Russian design,
production, and sales bureaucracies are joint signatories to technology transfer
agreements) offer unprecedented assurance of parts and service for Russian products,
never a strong point of Soviet arms sales. 90
Is China a Special Customer?
It appears not.
Without detailing the extent to which Russia's arms sales to other countries around
its periphery resemble or exceed its defense technology relationship with China, it is
probably sufficient to point out several examples ofhow Russia is offering much the same
technology nearly everywhere. A 1994 account of "Russia's big arms sales drive" pointed
out that
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the poor state of the Russian economy and the poor impression of Soviet
weapons during the 1991 GulfWar has forced the Russian Government to
sell virtually anything (bar weapons of mass destruction) to anyone who
can afford to pay for it with hard currency...As a result, leading edge
Russian military hardware, some of it not even in operational service with
the Russian military, is being offered for export to a variety of states. 91
The article went on to point out that Russia is selling the same Kilo-class submarines to
Iran that it has sold to China. More significantly, it has reportedly offered India "20 Su-30
enhanced Flankers - more capable than the 26 Su-27s sold recently to China." 92 A 1995
article in the Moscow periodical Kommersant argues that it is Russia's defense technology
ties with India, and specifically not with China, that represent the hope of Russia's
military-industrial complex. And it is noteworthy that Germany already owns a squadron
of MiG-29s and is being offered more at a point in time when China has yet to seriously
negotiate for the purchase of this aircraft. 93
Is Russia Holding Back Cutting Edge Technology?
It appears so, but it also appears that this may be largely irrelevant to progress in
the relationship.
A number of analysts have argued that the "military hardware that could be part of
any cooperative agreement is technologically antiquated by U.S. standards."94 Russian
specialists have also claimed that "neither the current, nor the proposed military sales to
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China will change the military balance between Russia and China... Russia follows 'two
political principles' in its arms sales to China: don't sell the best and limit the quantity.
Russia therefore will be able to maintain the technological edge in the newer generation of
aircraft."
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As already mentioned, Russia has included within the contract allowing production
of Su-27s under license in China provisions aimed at preventing competition between
Russia and China in the international market for advanced fighters. For example, while a
joint venture company in Shenyang will produce the Chinese Su-27s, the radars, engines,
and fire control systems for the planes will first be manufactured in Russian plants and
then sent to China for installation. More explicitly, China has signed an agreement not to
resell Su-27 weapon systems or technology. 96 However, despite this prohibition, Russian
technology promises to make possible technical upgrades to other aircraft in the PLAAF
inventory which the PRC can sell overseas, making these exports more competitive.
Thus, it appears that potential Russian concerns about the vulnerability of its
forces to Russian technology in Chinese hands have been substantially assuaged. At the
same time, the well-established Chinese pattern of offering near-meaningless trade
assurances—as in negotiating intellectual property rights agreements with the United
81
States while doing almost nothing to protect U.S. products in China—has not to date
impinged upon its ability to ignore these assurances in practice. Most significantly, few
negative consequences appear to flow from failing to honor its promises, as long as new
promises of better behavior are forthcoming. Thus, while both military and commercial
competitiveness are at issue in the defense technology relationship, these problems do not
appear to represent more than minor irritants in the relationship.
How Valuable is Chinese Technological Expertise to Russia?
Not very.
This question presupposes to some extent that a truly reciprocal technology
exchange relationship will have greater potential for longevity or development into a
broader security alliance. Whether this is accurate or not, Russian efforts to make use of
Chinese technical expertise appear quite unlikely. While there are technical areas in which
China enjoys at least arguable superiority over Russia—computers, materials technology
(e.g., crystals and super-conducting materials) and high-tech marketization—these involve
highly specialized civilian industrial bases and centralized civilian science and technology
planning that China developed at great expense and which will probably not be a feature of
the Russian military-industrial complex for years or even decades to come.
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Moreover, while there are lessons that Russia could learn from the Chinese
experience in defense conversion, the promotion of military self-sufficiency, and educating
its citizenry on the benefits of the "socialist market economy," political, social, and
economic differences (and chauvinism) may well prevent any of these lessons from being
applied in the Russian defense sector. For example, while China has made a major social
investment in making remote "Third Line" defense factories viable civilian enterprises,
Russia has basically defunded its own conversion process. 97 More broadly, while China
was able to de-emphasize extractive industries in its economy in the 1980s, 98 Russia is
dependent in many ways on continued high levels of extraction to meet its commitments.
Perhaps most importantly, while private Russian capital seems anxious to flee the country,
Chinese seem at times over-anxious to invest in their domestic economy, and this is true
for many returning overseas Chinese capitalists as well. For the foreseeable future,
exchanges of Russian high-tech weaponry and Chinese consumer goods may go far
toward exhausting the cooperative opportunities between these two economies.
What, then, do the answers to these questions have to say about the future of
Russo-Chinese defense technology cooperation? First, that it is likely to persist and even
grow for some time. Second, that regardless of the viability of the defense technology
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relationship, there is nothing about China from the perspective of Russian arms sales that
would suggest China has a special, favored position in Russian strategic planning: a
Russo-Chinese "axis" is no more predictable on the basis of the bilateral defense
technology relationship than is a Russo-Iranian or Russo-German alliance. Third, an
implicit Russian strategy of withholding cutting-edge technology from its cooperative
exchanges with China is to be expected and is probably immaterial to the progress of the
relationship. Fourth, the likelihood that defense technology exchange could broaden into
a more significant relationship between the Russian and Chinese military-industrial
complexes (and thereby develop some momentum toward a security partnership) is
probably very small.
F. COMPARING COOPERATION IN THE 1950'S AND 1990 fS
What consistencies emerge when we compare Sino-Russian defense technology
cooperation in the 1990s with similar exchanges in the 1950s? This section argues that
there are many consistencies and parallels between exchanges in these two periods, but
that most ofthese points of similarity make broader cooperation—and broader security
partnership—less likely to occur in the current period.
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One somewhat simplistic observation—but one nonetheless worth making—is that
the Soviet Union had a large surplus of arms to sell China in the post-World War II
period, and Russia had a similar large surplus to sell China at the end of the Cold War.
Perhaps the only point that can be safely made on the basis of this parallel is that, since
before the establishment of the PRC, the militarization of the Russian economy has created
a huge inventory ofweapons and constant pressure to market or otherwise move these
arms overseas. The sale of arms to China following rapprochement, then, was a natural
first step for the Soviet Union and, subsequently, Russia. While it cannot be convincingly
argued on the basis of available evidence that arms deals with China were pursued only
because they served the immediate interests of both sides, it can be argued that short-term
interests (i.e., not a long-term strategic realignment) were sufficient to explain the deals.
Another less obvious point emerging from an examination of cooperation in these
two periods is that the modern history of Sino-Russian defense technology exchange is not
contained within the confines of the 1950s and the current decade. The Soviet Union sold
arms to and exchanged defense technology with the Chinese Nationalists in the 1930s and
1940s, establishing an historical pattern of ambiguous and ideologically questionable
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rationales for arms sales to China. As already noted, Russia also sold far more arms to
China in the pre-rapprochement 1980s than did the United States.
The important point to be drawn from this pattern is that it calls into question an
implicit premise of much analysis currently being written about Russo-Chinese defense
technology cooperation. For example, as previously noted, Hung P. Nguyen argues in his
1993 article, "Russia and China: Genesis of an Eastern Rapallo," that communist
hard-liners in Moscow were the driving force behind the rapprochement ofthe early
1990s, and that weapon sales were the main vehicle for that rapprochement" There is an
implicit link in this argument between the ideological ties that drew Moscow and Beijing
closer and the growing momentum of the arms sales program. A year later, Sheldon
Simon reflected the thinking of many East Asians when he suggested that the defense
technology relationship, among other factors, "might move China toward a new
nonideological relationship with Russia." 100 The perceived tie between ideology and arms
sales, expressed negatively in the latter and positively in the former example, may in fact
be insignificant if it exists at all. Ideology is, of course, potentially important if one is
looking for the basis of a new alliance. However, as argued in the previous chapter, the
current ideological orientations of the Russian and Chinese states are not conducive to the
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establishment of an alliance.
A third point of comparison between the two periods is that production
capabilities were transferred in both cases. Although much is made of Russian technology
transfer in the 1990s, similar transfers in the 1950s demonstrate that this is nothing
unusual in the history of Russian arms sales practices. Technology transfer can in fact be a
crucial selling point, and may have made possible the Su-27 sales and other deals. It
certainly does not provide evidence ofgrowing bilateral trust and security cooperation.
A related point is that arms sales to China had a very strong commercial
component both in the 1950s and in the 1990s. The 1950s Soviet stipulation that "China
could have what it paid for" is echoed in the observation of Eugene and Natasha
Bazhanov, writing in 1 993
:
[increased Russo-Chinese arms sales] revived concern in Taiwan and
some countries in the Asia-Pacific region as a possible sign of a strategic
rapprochement between the two giant states. Actually the weapons were
exported because of mercantilist interests. 101
There is also the example of Russia's offer of 200 MiG-29s to Germany, already cited
above, to offset U.S. $2.5 billion worth of debt. It would be laughable to suggest that this
proposed arms deal, almost 10 times the size of the Chinese Su-27 contract, is indicative
of a Russo-German "strategic rapprochement" leading to alliance-building. For Russia,
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hard currency and foreign goods are the crucial elements in both the German and Chinese
deals.
Another possible parallel between the two eras is that, once China has reached the
end of its procurement plan and acquired a desired technological level, it may well
generate less demand for Russian weapons and technology. As noted in the opening
discussion of cooperation in the 1950s, when target strength levels were reached in China,
the flow of modern Soviet weapons tapered off. The Chinese may only be interested in
defense technology exchange until they catch up or reach a lower (than Russian) but
adequate (for Chinese purposes) level of technology.
Some of the explanations given for the Soviet promise of an atomic bomb to China
have parallels—in a broad sense—in the 1990s relationship. For example, the integration of
the Chinese Academy of Sciences with the Soviet military scientific and technical system
in the 1950s has a parallel in the widespread perception of a "genetic" relationship
between Russian and Chinese weapon systems in the 1990s. Such a perception, based on
technical characteristics, can—as in the 1950s—offer false assurance that parallel doctrinal
shifts are taking place and that they constitute a budding security alliance. In the presence
of rhetoric on both sides concerning common interests in defense conversion, force
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down-sizing, and modernization for regional conflict, such perceptions may be too easy to
come by.
Another parallel to the current period from the nuclear technology relationship of
the 1950s is the basically quid-pro-quo motivation for Soviet/Russian defense technology
exchange with China in both periods. In the 1950s, the Soviets needed Chinese uranium
and other scarce elements; in the 1990s, Russia has sought hard currency and consumer
goods from China. In both periods, defense cooperation with China—however limited it
may be in practice—has shored up Russia's position in the international system by creating
an impression of a broader security relationship.
In fact, defense technology exchanges are probably unrelated to concepts of
alliance in the minds of the Chinese leadership. China's repudiation of the Soviet-centered
alliance structure of the 1950s has parallels in the consistent Chinese rejection in the first
half ofthe 1990s of Russian proposals for a Russo-Chinese proto-alliance or security
structure, whether authored by Shevardnadze in 1990 or Yeltsin in 1995. Chinese
nationalist ideology does not appear to tolerate close, dependent relationships. As
William Kirby argues in an article on Chinese foreign relations,
The PRC-Soviet alliance of the 1950s...would be hampered by Chinese
fears of dependency and loss of autonomy in partnership with a much more
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powerful ally. This sense was apparently strong enough to risk a break
with the Soviet Union even while the security threat from the United States
remained acute. 102
Finally, just as U.S. -Chinese defense technology exhange in the 1980s turned out
to be one of the most highly vulnerable facets of the Sino-American relationship following
the Tiananmen incident in 1989, the current defense technology relationship with Russia
may not survive the first crisis in bilateral relations. China never approached defense
technology relations with the West as a stepping-stone toward a security alliance, and
appears no more likely to do so with Russia. On the Russian side as well, profound
concerns about its relationship with China may eventually diminish the leadership's ardor
for broader security cooperation, leading perhaps to a recognition among Russian leaders
that, as Tow states, "by seeking intermittent, if qualified, cooperation with both the Soviet
Union and the United States...China constantly sought to develop the autonomous military
resources necessary for it to make a critical difference in the global balance of power." 103
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IV. COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
This chapter examines Sino-Soviet economic relations in the 1950s, then compares
these relations with observable patterns in Sino-Russian economic relations since 1991.
As in the other case studies in this thesis, this examination of bilateral economic relations
over two comparable periods will demonstrate that recent cooperation does not point to
the emergence of a new alliance structure between the two states. Instead, parallels with
the 1950s relationship along with other, unprecedented factors, strongly suggest the
opposite: far from contributing to a broad strengthening of the relationship, economic
relations are likely to generate a growing dissonance and disequilibrium, even within the
economic sphere itself.
In this chapter, milestones of the 1950s economic relationship are traced from
Mao's visit to Moscow in the winter of 1949-1950 to the rupture in bilateral ties that
essentially ended cooperative relations by 1960. Certain features of the 1950s relationship
that are both crucial to the development of relations in that period and relevant to the
1990s relationship will be highlighted. The interim period of the 1960s through the 1980s
is also examined to provide continuity and to identify the origins ofmany post-Soviet
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developments. In keeping with the structure of this paper's other comparative cases, this
chapter will seek to isolate in the current relationship those factors which
- favor, promote, or allow for further cooperation;
- militate against or limit such cooperation; or
- appear to be crucial, in either a positive or negative sense, for continuing
cooperative relations.
Unlike the other comparative studies in this paper, a periodic comparison of
economic ties between these two states must contend with the fact that the relationship
cannot be treated as equally "intergovernmental" for both periods. Economic relations
were almost entirely a matter of bilateral governmental agreements and protocols in the
1950s (and on into the succeeding decades of curtailed exchanges). In contrast, the
1990s have seen the growth of private trade relations, joint ventures, and other economic
connections well outside the bounds of intergovernmental arrangements. While
accounting for these differences, this paper argues that economic relations between China
and Russia in the 1990s remain comparable with the 1950s relationship because of
persistent parallels in the "deeper" underlying principles that inform the conduct of the
relationship.
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In identifying these principles, it is argued, one may discern a persuasive—if
partial—answer to the larger question posed by this thesis: Are Russia and China
constructing—or tending toward—a bilateral security alliance? In the sphere of trade and
economic relations, it appears that the nature of cooperation in the 1990s relationship
does not bode well for the more intensive integration that would be supportive of a
bilateral alliance. It further appears that economic relations in the current period may
soon exhaust their potential for growth in purely economic terms.
A. THE 1950'S RELATIONSHIP
In a 1964 book, Chu-yuan Cheng describes the institutional basis upon which the
bilateral economic relationship was founded. When the People's Republic of China was
established in 1949, the Soviet Union was the first state to establish diplomatic relations
with it. On one of his rare trips outside China, Mao traveled to Moscow in December of
that year for a summit conference with Stalin. Extended negotiations resulted in the
signing of four important documents in February, 1950. 1
These documents, along with an agreement in April, 1950, establishing the ground
rules for bilateral trade, laid the groundwork for Sino-Soviet economic relations. Among
the important provisions of these agreements:
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- The Soviet Union was granted concessions allowing it to continue operation of
the Chinese Ch'ang-Ch'un Railroad and to maintain its military bases at Port
Arthur and Dairen.
- China was granted a modest U.S. $300 million in Soviet credits for the delivery
of basic industrial infrastructure from the Soviet Union, including railroads,
power stations, and machine-building plants. 2 China was to repay these loans at
a one per cent interest rate over 10 years beginning in 1954. Repayments were
to be made through "delivery to the Soviet Union of raw materials, tea, gold, or
U.S. dollars." 3
- Trade was to take the form of "reciprocal commodities deliveries between the
two sides," with price computation and settlement determined by
intergovernmental negotiation. 4
In November, 1952, the 50 enterprises established under the 1950 credit
agreement were supplemented by the construction or reconstruction of an additional 91
under a new agreement with the Soviets. The Soviet aid represented by these 141
projects would be crucial in establishing the basis of China's modern industrial complex,
with its "metallurgical, machine-building, electric power, chemical, and other branches." 5
China—with a similarly huge but fundamentally different resource base—thus embarked
upon the Soviet model of extensive development in every major industrial category, a
model that made a virtue of self-reliance and autarky while dismissing the benefits of
comparative advantage.
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The historical context of these agreements is very important. The initial 141
projects were funded not with dedicated credits but with fungible loan monies that China
was obliged to apply to the cost of the war in Korea, both during the war and in rebuilding
its materiel base after the end of the conflict. Thus, the benefits available to the struggling
Chinese economy from these loans were severely constrained.
The period ofKhrushchev's rise to power was marked by several important
developments in the economic sphere. Most significantly, the new Soviet leadership
rewrote its contract with the Chinese regarding economic cooperation, eliminating the
onerous Stalin-era institution of Sino-Soviet "joint-stock companies." As Khrushchev
would note in his memoirs:
After Mao came to power, his relations with Stalin soon became strained
at the level of trade and economic cooperation as well as at the level of
ideology. At one point Stalin concluded a treaty with China for the joint
exploitation of mineral resources in Sinkiang [Xinjiang]. The treaty was a
mistake on Stalin's part. I would even say it was an insult to the Chinese
people. For centuries the French, English, and Americans had been
exploiting China, and now the Soviet Union was moving in. This exploi-
tation was a bad thing, but not unprecedented: Stalin had set up similar
'joint' companies in Poland, Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
and Rumania. Later we liquidated all these companies. 6
Along with the renunciation of the joint stock companies, the Soviet Union also
provided China with loans and technical assistance for additional "sets" of industrialization
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projects: 15 projects (with a U.S. $100 million credit) were agreed upon in September
1954; 55 new projects (with a U.S. $625 million credit) followed in 1956.
The final set of aid projects was agreed upon in August, 1958, when "the Soviet
government agreed to sell China another 47 industrial enterprises" (emphasis in the
original). 7 These projects, which coincided with the Chinese Great Leap Forward
campaign to achieve rapid industrialization, were accompanied by a dramatic but
unsustainable surge in Chinese imports from and exports to the Soviet Union (Table 4. 1).
Table 4.1 Chinese Trade with the Soviet Union, 1957-1961 8
(From Chu-yuan Cheng. Economic Relations Between Peking and Moscow,
New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 53)






The composition of these imports and exports was most important: China was exporting
as much agricultural produce to the Soviet Union as possible to pay for a rapid increase in
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the importation of industrial equipment. With the agricultural and industrial failure of the
Great Leap Forward strategy in China, this trade pattern came to haunt the relationship.
An estimated 30 million Chinese had starved as the grain needed to feed them was used to
finance the purchase of industrial equipment and material that was of low quality and
poorly suited to the Chinese economy.
1. Characteristics of Soviet Aid
According to Cheng, Soviet technical assistance to China came through four main
channels:
- the dispatch of Soviet specialists and technicians to work in China;
- the supply of blueprints;
- the reception of Chinese specialists, technicians, and workers for training in
Soviet enterprises; and
- the conducting of training classes in Chinese factories and mines by Soviet
specialists.
9
Robert O. Freedman, in Economic Warfare in the Communist Bloc, points out that Soviet
assistance to Chinese industry was regarded by both sides as savings-intensive. Referring
specifically to the Soviet promise of a "sample atomic bomb and technical information
related to its manufacture," Freedman argues a point that can be generally applied to all
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bilateral projects of the 1950s: "the Russians made a major contribution to the Chinese
economy by enabling the Chinese to avoid a lengthy and costly research and development
process that would have consumed large amounts of scarce Chinese resources." 10
In fact, many Soviet aid programs, as pointed out in the previous chapter on
military technology transfer, had a contrary effect: rather than freeing Chinese resources,
Soviet insistence upon trade terms for its economic relations with China meant that the
Chinese never acquired the surplus capital necessary to build an independent economic
base. As Raymond Garthoff writes, "by saddling them with outlays as heavy as they could
bear, the Russians further held back the Chinese." 11
Another important aspect of Soviet assistance was how inappropriate it was to the
Chinese situation. As Freedman points out, the Soviet emphasis on foreign trade as "the
most important form of economic cooperation" between the two states had led by 1958 to
a Soviet agreement—already noted in a separate context—to "sell China another 47 plants
and the necessary technical assistance to put them into operation; this was still not the
economic assistance the Chinese economy needed ...the unwillingness of the Russians to
supply long-term credits forced the Chinese to increase their exports in order to pay for
imports of Soviet machinery." 12
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Nor were many of the broader lessons of Soviet development appropriate to the
Chinese case. An important characteristic of Soviet economic relations with China during
the 1950s was the inculcation of the Chinese with a development strategy marked by
industrial completeness and technological breadth. As Barry Naughton points out in a
recent article on China's economic strategy:
It is striking that China produces virtually all industrial products, but is an
astoundingly efficient producer of very few items... Impressive achievements
have been made in textiles and rocketry. In between these low and high
technology sectors, China attempts to foster the development of virtually
every sector, and displays relatively backward technology and low
productivity in most of them...In attempting to carry virtually all sectors,
China assumes a continuing economic drain due to the support of inefficient
producers and sectors, and prevents a more rapid movement into sectors in
which a true comparative advantage might be found. 13
Not all (or even most) of China's emphasis on self-reliance can be attributed to
Soviet influence, for the Chinese disposition to autarky has deep historical roots and
became most pronounced beginning in the mid-1960s when Sino-Soviet relations were at
a nadir. However, the inefficient investment of resources across all industrial sectors was
certainly reinforced by Soviet example and guidance. The most notable aspect of this
quest for industrial completeness on both sides of the Sino-Soviet economic relationship is
that, while conducive to intensive ties while China was in a position of industrial tutelage
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and dependency, industrial completeness naturally had an opposite effect on the long-term
prospects for complementarity and exploiting comparative advantage. When the state has
a stake in developing all sectors, trade—with its built-in rewards for comparative
advantage and punishments for inefficiency—becomes an enemy of the state program.
2. The Mechanics of Trade in the 1950s
Trade between the Soviet Union and the PRC assumed a formalized,
state-managed structure at its outset that would persist until the 1990s despite dramatic
swings in the volumes of trade. James C. Hsiung summarizes the constituent "forms" that
make up the overall relationships between Communist states in Beyond China's
Independent Foreign Policy. 14 Of these, the following are relevant to a description of
formalized aspects of Sino-Soviet trade and economic relations from the 1950s onward:
- Routine contacts: As early as 1950, the two sides convened regular sessions of
bilateral commissions to regulate trade and transport.
- Visits and exchanges: Frequent exchanges of ministerial-level officials and their
technical entourages provided opportunities to explore possibilities of increased
exchange and trade.
- Annual trade talks to set the level of trade: These talks, rotating between
Beijing and Moscow, culminated annually in the signing of protocols between the
two sides covering terms of trade, trade volume, and the scheduled delivery of
commodities.
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As Cheng points out, Moscow and Beijing maintained the formality of negotiating and
signing an annual trade protocol even after actual bilateral trade shrank to negligible levels
in the early 1960s. 15
These annual protocols were but one reflection of the exclusive nature of state
management in bilateral trade. In fact, trade protocols were one of the many forms in
which bilateral trade arrangements were institutionalized. Soviet loans constituted
intergovernmental treaties and were documented as such. Moreover, 1950 world
commodity prices served as the basis for bilateral exchanges until 1957, when they were
finally adjusted to address the obvious unfairness (to China) of the outdated pricing levels.
Another feature of bilateral economic relations in the 1950s was the use of
countertrade arrangements rather than exchanging large amounts of one another's
(nonconvertible) currency or dealing in scarce foreign exchange. As Giovanni Graziani
notes in Gorbachev's Economic Strategy Toward the Third World, the term
"countertrade" can refer to a broad variety of arrangements, including "barter, buy-back,
counter-purchase, bilateral trade and payments agreements, offset, debt for goods, and
others." 16 The Soviets and Chinese worked out various payment schemes in the 1950s,
but the predominant arrangment was the bilateral trade and payments agreement, in which
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the levels of imports and exports between the two sides were recorded in a kind of
running ledger. Bilateral indebtedness thereby became a function and expression of the
trade imbalance. Cheng shows how the Chinese, beginning in 1956 and continuing even
through the famine years following the Great Leap Forward, steadily and consistently paid
down their debt to the Soviet Union by reversing the import-export imbalance of the
previous years 17
A final point that bears mentioning in describing the mechanics of bilateral trade is
that, with the exception of personnel training arrangements, Soviet assistance to China
was almost entirely through trade, not grants-in-aid. Soviet assistance, Cheng points out,
became exclusively a matter of trade in the late 1950s, meaning that China—embargoed by
the West at this time—became a captive market for Soviet products, especially industrial
equipment, during this period. 18
3. The Chinese Critique of Economic Relations with the Soviets
a. Unequal Relations
Among the many Chinese criticisms of Soviet behavior toward China
during the 1950s, the accusation that the Soviets set up an unequal economic relationship
is based, perhaps, on the long-harbored resentments. Even before the Chinese
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communists had established control over the country, the Soviets had undertaken policies
certain to resurrect historical antipathies. As Peter Berton notes in a 1985 article on
Sino-Soviet relations, "their occupation ofManchuria in the final days of World War II
gave the Soviets the opportunity to strip the area of all industrial equipment, a move that
the Soviet Union justified as spoils ofwar against Japan but which every Chinese
irrespective of his political convictions deplored as a setback to postwar industrialization
of China." 19
The joint stock companies that the Soviets set up with the Chinese in the
early 1950s were perceived by both Chinese and Soviet officials as onerous and similar to
colonial exploitation. As already noted, the Soviet investment in these joint stock
companies was sold back to the Chinese beginning in the mid-1950s. However, as
Freedman points out, "it is interesting to note that although the USSR canceled
repayment requirements for the Soviet shares in the Eastern European joint-stock
companies following the Hungarian Revolution, similar action was not taken to relieve the
Chinese of this burden." 20 Freedman further notes that this Soviet requirement for
repayment placed "a major strain on China's balance of payments." 21 In fact, as Cheng
points out, Soviet sources affirmed that China repaid a significant portion of its overall
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debt through the transfer of convertible currencies. 22 It was, Freedman suggests, the
dilemma of feeding its own people while paying off the Soviet debt that prompted the
Chinese to launch the Great Leap Forward and communization movements:
unprecedented quantities of exports were required to meet both demands simultaneously. 23
Freedman's larger thesis, in fact, is that the Soviet Union under Khrushchev
attempted to use trade as a disciplinary weapon or form of leverage against China in the
late 1950s and early 1960s. One aspect of this "discipline" was the Soviet Union's
vigorous policy of economic assistance to certain "neutral" under-
developed nations at this time in order to "win them over to Social-
ism. " [This policy] must have been a bitter pill for the Chinese
leaders to swallow, since they had not received any Soviet capital
aid since the 1954 agreement. 24
Cheng seconds this interpretation, pointing out that "the Soviet Union has regarded
economic pressures as its most effective disciplinary weapon." 25
Another example of a Soviet policy perceived by the Chinese as pointedly
unfriendly to their interests was Moscow's unwillingness to enter into a long-term trade
agreement with China, as it did with most East European states. Cheng points out that
Both Moscow and Peking have stressed the significance of such agree-
ments. Ting Ke-chuan, Vice-Director of the General Office of the Ministry
of Foreign Trade, has called these long-term agreements "the main form of
economic cooperation between the socialist countries in the future. " In
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1958, when the [PRC] and USSR, concluded a treaty of commerce
and navigation, the Chinese also expressed a desire to conclude a
long-term trade agreement with the Soviet Union. In that year, China
signed a series of long-term trade agreements with Poland, Hungary,
Rumania, Bulgaria, North Korea, and Albania. . . . However, no such
long-term trade agreement with the U.S.S.R.was concluded. 26
The long-term maintenance of 1 950 world market prices, already
mentioned above in the discussion of trade mechanics, gave rise to several developments
which created an impression of Soviet unfairness among Chinese observers. Cheng argues
that, in general, shifts in world market prices during the eight years of the "freeze" favored
the Soviets. In a 1952 incident that was particularly irksome from the Chinese
perspective,
a substantial quantity of soybeans exported from Manchuria to the
U.S.S.R. was then sold by the Soviet Union in London at a price much
lower than the Chinese Communists bid in Hong Kong...the Soviet
government had a trade agreement to import Chinese soybeans at
only... half the price on the international market. This enabled the Soviets
to resell the Chinese soybeans at a price even lower than that bid by
Communist China's trade company in Hong Kong. 27
There is also considerable evidence, again cited by Cheng, that the Soviets
were able to take advantage of their role as China's economic "tutor" to foist off low
quality equipment on Chinese industry while using the presence of Soviet technicians in
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Chinese factories to ensure that Chinese exports to the Soviet Union were of the highest
quality. 28 Finally, Cheng notes that
the overvaluation of the ruble exchange rate since 1950 proved to foster
Soviet exploitation. Although the value of the non-trading ruble was set
at one ruble to twojen-min-pei [the PRC currency, now termed
'Renminbi' or 'RMB'], the trading ruble was long exchanged at the rate
of one ruble to one JMP. 29
b. Low Levels ofSoviet Economic Assistance
Many authors have pointed out that the amount of the initial Soviet aid
package to the PRC was very small, amounting to a U.S. $300 million credit to be used
over 5 years. When compared with the multibillion dollar package of aid for European
reconstruction under the Marshall plan, or even with Soviet investment in Eastern Europe,
Soviet assistance to the Chinese seems almost miserly. Furthermore, as Cheng notes, of
the U.S. $2.25 billion that the Soviet Union lent to China during the 1950s, only $430
million—or about 20 percent of the total—could be classified as loans to enable China to
purchase Soviet machinery and equipment. The other 80 per cent represented war debts
and repayments for acquired military materials. 30 Thus, in terms of actual development
aid (discounting the putative value of Russian infrastructure on its erstwhile bases in China
and the costs of the Korean war), the Soviets provided very little funding indeed, and what
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funding it did provide was entirely in the form of loans. The Chinese had to pay for each
piece of Russian equipment they received.
Some argue that this failure to provide China with amounts and forms of
development aid appropriate to its needs was a crucial factor in the breakdown of
Sino-Soviet relations in the late 1950s. Such a finding would turn on its head a standard
explanation for the interruption of Soviet assistance to China: that the political falling-out
at the leadership level led to Soviet withdrawal of assistance to China. Freedman argues
just this point, that conflict in the economic sphere expanded eventually to the broader
bilateral relationship: "Soviet unwillingness to provide China with as much economic aid
as the Chinese leaders felt they needed was a central factor in the deterioration of
Sino-Soviet relations." 31
Freedman argues a related point elsewhere: that by 1956, the Soviet Union
was seeking to lay the groundwork for an end to its assistance to China. Various Soviet
journal articles from this period "strongly hinted to the Chinese that they had best rely on
their own resources." 32 Presenting these "hints" in terms that praised China's capacity for
development, the Soviets thereby established their justification for denying China the
capital aid it still needed: the Chinese did not need Soviet assistance any longer. The
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result of this strategy, Freedman suggests, was a growing Chinese sense that the Soviet
Union was downgrading its relationship with China in order to better pursue Khrushchev's
doctrines of "peaceful coexistence" with the West.
c. Soviet Overestimation of Its Contributions to China
The preceding description of how limited Soviet economic assistance to
China actually was helps to explain Chinese pique over Soviet insistence, from the 1960s
onward, that the Chinese were ungrateful recipients of Soviet largesse during the 1950s. 33
In fact, Freedman cites a 1963 Kommunist article that dismisses Chinese compaints over
niggardly Soviet aid:
A few years ago... it was asserted that the obligation of Socialist countries that
had moved forward in their economic development allegedly consisted in
'waiting' for the lagging and giving them everything that had been created by
the forward moving countries, as distinct from the lagging ones. This parasti-
cal understanding of the principles of proletarian internationalism with regard to
the relations between Socialist countries was in radical contradiction to
Leninism. 34
Soviet economic relations with China, while undeniably important, were
not as crucial to China's development as the Soviet Union may have believed. It is clear
from the above account of the 1950s relationship that, even in the absence of financial aid,
China did greatly rely on Soviet human and physical capital in the form of advisors, plants
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and equipment, and technology. However, the absence of Soviet loans or grants to China
in the latter half of the 1950s helped create a China that could and would stand on its own.
Unlike the Soviet Union's Eastern European clients, China was not dependent on Soviet
loans. Furthermore, its exports to the Soviet Union were of considerable importance to a
Soviet economy chronically short of the food and consumer goods that made up the bulk
of China's exports.
In fact, the rupture in Sino-Soviet relations that occured in 1960 hurt the
Soviet economy in many ways, suggesting that bilateral economic relations were more
important than the Soviets ever acknowledged, and consisted of far more than Soviet
tutelage. Cheng notes that the break-up resulted in an immediate loss of market for Soviet
goods, a particular problem given Soviet overproduction in many categories of industrial
products. 35 Beijing's challenge may have encouraged—and was certainly echoed by—some
Eastern European countries. Rumania, for example, maintained economic ties with China
and the West while criticizing Soviet efforts to dictate Comecon policies. In addition, the
losses sustained by both sides in the attenuation of their trade relations may be reflected in
the fact that both countries quickly became far more interested in trading with the broader
world economy. Seeking new partners to perform the economic functions which each had
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previously provided for the other, the Soviet Union turned to the West for grain in the
early 1960s, while China began seeking industrial technology in Japan and Western
Europe.
B. THE INTERIM PERIOD (1960-1990)
As noted in the previous section, the Soviet Union and China began to turn to
other trading partners to meet the needs no longer met by Sino-Soviet ties. The readiness
with which both sides moved into new trading partnerships for essential goods is
indicative of a constant theme in bilateral trade relations: the traditionally marginal nature
of the Sino-Russian trade relationship. The extent of China's actual isolation and the
necessity of its reliance on the Soviet Union in the 1950s is also brought into question by
the speed with which new partners were found: China's near-total abstention from trade
outside the communist bloc might well have been abandoned fairly easily at an earlier date
if trade with the Soviets were not predicated upon countertrade rather than hard currency
exchange. The Western "embargo" of Communist China was probably vulnerable from its
very beginning.
While the Sino-Soviet split did harm the economies of both countries, and
although technological development in China was clearly set back by the withdrawal of
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Soviet advisors, the economic relationship was not of such significance that it could bring
the two sides to a reconciliation, even when one of the sides was actively campaigning for
a resumption of economic ties. The Soviets on more than one occasion during the long
decades of estrangement offered to renew bilateral economic arrangements and technical
assistance as a way to reopen ties through that relatively neutral channel, avoiding
intractable ideological and nationalistic contradictions. In late 1963, Freedman notes,
Khrushchev sought to ease the increasingly tense Sino-Soviet relationship through
economic incentives, offering renewed trade and technical aid "to create favorable
conditions for normalizing relations in other fields." 36 Mao not only refused the
offer—citing Chinese concern over Soviet reliability—but suggested ironically that the
Soviet Union might wish to receive Chinese technical tutelage. 37 Initial negotiations to
end the dangerous military confrontation along the border rivers in 1969 included Soviet
offers to reinitiate trade ties. Once again, the Soviets saw the reopening of trade ties as a
way to make at least some progress in defusing bilateral tensions: reaching agreement on
"such 'easy' issues as trade relations first in order to create a positive atmosphere for
solution of the far more difficult border question." 38
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While the Soviets sought periodically to renew economic ties, they might well have
regarded the break in relations as a fairly welcome development from the narrow
perspective of the Soviet international aid experience in succeeding decades. The break in
economic relations did relieve the Soviets of a very large and needy economic client just at
the time that the growth of the Soviet economy began to slow significantly. As Graziani
points out in his discussion of Soviet aid programs in Gorbachev's Economic Strategy in
the Third Worldr, "in an attempt to sustain some of the poorest countries in the world, they
drained a Soviet economy already plagued by declining growth rates." 39
Another almost immediate effect of the near cessation of Sino-Soviet trade in the
early 1960s was the abandonment of the infrastructure that had been built up on both sides
of the Sino-Soviet border to accommodate overland trade. As James Moltz points out:
"The economic effect of these years of military and political confrontation brought the
destruction of a whole network of railways, roads, bridges, and infrastructure ties that had
made broad Sino-Soviet cooperation in the 1950s possible."40 Work to rebuild these
structural facilities would not begin until well into the 1990s, helping to keep Sino-Soviet
border trade at relatively low levels (by international standards) despite warming relations
in the early 1980s.
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The make-up of Sino-Soviet trade, although vastly reduced in volume from its
highest levels in the late 1950s, remained remarkably consistent over succeeding decades.
While strategic materials and technologies were no longer exchanged, the pattern
established in the late 1950s of Chinese consumer goods and light industrial products
flowing to the Soviet Union in exchange for Soviet raw materials41 persisted into the 1980s
and extended into the 1990s trade relationship. Graziani points out that during the 1980s,
Sino-Soviet countertrade included exchanges of Soviet raw cotton for Chinese textile
products, 42 while "Chinese bearings, automobile batteries, and handtools" were also sold in
the Soviet Union. 43
The notable aspect of this trade composition is not that the Soviet Union was
exporting large quantities of raw materials to China, for this was always a basis of the
Soviet foreign trade. Rather, it is noteworthy that a significant portion of China's exports
to the Soviet Union from the early 1960s to the end of the 1980s were precisely those
types of products—processed foods, consumer goods, replacement parts~that the Soviet
economy could never produce in sufficient quantities for its consumers. A description of
Sino-Soviet trade circa 1990 shows how consistent and pronounced these patterns had
become: Soviet exports to China were dominated by steel, timber, minerals and metals,
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with automobiles and planes only making the list by virtue of their relative cheapness.
Chinese exports to the Soviet Union were chiefly composed of meat, fibers, processed
foodstuffs, textiles, handtools, parts, machine tools, and labor services, with a
complementary exchange of minerals and metals. 44
By the late 1980s, many signal changes had occured in the bilateral economic
relationship. For the first time since World War II, Soviet authorities began in 1987 and
1988 to allow and even to promote true joint ventures with foreign firms, both within the
Soviet Union and abroad. 45 Given the Chinese government's contemporaneous promotion
ofjoint ventures as an economical means of acquiring advanced manufacturing
technology, this Soviet initiative was to place the USSR in direct competition with China
for international investment, establishing a pattern that has survived into the post-Soviet
period.
It must also be stressed that, although bilateral trade grew most dramatically in the
early 1990s through an explosion of "suitcase" and other informal channel trade, Soviet
and Chinese authorities had stepped up trade through formal channels as early as the
mid-1980s. A 1990 press account notes that the total value of bilateral trade for the
period 1986-1990 was double the value for the seventies. While trade remained low by
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international standards given the size of the two economies, the slowly revitalizing trade
relationship of the late 1980s laid the groundwork for the rapid growth of Sino-Russian
economic relations in the early 1990s.
C. SINO-RUSSIAN TRADE RELATIONS IN THE 1990'S
1. Milestones of the 1990s Relationship
While official trade had markedly increased in the late 1980s, the bilateral initiative
that ushered in the era of revived Sino-Soviet trade was the successful negotiation in
1990 and 1991 of a deal whereby China would receive Su-27 advanced fighter aircraft, as
discussed in the previous chapter. The deal was highly significant from an economic
perspective. First, the sale of these fighter jets to China, later accompanied by the
technology to build them in China, represented a huge potential savings to a Chinese
military aircraft industry which was expensively splintered into many different but largely
parallel development programs, none of which was close to producing an aircraft with
current-generation capabilities. Second, the deal involved the same countertrade
techniques that had characterized Sino-Soviet trade ties in their heyday, indicating that, at
least for the time being, the old ways of doing business in the communist bloc still had
their utility in the 1 990s. Third, the fighter sale—and sales to other states that quickly
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followed—translated into a softer landing for those parts of the Soviet military-industrial
complex involved in producing the plane and its components. These industries, employing
a large portion of the Soviet workforce in defense industrial centers across the country,
were facing drastic cuts as Moscow simultaneously withdrew from its role as a provider of
free arms to revolutionary movements worldwide and drew down the Soviet military's
own profligate military requisitioning schedules. The day of reckoning for thousands upon
thousands of redundant workers was thus put off somewhat by foreign sales that carried a
promise of real payments. Finally, the deal established a pattern for Sino-Soviet and
Sino-Russian trade relations in the 1990s: China was able to effectively supplement its
already large trading ties with the West (only briefly slowed by the sanctions that followed
the Tiananmen Incident in 1989) with specific commodities (such as fighter jets) which it
had no hope of acquiring except from the Soviets. In turn, China could pay for these
large-ticket defense items through countertrade, an option not available in its trade with
the West.
The period of 1992-1993 saw an explosive growth of cross-border trade, marking
a new stage in the resumption of trade ties. In the townships along the riverine borders of
Manchuria and the Russian Far East, a "wild west" capitalism sprang up involving street
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markets and unguaranteed barter deals between Chinese and Russian production and
trading companies. 46 Chinese traders poured into the cities of Russia, selling inexpensive
consumer goods at irregular markets throughout the country. While they received less
attention, Russians also took advantage of a newly eased border-crossing regime to sell all
manner of Russian exotica in the open-air markets of the Chinese border cities. 47
Sino-Russian cross-border trade during this period has been viewed as
advantageous to both the central authorities and individual citizens of the two countries.
For Russia, the introduction of inexpensive Chinese consumer goods and commodities
through alternative markets during this period meant that the withdrawal of government
subsidies for many consumer goods was not as traumatic as it might have been for
consumers. Chinese traders were said to have been amazed at the voraciousness of the
Russian consumer's appetite for everything from canned foods to plastic bowls. For
China, the border trade provided new opportunities for Chinese traders as well as an
outlet for superfluous Chinese workers in the northern provinces, many ofwhom found
contract labor positions in the Russian Far East.
The years 1993 and 1994 saw a pronounced official backlash against the excesses
of the freewheeling cross-border trade ofthe previous two years. From the Russian per-
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spective, it appeared that the Chinese had taken advantage of the large barter component
of the Su-27 deal to foist off poor-quality goods in payment for the high-tech aircraft.
Further progress on the Su-27 deliveries was called off for a time until the barter
arrangements could be renegotiated. Another important issue affecting cross-border trade
was the increasing unease of local Russians and Moscow authorities over the vast numbers
of Chinese that appeared to be "colonizing" the Russian Far East. Even cooler heads not
panicked by visions of "the Yellow Peril" saw that it was time for a more stringent and
properly codified border-crossing regime. Although a new requirement for an "invi-
tation" from a Russian firm before an entry visa could be issued to a Chinese trader was
apparently easy to circumvent, the establishment of such regulations did slow the influx of
Chinese without legitimate business in Russia. Other issues that concerned authorities on
both sides of the border were the dramatic increase in "hooliganism" and organized crime
in the border regions of both countries, an increase in accusations against Chinese traders
of sharp business practices and unfulfilled contracts, and a sense among many Russians
that sales of Siberian minerals to the Chinese was tantamount to the plundering of a
Russian birthright.
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Thus, from 1994 onward, a maturing trend in Sino-Russian economic relations,
largely imposed by government authorities, has dampened the initial vitality of the bilateral
economy. Retrospectives on the decline in "unregulated, highly profitable, and primitive"
trade practices identify many factors responsible for the downturn. A growing Russian
perception that steel and fertilizer were "strategic" Russian products not exchangeable for
Chinese consumer goods coincided with the imposition of Chinese macroeconomic
controls to cool off an overheated domestic economy, sharply lowering demand for such
Russian commodities as cement and rolled steel. 48 Concerns over the quality of Chinese
products grew at the same time as the availability of Russian commodities and consumer
goods improved. At the same time, both countries' governments adopted policies that
rejected barter trade as inappropriate to two economies seeking integration with the world
trading system. However, in the absence of hard currency liquidity or bilateral bank
settlement arrangments, potential trading partners on opposite sides of the border have no
means of making good on their mutual obligations now that countertrade is no longer an
option. 49
Perhaps most significantly from a long-term perspective, Chinese businesses and
economic planners may be coming to the realization that Russia is not destined to become
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a major Chinese trading partner in the foreseeable future. Despite high-profile weapons
sales and power plant projects, Russia accounts for less than two per cent of China's
global trade. 50 As a 1996 article points out, "Russia can't help the Chinese economically in
any major sense - it's not a major export market like the United States is for China." 51
Large-scale regional development projects involving China and Russia—such as the Tumen
Delta Development Zone— appear to be languishing, and China's economic relations with
the former Soviet republics of Central Asia appear far more dynamic than its largely
stagnant relations with Russia.
Still, the last several years have seen some positive developments in the
Sino-Russian economic relationship. The growth of modern transportation and
communications facilities between the two countries has included not just the renovation
of rail, highway, and waterway links but the initiation of cargo airline service between
Chinese and European Russian cities in late 1994. 52 In addition, there appears to be
enormous potential for Russian engineering firms to undertake infrastructure and power
generation projects in China. China is faced with marked deficiencies in both areas and
might employ Russian firms far more cheaply than their Western counterparts. Such deals
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would also be welcome in Russia, where they would entail profitability and employment in
the nascent Russian commerical sector. 53
2. Characteristics of Sino-Russian Trade in the 1990s
a. The Orientation of Chinese and Russian Trade
An examination of trade statistics for these countries for the first half of
the 1990s suggests a number of important factors affecting the relationship (See Table
4.2).
Table 4.2 International Trade54
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
(After Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, Washington: International
Monetary Fund, 1996, p. 4)
Year China USSR/Russia
Imports Exports Imports Exports
1989 73,166 52,024 55,024 59,531
1990 88,578 49,052 50,137 54,153
1991 112,664 61,785 48,257 44,341
1992 136,261 81,866 17,744 12,182
1993 156,114 108,318 43,045 28,929
1994 191,198 120,686 61,199 39,574
1995 213,880 147,039 76,244 48,797
Starting off at similar levels in 1989, international trade volumes for the
Soviet Union (and its Russian successor state) show a steady decline relative to China,
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although they have increased in absolute terms after bottoming out in 1992, the first
tumultuous year after the Soviet Union's dissolution. By 1995, Russian trade volumes in
both import and export categories were only about one-third as large as China's. These
patterns clearly derive from China's longer experience as a participant in the world
economy and Russia's difficulties in reforming an economy torn apart by the Soviet
disintegration. What the pattern also strongly suggests for the longer term, however, is
that China is increasingly oriented toward integration with the world economy while
Russia has done little more than recover to its 1989 level of trade activity.
These figures also indicate that imports were outstripping exports in both
economies over the last half decade. This disequilibrium in imports and exports is largely
attributable in both cases to the purchase of relatively expensive technical capital from the
West as these countries seek the industrial efficiency that will make them internationally
competitive. The salient point from this observation is that the two countries are not, as a
rule, seeking these technical fixes for their modernization drives from one another but
from state-of-the-art sources in the West.
130
Another set of statistics for the same period (Table 4.3) provides a more
direct means of assessing the orientation of Chinese and Russian trade, which is decidedly
not in the direction of increasing Sino-Russian economic integration.
Table 4.3 Chinese exports to and imports from Asia, Europe and Russia55
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
(After Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, Washington: International
Monetary Fund, 1996, p. 4)
Chinese Trade with Asia Chinese Trade with Europe (Russian
component)
Year Exports Imports Exports Imports
1989 37,908 25,319 3,182(1,849) 4,099(2,147)
1990 45,632 26,716 2,832 (2,048) 3,293 (2,213)
1991 55,291 35,213 2,206(1,823) 2,766(2,081)
1992 63,951 45,994 3,178(2,337) 4,641 (3,512)
1993 54,354 53,245 3,894 (2,692) 7,268 (4,986)
1994 76,201 57,542 3,108(1,578) 5,740 (3,466)
1995 95,463 66,465 3,734 (1,674) 5,531 (3,799)
An examination of the figures above shows Russia's marginal role as a
Chinese trade partner. There was no significant rise in China's overall trade volume with
Europe generally (the geographical category in which Russia appears in World Bank
statistics) or Russia specifically for the period 1989-1995, although Russia clearly
represents the lion's share of China's trade with Europe. In contrast, China's trade with
East Asia has grown steadily in recent years; more specific data from this source indicate
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that the great majority of this trade is conducted with Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and
Taiwan. 56 China's trade volumes with Russia are only about 10 to 20 per cent of its trade
with the developing countries of East Asia, and do not even match China's levels of trade
with the individual East Asian trading partners listed above. Finally, a long-term
imbalance in favor of Russia appears to be emerging in the bilateral trade figures in recent
years as the channels through which Chinese products entered the Russian market in the
early 1990s were restricted.
Other, less calculable factors, also tend to keep Russian and Chinese trade
oriented away from one another. While China has been included in every major Pacific
Basin economic forum established since the mid-1980s, Russia finds itself marginalized
within or excluded from such fora. 57 Overseas Chinese in East Asia, one of the engines of
China's economic growth, help keep China oriented toward a strategy that seeks
prosperity through international trade. There is no equivalent Russian diaspora of
entrepreneurs and technicians with strong ties to the motherland and a desire to assist in
its development. Within Russia itself, a widespread distaste for commercial activity,
reinforced by seventy years of communist suppression and other indigenous factors, gives
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rise to caricatures of Chinese in the popular press as sharp, money-grubbing operators
eager to exploit Russia's natural riches.
b. State Management and the Politicization ofEconomic Relations
Despite efforts at privatization in Russia and the progressive localization of
economic decision-making in China, the state in both countries retains enormous leverage
in strategic economic decisions. While the state may play a decreasing role in setting the
terms of trade between firms on opposite sides of the border, it is still capable of
exercising control through negative sanction, that is, by effectively obstructing trade that it
regards as undesireable. At least so far in the Sino-Russian trading relationship, patterns
of state behavior—an insistence on hard currency trade when the financial arrangements
necessary to such trade do not exist in either country, under-developed and
under-regulated financial sectors in both countries that make the funding of Sino-Russian
joint ventures impossible—undermine the growth of long-term strategic cooperation in
economic affairs. In fact, firms in both countries seek joint venture partners primarily in
the West and the other countries of East Asia, where their reputable foreign partners can
obtain financing through well-established funding sources; Chinese and Russian industries
are more likely to be in competition with one another for such foreign partners than
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cooperating with each other to build Sino-Russian joint ventures. At least in the near
term, deals between Chinese and Russian businesses may also be expected to follow a
pattern, described by Richard Hornik in describing China's "hot money" economy, that is
obviously anathema to long-term integration of the two economies:
Profits are illegally siphoned off from quick-fix ventures, then injected into
new speculative schemes or sent abroad, but always with the primary goal
of hiding revenues from Beijing. This get-rich-quick risk-taking eschews
the kinds of long-term projects that might nurture sustainable growth.... 58
State intervention in trade promotes the politicization of economic
relations in inumerable ways, both domestically and internationally. As Michael Burawoy
points out in a comparison of the Chinese and Russian economies, transitional policy
choices can make all the difference in determining whether a firm will seek subsidies or
profits:
[In China,] the county, township, and village administration have the
autonomy and interest to work out their strategy of development because
they are subject to hard budget constraints from above.
In Russia, by contrast the center still strives to be the residual claimant,
struggling to maximize appropriation in order to redistribute. Following this
redistributive logic, instead of investing in local accumulation, the region
expends political energy trying to maximize what it obtains from the center
and minimizing what it gives up. 59
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There are obvious contradictions between the objectives of economic actors in these two
models, suggesting that cooperation between Russian and Chinese firms might be severely
complicated—and limited—by the very different principles upon which each operates. In
practice, state authorities on both sides must still see the macroeconomic, political, or
personal benefit of a Sino-Russian joint venture before its promoters can hope to acquire
the necessary financial and political support to facilitate its establishment.
One might also consider whether ulterior motives did not prompt Russian
authorities to take measures in the 1993-4 period that were certain to suppress not only
cross-border trade but the growth of trading arrangements between individual Chinese and
Russian firms. Far from being a pure economic decision, it appears that increasing
domestic political pressure over perceived Chinese inroads into the Russian economy
made it politically imperative that government leaders respond in some clear fashion.
Russian fears of seeing their Asian territories overwhelmed by the Chinese are
centuries-old, but have found expression in the post-Soviet period in various forms:
images, purveyed by Russian politicians and journalists, of Chinese immigrant hordes
washing over the Russian Far East; a form of self-hatred that sees Russia and the Russians
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as forever vulnerable to the more clever and entrepreneurial Chinese; the loss of a Russian
"birthright" to the Chinese in the resource-rich Far East.
c. Non-Complementarity
Many opportunities no doubt exist for complementary economic relations
between Russia and China. Any two such large countries could be expected to have an
abundance of potentially complementary sectors, ofwhich China's unparalleled human
resources and Russia's wealth in natural resources are only two of the most obvious.
However, in addition to the problems of market orientation and trade dysfunctions
identified above, there are several fundamental incompatibilities that prevent the two sides
from exploiting the complementarities that do exist between them.
First, both economies are still dominated, albeit to a declining degree, by
large state-run firms. These firms are a legacy of the emphasis on heavy industry and
military preparedness that characterized both economies as late as the 1980s. Significantly
for the outlook for Sino-Russian integration, Chinese state-run firms are most heavily
concentrated in northern China, the very region in which Russian firms are most able to
establish cooperative ventures. The prospect of trade between these large Chinese and
Russian firms—producing heavy machinery, weapons systems, chemicals and the
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like—present particular problems for managers on both sides of the border. The central
issue is the unprofitability of these firms and the extent to which they are propped up by
both states to prevent massive layoffs that would threaten the social order. While state
subsidies for these firms may be justified in the minds of the political leadership on behalf
of social harmony, further subsidization of losing interests in the name of Sino-Russian
synergy does not appear to be a rational option.
A second incompatibility is that the principle of comparative advantage
operates between these two economies on a very intermittent basis, primarily because
bilateral trade is not at all "free." State-perceived demand must be at a very high level for
reciprocal advantage to become meaningful in bilateral trade. For example,
Russia—especially the Russian Far East—was deeply needful of the sort of consumer goods
which China was producing in cheap and readily exportable quantity in the early 1990s.
At the same time, China was more than ready—after decades of producing inferior military
aircraft at enormous cost—to advance dramatically the technical level of its forces with the
purchase ofRussian military aircraft. For a time, the sheer force of necessity did make the
relative advantage that each country possessed in a particular category of product operate
according to free-trade principles.
137
Russia and China failed to move beyond, or even sustain, this nascent
exploitation of reciprocal advantages for a number of reasons. Unlike the 1950s, both
countries now have access to Western and other internationally traded goods and
commodities, making bilateral trade a very selective process: the Russian or Chinese
advantage in producing a particular item must now compete with the comparative
advantage of many foreign producers. Then too, the "complete economies"~producing
virtually all industrial goods without regard to efficiency—which decades of central and
autarkic planning have built in both Russia and China are particularly resistant to the
operation of comparative advantage, at least at the current stage. Furthermore, when one
of the states declares certain goods "off limits" for exports, as Russia did in identifying
"strategic resources," it makes the demonstrable advantage of exchanging Russian raw
materials for finished Chinese products a moot point. Finally, the "complementarity" of
Russian and Chinese industrial products—often mentioned during official
exchanges—appears to begin and end with weapons production. Only in this field did
China consciously follow Russian standards during their long decades of isolation from
one another, so that today some Chinese weapons show clear signs of a Soviet heritage.
138
There is little evidence of Chinese adaptability to Russian industrial standards outside
specific military areas.
D. COOPERATION IN THE 1990S: POSITIVE FACTORS
The previous section enumerated many characteristics of Russo-Chinese trade that
do not bode well for the long-term growth of economic relations; in fact, there are a
number of potentially positive factors in the overall economic relationship that deserve
mention here.
As already discussed in the chapter on military technology exchanges, the potential
for sales of advanced Russian technology to China has not been exhausted by the deals
struck to date. There are admittedly many limitations to such trade, such as the difficulty
Russia will face in competing with Western military technology in the years to come as
well as domestic political objections to the narrowing of Russia's technical advantage over
the Chinese military through weapons sales. China's military-industrial complex may also
be able to efficiently clone selective purchases of Russian technology throughout its forces
rather than buying multiple copies of a new system. On the civilian side of the technology
exchange relationship, there appears to be considerable room for Russian participation in
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infrastructure and high technology projects in China. As noted earlier, the relative
cheapness of Russian bids may be attractive to Chinese planning authorities.
James Moltz points out two potential areas of growth in bilateral economic
cooperation. First, regional leaders in the RFE could—rather than continuing to look to
Moscow for subsidies—establish a far more promising basis for economic growth by
"engaging regional Chinese governments in more effective cooperative arrangements."60
Second, he argues that "while the new border regulations instituted in January 1994 have
resulted in a short-term reduction in overall Russo-Chinese trade, they could—if regional
political tensions can be kept in check—lay a better groundwork for more favorable
long-term economic relations."61
In a separate article, Moltz argues that Russia's post-Soviet economic development
path will be more similar to China's than to Western approaches based on free enterprise.
The Russian government is likely to take the leading role in directing national economic
development: "Instead of following the West, Russia may move closer to the East Asian
model of mixing small-scale privatization with the marketization of state enterprises, using
indicative-type central planning and channeled state investment to revive its economy and
build new export industries. " 62
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Subsequently, Moltz notes that China has been actively advising Russia to follow
its economic model. He also suggests that similarities of size, scale, and historical
experience offer better chances for economic learning, and that labor migration is a
potentially valuable resource to both economies. 63 Moltz observes that, with "Western
aid promises remaining largely on paper, the prospects of forging new ties with a growing
economy on its border became much more attractive to Russia" and points out that
Russia's trade with OECD countries shrank in the first half of 1993 while its trade with
"less democratic, non-Western" trading partners increased significantly during the same
period."64
Other positive aspects of the relationship require greater qualification when
assessing their potential for promoting further cooperation. For example, the countertrade
deals that have been advantageous for Russia and China in some respects (in that they
allowed the deals to go forward at all) are fatally flawed from a longer-term perspective.
Even if such bilateral trading arrangements were to somehow regain the popularity they
enjoyed in the early 1990s, they are a very inefficient means of trade. Such techniques
have only slowed the processes of rationalization and marketization that will be necessary
for Russo-Chinese trade to become more than a marginal component in either economy.
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China's ability to upgrade its military and civilian technical bases with relatively
cheap Russian products promises much the same sort of savings in development costs as
the 1950s relationship made possible. However, the persistence of this "good deal" for
China in the 1990s will depend upon many uncertain factors. The most significant of these
for the development of long-term economic ties is probably the question of whether
Russia's civilian technology exports will remain attractive. Many analysts believe that
Russia's technical products are sure to fall behind their Western counterparts and become
less internationally competitive.
The temporary nature of the advantages offered by development cost savings for
China probably also apply to the short-term benefits which Chinese purchases brought to a
struggling Russian military-industrial complex in the early 1990s. Many of the weapons
sold by Russia at cut-rate prices in this period were taken out of an oversaturated
inventory system, with proceeds used to keep huge weapons plants open and workers
there employed. As the most efficient of these plants undergo conversion to civilian
production with much reduced staffing, the importance of large-scale purchases by China
has already diminished for this large sector of the Russian economy. The same can be said
of the "suitcase trade" of consumer goods from China that sustained the Russian Far East
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during the early years of the post-Soviet period. Although this trade eventually was
restricted, it served the interests of both sides while it was allowed to flourish. In fact,
Russian researchers Vadim Shabalin and Vladimir Portiakov portray a Russian economy
which, restrictions notwithstanding, may still need Chinese goods over the near term to
make up for shortages:
Russia now has an economy that is unbalanced to an even greater extent
than that of the Soviet Union...While generating nearly 60 per cent of the
Union's national income, Russia produced 51 per cent of its meat, 35 per
cent of its vegetable oil, 30 per cent of its sugar, etc. Today the country's
economy has been greatly hamstrung by the rupture of the old economic
ties that has intensified the existing structural disproportions. 65
There may also be some complementarity in Sino-Russian trade because of China's
large-scale borrowings from Soviet-style economic institutions and conventions in the
1950s and their persistence in subsequent decades. These borrowings include codes
governing the status of natural and juristic persons, the Soviet model of trade relations by
treaty (in which the goods to be exchanged are specified), trade missions, trademark and
patent laws, and arbitration clauses. 66 This institutional kinship may be less effective over
time in facilitating trade, but it probably still has some positive effect at present.
Gerald Segal argues in his 1994 article, "China's Changing Shape," that Beijing
welcomed better economic relations with the Soviet Union and then with Russia because
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ofthe "benefits of regional interdependence." Trade relations with a continental neighbor
gave internal regions of China the opportunity to participate—at least to some extent—in
the opening of the economy to foreign trade. 67 Trade with Russia will give Chinese in the
Northeast a stake in promoting and maintaining good relations with Russia.
Finally, as Lincoln Kaye argued in 1992, projects such as the Tumen Delta
Development Zone may one day "provide insurance for Northeast Asia's trading dynamos
against any future protectionist...lurches by such groups as the EC and NAFTA
countries." 68 As with virtually all of the "positive factors" cited in this section, however,
the advantages possible through regional cooperation are only potential; the two countries
will need to overcome many intrinsic obstacles to achieve significantly greater
cooperation.
E. COOPERATION IN THE 1990' S: NEGATIVE FACTORS
In addition to the negative factors discussed in the previous section,
"Characteristics of Sino-Russian Trade in the 1990s," there appear to be three major
factors in the economic relationship that may be expected to obstruct future progress.
These are the historically marginal nature of Russia's economic presence in East Asia,
institutional gaps that will prevent the development of a rational trading regime between
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the two economies, and the political difficulties inherent in China's economic relations with
the Russian Far East.
Russia has never been an economic power in Asia. The upsurge in trade with
China in the early 1990s that made it seem an emerging power in the region was mostly a
function ofthe Russian Far East's underdevelopment: for a time, the RFE became a
hungry market for Chinese consumer goods and a source of raw materials for China, but
this was ultimately unsustainable. China looks to Russia to supplement—not replace—its
principal economic relationships with the West in specific and limited ways: as a source
for raw materials and certain high-technology items, and as a relief valve for Chinese
workers. Unlike its pariah status in the world economic system of the 1950s, China is no
longer embargoed, and can purchase Western alternatives in virtually every industrial and
technical field save weaponry. In most of these fields, Russia has competitive
disadvantages or lagging technology.
Although the two sides often highlight supposed compatibilities between their two
economies, such compatibilities are in fact largely spurious, with the notable exception of
some parallel development in Soviet-era defense technology. Both countries have
complete economies with internal incentives to retain large numbers in their military
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industrial complexes. As already noted, comparative advantage operates only at the
extremes of the two economies' technical spectrum: between Russian high-tech weapons
and Chinese low-tech consumer goods. An economic complementarity table published by
a Manchurian institute and printed subsequently in the Far Eastern Economic Review is
instructive. Although the table compared several different Northeast Asian economies in
its original form, juxtaposing the Manchurian and Russian entries by themselves shows
that, in nine categories of economic attributes, the Chinese themselves see significant
complementarity in only two: China's labor surplus and greater agricultural productivity. 69
Shabalin and Portiakov devote considerable space to the supposed complementarity of the
two economies. China is far ahead of Russia by such crucial measures as volumes of
foreign trade, consumer electronics, cement, textiles, machine tools. Russia, by contrast,
leads only in milk and oil. 70 China does not use much of the first and generally substitutes
coal for the latter.
As shown in the earlier tables, China's trade with Asia far exceeds its trade with
Russia and is growing, while its trade with Russia remains uneven and largely stagnant.
Although Russia is the largest European trader in China, its trade volumes are dwarfed by
China's trade with Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, and are roughly equal to its trading
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relationship with Thailand. China's growing orientation toward East Asia, as exemplified
by its membership in every major regional forum and economic association, is simply not
shared by Russia. Peter Mozias argues in a 1994 article on prospects for the Russian and
Chinese economies that China is more favored in the process of East Asian economic
integration because "integration patches involving countries with different levels of
development are usually based on bilateral relations. These processes are especially
dynamic in the case of ethnically similar countries...Owing to the geographical position
and set of relative advantages, China has better chances ofbecoming a member of various
integration^ groups than Russia. China can be involved in integration processes both on
its own southern border and in Northeast Asia," whereas Russia's options appear limited
to North China. 71 As Segal argues, unlike Overseas Chinese investors from East and
Southeast Asia, Russians do not have the connections elsewhere in China to pick and
choose regions where the terms of trade are optimal: they remain stuck in the North. 72
In fact, it can be argued that the RFE's economic future lies with the countries of
East Asia, where it has access to markets and economical transportation links. This may
be true for Central Asia as well, where it is unclear how the former Soviet republics will
align themselves economically. Shabalin and Portiakov argue that with the Asian part of
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Russia "thrown into the lap of the booming Asia-Pacific economy, ofwhich China is a
part, the Russian economic body could be torn apart, with consequences now difficult to
predict."
73 What can safely be said about this still uncertain situation is that strategic
relations between the two states are unlikely to benefit from an economic dimembering of
Russia in which China plays a central role.
There are also a number of simple but nonetheless serious limitations on the
growth ofRusso-Chinese integration. For example, according to World Bank figures for
1993, China's per capita income was only about one-sixth the size of Russia's; although
there are many ways of adjusting for purchasing power parity between the two countries,
it is obvious that the relative poverty of China's people will limit the opportunities for
trade considerably. The extreme overland distances between most Russian manufacturing
centers and China also greatly limits the potential for cooperative trading ventures, since
transportation costs often make otherwise profitable deals untenable. Finally, as Shabalin
and Portiakov note, "the spirit of competition has not been completely purged from the
relations between the two countries. Chinese analysts, too, admit as much." 74 The
relative success of either economy at the perceived expense of the other is always a
potential basis of "self-reliance" rhetoric and policies.
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The difficulty of transporting goods between the two markets is related to another
category of factors limiting trade: the near-absence of trade-facilitating infrastructure and
institutions in either country. The movement of goods across the border is primarily
small-scale, opportunistic, and regional. Containers full of goods are not moving
smoothly or in great quantities between the two countries through formalized channels,
and such trade cannot develop without more sophisticated facilities in terms of finances,
infrastructure, and legal codes.
Because of the problems they face in accumulating capital and the untrustworthy
nature of the Russian currency, firms in Russia lack the capital to enter into long-term
cooperative relations with Chinese partners. Richard Hornik argues in a 1994 article that,
with "hyperinflation fueling a bubble economy," Chinese companies are similarly unable
to conduct hard currency-based trade with Russia. 75 Deals tend to be finite in scope, with
no long-term trade arrangements. Commitments are ad hoc and derive not from
long-term strategic interests but short-term advantage and profitability. As Hornik points
out, the Chinese in the 1990s have tended to eschew long-term projects that might nurture
sustainable growth. This is true for both foreign partnerships and purely domestic
ventures.
149
Mozias points out that Russia and China will be competing with one another for
markets and foreign investment for years to come, a situation hardly conducive to
increased cooperation:
Over recent years, China has been increasingly successful in competing
against ASEAN countries keen on attracting foreign investment... invest-
ment flows to China where the1992 amount was almost five times more
than the 1991 level. ...The fact that most countries in the region depend
on oil imports will encourage investment in the few oil exporters
[including] China... In the circumstances, it is hardly plausible to expect
any major investment flows to Russia in the near future. Apart from the
obvious faults of the domestic investment climate, here [in Russia] the
stiff competition on the part of other recipient states will see to it that
investors take their capital to those countries with terms considerably
more tempting than anything Russia can offer. 76
Despite its poor prospects for integration with the East Asian economy, Mozias suggests
that Russia will be trying to enter East Asian markets as a competitor with China:
Internal Asian trade in APR [Asia-Pacific Region] total trade is expected
to go up to 55 per cent from 42 per cent in 1990. In part, the growth will
apparently be due to Russia's more active trading abroad, for its
competitive advantages (first of all, the advantages of its natural and
technological potential) can be most readily made use ofby exchanging
goods with "lower floor" countries. 77
Finally, traditional Russian apprehension over the Chinese "yellow peril" may
increase the likelihood of a strong popular reaction in Russia against the economic
integration of the RFE and Central Asia with China or East Asia in general. This is
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especially likely if, as is generally predicted, the region becomes less culturally and
economically tied to European Russia. Russian leaders must also be sensitive to the
appearances of trade with China in the public's perceptions: popular resentment may
spark unrest and attacks on Chinese nationals if the terms of trade and the commodities
involved make China look like a colonial exploiter of Russia's "birthright." Even Russian
economists such as Shabalin and Portiakov appear to betray a nationalist bias in their
arguments that the RFE should not be allowed to become a primary material appendage of
China, that the Trans-Siberian Railroad needs to be expanded, and that sufficient labor for
the development of the RFE must come from Russia. 78 This is clearly a recipe for
economic inefficiency whose singular appeal is to nationalist sentiment: China is a natural
market for the RFE's resources, the Trans-Siberian Railroad is moribund and inefficient
even in its current, relatively streamlined form, and large-scale projects such as pipelines
or the Tumen Delta Development Zone will require mostly Chinese workers and bring
about further sinicization of the RFE. As a Western diplomat characterized the outlook
for regional cooperation on the Tumen Zone in 1992: "These [Northeast Asian] countries
are hardly as cosy with one another as a trio of U.S. states...The UNDP may be asking all
the right questions in its preliminary studies, but the outcome won't necessarily depend
151
upon nice, rational, technocratic answers. Fluky, irrational, unpredictable politics, more
likely."
79
F. ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS ON THE ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP
The types of questions posed at the end of the preceding chapter regarding the
potential ofgrowing cooperation in defense technology are relevant for the economic
relationship as well. As in the preceding case, these questions are argued positively or
negatively on the basis of the available evidence, with a summation at the end evaluating
the significance of these findings for this area of the cooperative relationship.
Does the economic relationship have stayingpower?
At first glance, it appears that Russia and China do share many advantages from
bilateral trade which will tend to reinforce cooperation. As already mentioned, China
should enjoy considerable savings in research and development from its purchase of
advanced Russian weapons systems and civilian technologies as well as from
acquiring the manufacturing capability for many of these products. Both sides have the
potential to benefit from Russian infrastructure projects in China.
However, these examples do not justify optimism over the long-term outlook for
bilateral economic relations. By virtue of its leap across generations of technical
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development in selective purchases from Russia thus far, China has reduced the
advantages offered by further purchases simply because it has come dramatically closer to
Russian levels of technology. This would not necessarily mean a diminution in economic
relations and mutual advantage if Russia could be expected to continue moving well ahead
of China in key technologies. In fact, it appears that Russia will be very hard-pressed to
keep the technical level of its products advancing at a sufficiently rapid pace to compete
with the West for the China market; rather, the relatively low prices of Russian goods are
likely to be associated increasingly with previous-generation technology and relatively low
levels of quality.
It is also worth noting again that countertrade, which offered mutual advantages in
the early 1990s, quickly fell out of favor on both sides of the border. Unregulated border
trade, while lucrative for many of those involved, has also been stymied by greater
government discipline and control. In like manner, the Russian military-industrial complex
was saved from insolvency temporarily in the early 1990s by deals such as China's
purchase of the Su-27 aircraft. The more efficient firms of the former Soviet MIC are
now well along in their defense conversion efforts, and are not as dependent on the sale of
weapons systems for survival. At the same time, both economies appear to be suffering
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the effects of short-term deals and the movement of profits overseas, trends which will
work to the detriment of long-term growth in Sino-Russian cooperation. Finally, as
argued above, the two sides have failed to exploit and expand upon the reciprocal
advantages that do exist in their economies.
Are Russo-Chinese economic relations special or unique?
Many authors have argued that improvements in economic relations between these
countries are part of a trend toward a broader form of alignment. The evidence presented
in this chapter suggests that the relative normalization of economic ties between the two
countries in fact is limited to a few areas in which China and Russia can economically
obtain goods from one another that they are effectively denied by more preferred
providers in the West, whether because of political embargoes of desired weapons
technology (China's case) or the realities of a weak trading position (Russia's apparent
rationale in exchanging Su-27s for consumer goods.) China especially, but also Russia,
remains oriented primarily toward the West as technology-importing economies. There is
nothing unusual about this: sidestepping embargoes and foreign government regulations
to acquire technology is a feature of China's relations with many countries; Russia's sales
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ofweapons systems in the developing world since 1992 have proceeded on the same bases
as its trade in these products with China.
China and other East Asian countries enjoy trade relations with the newly
independent states of Central Asia that appear far more dynamic than their economic ties
with Russia. And Russia is decidedly outside the processes of regional integration that are
taking place among the East Asian economies. If Russia's economic relations with China
are unique, they are unique—with the possible exception ofNorth Korea's—among China's
neighboring economies in their comparatively slow growth, if not stagnation.
How important is the economic relationship to each side?
As argued above, the Chinese and Russian economies remain important to one
another in narrow technical fields, but no synergy has developed that promises to expand
cooperation or trade beyond those confines. While regional cooperation between north
China and the RFE could become very important, it is at present only potentially so, and
must be encouraged if it is to become a significant factor in the economies of the two
regions.
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How wouldfurther reforms affect the relationship?
Although there are too many variables involved to allow for fruitful speculation on
how relations would be affected if one or both sides proceeds further with market reforms
or opening to the international economy, at least three observations can be made about
this prospect. First, for the foreseeable future, it appears that any further integration with
the world economy by either country would tend to marginalize the other because of the
relative inefficiencies in bilateral rather than multilateral trade. Second, reforms that
diminish state interference in the financial and commercial sectors of the economy may
allow economic actors to operate in a more rational environment. Long-term planning,
crucial to industrial cooperation between Chinese and Russian firms, would also be made
more feasible by a less intrusive state. Third, rationalization and marketization ofthe two
economies would, in general, tend to enhance the effects of comparative advantage for the
two economies.
The problem with this sort of speculation on the positive effects that marketization
might have on cooperation is that the forces driving market reforms in these two
economies are weakened by the continuing preponderance of state influence on economic
decisions. The Russian government has adopted policies that tend to obstruct the growth
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of both international ties in general and bilateral ties with China in particular. Its revenue
collection woes will probably make the Russian government more intrusive in economic
matters for the foreseeable future. And much of Russian industry continues to pursue
"rent-seeking" activities—such as securing government subsidies—rather than breaking
with the culture of the Soviet era and competing for profits in the marketplace. China has
its own large state sector to maintain, one that is shrinking only gradually over time. The
more efficient Chinese private sector is dominated by small enterprises that lack the capital
to strike deals with Russian firms; in any case, they tend to be tied into domestic and
international trading networks in which Russia is not represented.
The answers provided to these questions suggest that the Sino-Russian economic
relationship is not particularly healthy at present or promising for the future. Many
factors operate to limit the growth—or even the persistence—of this relationship. If the
economic ties between these countries can be considered "special," it is because they are
particularly poor given initial estimates of their potential and the contrasting dynamism of
China's economic ties in East Asia. In a few technical fields, the relationship remains
important to the two economies; however, cooperation is not spreading across productive
sectors, even in the RFE-north China regional relationship where it might be most
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effective. Finally, it is difficult to see how market reforms would significantly improve
Sino-Russian trade.
G. COMPARING COOPERATION IN THE 1950S AND 1990'S
A good starting point for a comparison of Sino-Russian economic ties in two eras
is to identify persistent historical factors that are present in both. There are a number of
characterizations that apply equally well to China and Russia in two periods: China
remains much the poorer country, the overland distances between the major markets of
the two countries remain daunting, and trade channels between them continue to develop
outside the standards ofthe broader world economy. Economic ties between these
countries sprang from marginality to rapid growth in the early years ofboth decades but
declined significantly as the two decades wore on. Ironically, the historical resentments
that found expression in Chinese complaints of economic exploitation by the Soviets in the
late 1950s have been resurrected in the 1990s by the Russians: anger over shoddy Chinese
goods and the appropriation of Russian natural resources is reinforced by a sense that
China would still be a primitive country if not for Soviet assistance.
Parallels between the two periods in Sino-Russian economic relations are
numerous. In both periods, China has been an important trade outlet for the Soviet and
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Russian MICs. Similarities in the composition of bilateral trade in the two periods
suggests that some form of comparative advanatage was and is operating between the two
economies. These are positive factors for the overall economic relationship. Less positive
is the fact that, during both periods, bilateral economic ties have been more subject to
government fiat than to market forces.
A discussion of distinctions between the two periods must acknowledge at the
outset that economic cooperation in the 1950s was initiated as a function of the bilateral
alliance, while cooperation in the 1990s was based to a substantial degree on mutual
economic interest. This must be regarded as a positive factor. Relations based on rational
economic principles are more likely to be mutually beneficial and efficient than the
development of economic ties based on artificial political principles. Although counter-
trade has been an important component of economic relations in both periods, the hard
reciprocity requirements of the. 1950s appear not to have appeared in the 1990s
incarnation of this trading arrangement. This also bodes well for the relationship, since
grounds for cheating and resentment are greatly reduced by not insisting on a strict
balance of trade. Another distinction between the two eras that would appear to benefit
the relationship in the current period is the absence of a war debt; in the 1950s, China's
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arduous repayment-in-kind of Soviet advances for the Korean war effort kept the trade
relationship from developing for most of the decade.
Many surface similarities between the two periods are belied by important
differences in the fundamental principles underlying the relationship's development in the
two periods. China was embargoed by the West in the 1950s and faced similar pressures
in the early 1990s, not only because ofCOCOM restrictions but because of international
reaction to the Tiananmen Square incident of June, 1989. In both periods, this isolation
increased the value of Russian technology to China's modernization. However, even at
the height of the international sanctions effort against China, it was obtaining technology
from many sources, and by the mid-1990s may have faced fewer restrictions on its
international purchases than at any time since 1949. Thus, while Russia has continued to
hold a competitive trading advantage in certain categories of defense technology, this
sole-supplier advantage was far more narrowly defined than in the 1950s, barely extending
beyond weapons systems. Similarly, Russian technology sales to China in both decades
represented major savings for the Chinese in research and development costs. However,
the development ofmany technologies to modern levels in China during the long years of
Sino-Soviet estrangement have again left only a few fields in which the Russians have a
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competitive advantage over Western sources today. The fact that both countries find
themselves unable to establish a hard-currency trading regime—despite their governments'
normative insistence—should tend to enhance opportunities for bilateral trade, since this
inability stifles integration with the world economy. However, the extension of the
hard-currency requirement to bilateral trade has largely prevented the two sides from
realizing this potential advantage. In the one important area where the two economies are
both integrating with the international economy—in seeking foreign investment—they are
likely to compete, not cooperate, with each other.
Perhaps the most significant distinction between the economies in these two
periods, at least in gauging the prospects for future cooperation, is that Russia's
contribution is no longer crucial to Chinese economic development. China in the 1990s is
in firm possession of its own development model, involving Special Economic Zones, a
major redistribution of emphasis among economic sectors, and exploitation of its own
particular strengths. While Russian leaders have frequently praised the Chinese model and
called for its emulation in their own country, the Russo-Chinese tutelage of the 1950s will
not translate into a Sino-Russian tutelage in the 1990s. As has been argued throughout
this chapter, Russia's economy is fundamentally dissimilar from China's, its people have a
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different orientation toward commerce, its labor and resource costs are markedly different,
and its place in the East Asian economy is marginal at best.
162
Notes
; Cheng, Chu-yuan, Economic Relations Between Peking andMoscow, New York:
Praeger, 1964, p. 12.
2 Compared to the billions of U.S. dollars committed to the reconstruction ofEurope
through the contemporaneous Marshall Plan, this was a relatively tiny amount.





6 Khrushchev, Nikita, Khrushchev Remembers, Boston: Little, Brown, 1970, p. 463.
7 Freedman, Robert Owen, Economic Warfare in the Communist Bloc, New York:
Praeger, 1970, p. 115.
8 Cheng, op. cit, p. 53.
9
Ibid, p. 35.
10 Freedman, op. cit., p. 115.
11 Garthoff, Raymond L., "Sino-Soviet Military Relations, 1946-1966," in Garthoff, ed.,
Sino-Soviet Military Relations, New York: Praeger, 1966, p. 86.
12 Freedman, loc. cit.
.
13 Naughton, Barry, "The Foreign Policy Implications of China's Economic Development
Strategy, in Robinson and Shambaugh, eds., Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and
Practice, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 52.
163
14 Hsiung, James C, ed., Beyond China's Independent Foreign Policy: Challengefor the
U.S. and Its Asian Allies, New York: Praeger, 1985, pp. 31-2.
15 Cheng, op. cit., p. 21.
16 Graziani, Giovanni, Gorbachev's Economic Strategy in the Third World, New York:
Praeger, 1990, p. 80.
17 Cheng, op. cit, p. 53.
18
Ibid, p. 18.
19 Hsiung, op. cit., p. 26.





















31 Freedman, op. tit, p. 103.
32
Ibid, p. 112.
33 Hsiung, op. cit., p. 33.
34 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 15, No. 43, p. 3, cited in Freedman, op. tit,
pp. 116-117.
35 Cheng, op. cit., p. 105.






Graziani, op. tit, pp. 4-5.
40
Moltz, James C, "From Military Adversaries to Economic Partners: Russia and China
in the New Asia," Journal ofEast Asian Affairs, Winter 1995, pp. 157-182.
41 Cheng quantifies this late 1950s development, noting that "[Chinese f]ood exports
accounted for 27.4 per cent of the 1956 total volume, declined to 26. 1 per cent in
1958, 19.9 per cent in 1959, 15.1 per cent in 1960, and was only 3.2 per cent in 1961.
The gap was filled through a greater export of consumer goods, which increased from
28.5 per cent ofthe 1958 volume to 62.4 per cent of that of 1961." op. cit, p. 64.
42




Reuters, 17 September 1990.
165
45 Graziani, op. cit, 86-7.
46 Chicago Tribune, 16 November 1992. In Heihe, the cross-border dealing had started





Reuters, 16 July 1995.
49 Agence France Press, 26 April 1996.
50 Ibid
51
Reuters, 25 April 1996.
52 South China Morning Post, 24 February 1 995.
53
Reuters, 26 April 1996.
54 Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, Washington: International Monetary Fund,
1996, p. 4.
55
Ibid, p. 26 and p. 58.
56 Hong Kong figures are anomalous in that China calculates goods shipped through Hong
Kong to foreign destinations as trade with Hong Kong.
57 Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 46, No. 45, p. 22.
58
Hornik, Richard, "Bursting China's Bubble," in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3, p. 30.
59 Burawoy, Michael, "The State and Economic Involution: Russia Through a China
Lens," in World Development, Vol. 24, No. 6, 1996, pp. 1107-1108.
166
60 Moltz, "Regional Tensions in the Russo-Chinese Rapprochement," in Asian Survey,
Vol. 35, No. 6, June 1995, p. 527.
61
Ibid, p. 526.





65 Shabalin, Vadim and Vladimir Portiakov, "Russia and China: How Their Economic
Muscles Compare," in Far Eastern Affairs, No. 1-3, 1993, p. 19.
66 These borrowings are described by Gene T. Hsiao in The Foreign Trade of China:
Policy, Law, and Practice, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, p. 105.
67
Segal, Gerald, "China's Changing Shape" m Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3, May/June
1994, p. 52.




70 Shabalin and Portiakov, op. cit., pp. 21-22.
71 Mozias, Peter, "Options ofEconomic Development in the APR: Prospects for Russia
and China," in Far Eastern Affairs, No. 2-3, 1994, pp. 36-37.
72
Segal, op. cit., p. 50.





Hornik, op. cit, p. 30.
76 Mozias, op. cit, pp. 30-31.
77
Ibid, p. 32.
7S Shabalin and Portiakov, op. cit., pp. 24-25.
79 Kaye, op. cit., p. 17.
168
V. COOPERATION IN TERRITORIAL AFFAIRS
This chapter examines and compares Sino-Russian territorial relations in the 1950s
and 1990s. Interaction between these two countries over border issues and other
territorial matters differs in some respects from the preceding discussions of bilateral
relations in defense technology or economic affairs. First, territorial relations have been
an important issue between Russia and China for centuries, while economic relations have
always been marginal and defense technology ties only became a major aspect of bilateral
relations in the 1950s and again in the 1990s. Second, in comparing cooperation between
the two sides over territorial issues in these two decades, one must take account of the
fact that the era of greatest interest to most security analysts and scholars writing on
Sino-Russian territorial relations was the intervening period of 1960-1990, especially the
late 1960s, when the two sides clashed across their common border, and the 1970s, which
saw a massive Soviet investment in defensive infrastructure and manpower in the Russian
Far East (RFE).
The first issue—the long historical background of bilateral territorial relations—is
dealt with here through a brief retrospective on the principal factors that have defined
Sino-Russian relations in this area. With regard to the second issue—the relative
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importance of the 1960-1990 period—it is argued that, just as in the previous two
comparative case studies, it was the era of unprecedented cooperation in the 1950s that
provides the most useful comparative case with the 1990s. It is not the mutual
antagonism and wariness of the interim years that stands out in historical perspective but
rather the two periods of unusual cooperation that are the main subject of this study.
As in the previous case studies, this chapter will seek to isolate those factors in the
relationship which favor, promote, or allow for further cooperation; those which militate
against or limit such cooperation; and those which may be crucial—in either a positive or
negative sense—to the future course ofthe cooperative relationship.
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Most accounts of Sino-Russian territorial relations begin with the treaty of
Nerchinsk in 1689, which set the terms of bilateral relations in both territory and trade
following the first official contacts between representatives of the two governments.
Neither side showed much interest in the border regions between them, however, until 150
years later, when other European powers began to carve out spheres of influence in
China. 1 Russia, which had begun to modernize before China, was able to apply pressure
to win concessions from the Qing empire along their mutual border. From the mid- 19th
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century until the Russian revolution, Moscow defined its sphere of influence in China to
include Manchuria and access to the sea. Relevant to territorial relations in the modern
period is the fact that treaties signed during the late 1 9th century form the juridical basis
for the Sino-Russian boundary of the 1990s. 2
Some of the factors which remain salient from this early period in the bilateral
relationship are highlighted by S.C.M. Paine in her 1995 book, Imperial Rivals. One of
these is the problem of minority peoples. The areas in which the Russian and Chinese
empires grew to meet one another were not populated by Russians or Chinese but by
sparsely settled, generally nomadic peoples. Paine notes that
because the border represents geographic and not ethnic consi-
derations, these ethnic minorities had much more in common with their
counterparts across the border than with their culturally and geogra-
phically remote central governments. Moreover, neither country's central
government has been particularly adept at dealing with the grievances of
its ethnic minorities...the frontier area is inherently unstable, with enduring
ethnic tensions providing ever ready tinder to ignite and fuel border
conflicts. 3
Ambivalence toward the border lands arising from their enormous potential but
marginal exploitability continues to mark relations between the two countries today. Once
established in Asia, Russia was obligated to protect and reinforce its Far Eastern holdings
from "sheer geopolitical necessity," George Kennan has observed.4 However, Paine
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notes, "populating, supplying and protecting these acquisitions proved costly indeed." 5
Unlike other European concessions in 19th century China, Russia's sphere of influence
remained landlocked and economically marginal. W.A. Douglas Jackson noted in 1962
that the Russo-Chinese border lands are marked by "a short growing season,
poorly-drained soils, and permafrost," which "have been effective to date in restricting the
agricultural potential. In effect, therefore, the Soviet Far Eastern population clings to the
Trans-Siberian Railway, on which it heavily depends."6 The vast expanses of the Eastern
Asian land mass are also characterized by long transportation lines and short navigation
seasons for river transport, making development of its potential even more difficult.
The Russians nevertheless sought to expand their Far Eastern possessions, and
won a number of concessions from the Chinese. This is a third area of continuity with
territorial relations in the modern period: China and Russia have been unusually prone to
violate bilateral treaties and to seek territorial advantage when the opposite side appears
weak, although Russia has usually been in the better position to do so. To the extent that
there is "an illusion ofRusso-Chinese friendship" in the imperial period, Paine argues, it
has arisen because of Chinese unwillingness to "lose face" by bringing Russia's violations
before the international community. Although the Japanese took over much of Russia's
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sphere of influence (and infrastructure projects) in Manchuria during the 1920s, the new
Soviet regime was able to retain significant influence or outright domination in Outer
Mongolia and Xinjiang. By the 1940s, Robert Freedman writes, "Soviet military and
economic aid and pressure had turned the Chinese province into a virtual Russian
protectorate."
7 At the end of the war, Freedman notes, "the Russians tried to get the
Nationalists to agree to joint administration of Manchuria's industrial and mining centers." 8
In the event, the Yalta agreement at the end ofWorld War II gave the Soviets a pretext to
remain in Manchuria for years, although their subsequent dismantling and removal of
industrial stock was clearly in violation of the agreement. As Jackson argues, "Yalta in
effect reversed the decision of 1905 [i.e., Japan's victory over Russia in the
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905], giving the Soviets a lease on Port Arthur and a
dominant presence in Dairen, plus Changchun Railway concessions." 9 Jackson also
observes that "the actual boundary between these two immense states achieved its present
exactitude only in the period 1 945-49.
"
10 The boundary that emerged in this period is
described in the 1 992 reference book, Border and Territorial Disputes.
The Sino-Soviet border falls into two sections, divided by the buffer state
of Outer Mongolia: (i) the Far Eastern sector, which divides Manchuria
from Eastern Siberia, and (ii) the Central Asian sector, which divides the
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Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (Sinkiang) from the Soviet
Republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, and Tajikistan."
Having arrived at the threshold of communist victory in China, with Russia firmly
entrenched throughout China's northern territories and in Mongolia, it remains to point
out that, along with the historical continuities that characterize Sino-Russian territorial
relations, there is a strong element of state nationalism in the approaches that both
countries take to their border regions. First, as George Moseley argued in 1973, these
territories are roughly analogous in the Chinese and Russian national psyche to the U.S.
view of Alaska: a thinly populated territory, enormously rich in natural resources, and
central to the nation's development strategy and national image. 12 Second, the
Russo-Chinese border regions generate tensions because, as overland empires, both the
Russian and Chinese regimes derive legitimacy in part from the territorial expansion of the
state to its full historical extent. The dissolution of the Soviet Union may only have
intensified this imperative in Russia, where revanchism is a basic principle of the
nationalist program; in China, the reacquisition of such territories as Tibet, Hong Kong,
and Taiwan has been part of the state program since 1949. Finally, Alexei D.
Voskressenski has devoted a book-length study to the long tradition in both Russia and
China of scholarship in the exclusive service of the state. Officially sanctioned, mutually
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antagonistic interpretations have for so long filled all published writings in these countries
on the border question that there is now little basis for anything but jingoistic,
self-affirming views on bilateral territorial issues. 13
B. THE 1950S RELATIONSHIP
As Jackson observed regarding Sino-Soviet territorial cooperation in the 1950s,
the relationship "that has emerged between China and Russia is a contradiction of the
historical record." That record, he notes, was one of "traditional fear and suspicion, if not
outright dislike between peoples of either country." 14 Yet, the first formal contacts
between the communist Chinese and Soviet regimes in 1950 were marked by substantial
cooperation over territorial issues. Outstanding territorial issues between the two sides
were clearly put aside for the sake of ideological solidarity within the newly formed
communist bloc. As Mao observed regarding his initial consultations with Stalin on a
broad range of bilateral issues:
In 1950 I argued with Stalin in Moscow for two months... We adopted
two attitudes: one was to argue when the [Soviets] made proposals we
did not agree with, and the other was to accept their proposal if they
absolutely insisted. This was out of consideration for the interests of
socialism. 15
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And, as the authors ofBorder and Territorial Disputes point out:
As late as April 28, 1960, Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Prime Minister,
described the differences on border questions between China and the
Soviet Union as 'insignificant divergencies on the maps' which could
'easily be peacefully resolved." 6
As noted in the chapter on economic relations, the temporary compromises of
sovereignty to which Mao agreed in 1950 included joint administration with the Soviets of
the Chinese Ch'ang-ch'un Railroad and continuous use by the Russians of the naval base at
Port Arthur. Another interesting result of the agreements negotiated between Mao and
Stalin during the Chinese leader's visit to Moscow in early 1950 was "a continued Russian
presence in Sinkiang [Xinjiang], Mongolia, and Manchuria," Freedman notes. Stalin's
territorial impositions and Mao's concessions were reflective of what both sides would
quickly come to see as a paternalistic, even neocolonial pattern of interaction based on
China's poverty and weak international position in 1949. While these concessions may
have been undesirable from Mao's perspective, he did win Stalin's agreement that Russia
would withdraw from the naval base at Port Arthur by the end of 1952, although the
Russian lease was subsequently extended. 17 New Soviet bases were never permitted, nor
were Soviet missiles allowed to be stationed on Chinese soil without being under Chinese
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command. Chinese strategists apparently recognized that the presence of Soviet missiles
would set China up as a potential target with no concomitant voice in strategic decisions.
Stalin's death in late 1953 ushered in a number of changes to the bilateral
relationship, and territorial relations were no exception. In September 1954, Bulganin,
Khrushchev, and Mikoyan visited Beijing where they signed a "joint communique on the
withdrawal of Soviet military units from the shared naval base in Port Arthur and the
transfer of this base to sole Chinese jurisdiction. " 18 The rectification of Stalin's
neocolonial excesses being undertaken by the new Soviet leaders was particularly
welcome, as the retrocession was to be made free of charge to China: "the 1950
agreement had stipulated that the Chinese would have to pay for the installations." 19
The Chinese also raised the issue ofMongolia during the Soviet leaders' visit. This
is often cited as an early instance of Sino-Russian dissension, although the earlier Mao
quotation indicates that there was probably much private disagreement between the two
sides over territorial issues in 1950 as well. The recentness of Soviet suzerainty over
(Outer) Mongolia after centuries of Chinese dominance, China's success in reacquiring
Tibet some years earlier, and the new openness of the Soviet leadership probably all
played a part in prompting the Chinese to propose the reincorporation of Mongolia into
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China. However, the Russians apparently refused to discuss this. 20 Premier Zhou Enlai's
effort to resurrect the Mongolian issue during talks with Bulganin in 1957 appears to have
been similarly unsuccessful. 21
Harold Hinton notes that, as Soviet-Chinese relations began to decline in the late
1950s, Lin Biao—newly appointed as Defense Minister in 1959—began "to organize
violations of Soviet territory by parties of Chinese military personnel, apparently to signal
defiance of Soviet 'revisionism.'" 22 Thus, differences over territorial issues became one of
the first and most important elements in the Chinese rationale for the Sino-Soviet split.
Many observers have downplayed the significance of territorial issues in the
Sino-Soviet dispute, arguing that the ideological dispute between the two sides spilled
over into fighting and deadlocked negotiations over border demarcation as a sort of thrust
and parry within the international communist movement. 23 It is true that both sides appear
to recognize the difficulties in extracting economic value from the border lands, and that
neither side has shown any real interest in acquiring significant amounts of the other's
territory since 1950. However, it is significant that the underlying historical principles of
Sino-Russian border relations, outlined at the beginning of this chapter, are all visible in
the 1950s relationship: Russia's desire for access to the sea, the playing out of territorial
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ambitions on the land of non-Russian, non-Chinese peoples, the unusual readiness with
which the two sides dispense with treaty obligations and resort to military force, and the
enormous symbolic value which the border territories hold for both the Russian and
Chinese people.
C. THE INTERIM PERIOD ( 1 960- 1 990)
The border tensions which arose at the end of the 1950s continued into the 1960s.
Continued Chinese incursions into Russian territory—as well as the apparently Soviet-
orchestrated flight of 50,000 Kazakh refugees from Xinjiang to the Soviet Union between
1962 and 1965--prompted Moscow to propose bilateral talks on the border question in
May 1963. These ultimately fruitless talks began in February 1964. The background to
these moves was a steadily deteriorating relationship between the two sides in territorial
affairs. In December 1962, Khrushchev had publicly taunted China for its failure to press
territorial claims against "imperialist powers" while constantly raising such issues with the
Soviet Union. Beijing regularly called for revisions to the "unequal treaties" which the
tsars had imposed upon a weak China, and accused the Soviets, like their tsarist
predecessors, of always trying to grab more land. Freedman points out an interesting
aspect of this period in the dispute: the Soviets sought repeatedly to tie promises of
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resumed economic and technical exchange relations to the successful resolution of the
border question. 24 At the same time, Chinese newspapers editorialized against the Soviet
withdrawal of aid and technical experts in 1960, portraying these "betrayals" as part and
parcel of the revisionist Soviet agenda that also clung to the tsarists' ill-gotten territorial
gains.
As Sino-Soviet territorial relations declined in the 1960s, Western analysts
suggested a number of rationales for what appeared on its face to be a largely irrational
conflict. According to the authors of Border and Territorial Disputes,
The tension on the borders greatly increased with the beginning of the
Cultural Revolution in China in the summer of 1966. It was reported
from Moscow on Oct. 2, 1966, that an estimated 2,000,000 Chinese had
taken part in mass demonstrations on the the Soviet frontier, especially in
the Far Eastern sector, in support of China's territorial claims, and that
Chinese troops had opened fire several times on Soviet ships plying on
the Amur...Many minor incidents were believed to have taken place in the
later months of 1967 and in 1968.... 25
At the time, some analysts pointed to the traditional Russian fear that the Chinese might
some day overwhelm the sparsely populated Russian Far East. Others interpreted the
dispute as a useful tool by means ofwhich both sides activated domestic support against a
common enemy. The real fear which both sides apparently felt in 1969 at the prospect of
escalation to full-scale war suggests, however, that domestic political mobilization came
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to be regarded in both Chinese and Soviet leadership circles as an insufficient justification
for the dispute after that date. 26 Still others saw the dispute in terms of a power struggle
between the Chinese and Soviets for legitimacy, if not supremacy, within the international
communist movement: agreeing "that the border treaties imposed on China by tsarist
Russia are 'unequal'...would open up long stretches of the Soviet frontier to territorial
revision;" it would also raise China's stature as a leader of the communist world. 27
The open fighting along the border rivers during 1969 and 1970, including the
famous battle on Damansky/Zhenbao Island in which Chinese forces were badly mauled,
was apparently a sobering experience for both sides. As Lowell Dittmer describes it:
A beginning was made in bridging the yawning diplomatic chasm only when
the point had been reached that the prospect of war was clearly in view,
and the uncertain and no doubt mutually catastrophic consequences of such
an outcome could be fully appreciated. The Chinese agreed to negotiate in
the wake of the 1969-70 border clashes under Soviet nuclear blackmail.
Zhou Enlai and Kosygin agreed in their preliminary talks at the Beijing
Airport to drop the Chinese precondition that existing treaties be described
as "unequal," also to cease armed provocations along the border. This series
of talks contained the dispute, giving both sides a regular forum (the talks met
biannually in Moscow) in which to articulate their suspicions and even broach
a few new proposals....
Although discussion deadlocked over [the "inequality"] issue, it cannot be
said that the talks were utterly fruitless. The arms build-up along the
frontier stabilized, trade increased slightly, the Soviets offered in camera
to accept the thalweg (midline down the main navigable channel) to
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demarcate riverine boundaries (in 1973) and made certain other territorial
concessions. 28
Dittmer goes on to note that the talks continued through the 1970s without major
progress until 1979, when the Chinese informed the Soviets in the wake of U.S.
recognition that they intended not to renew the Sino-Soviet mutual defense treaty of 1950
when it expired in 1980. "But in the context of the same notification," Dittmer notes,
"Beijing indicated its willingness to engage in talks "on a separate basis from those on the
border," thereby allowing the two sides to begin "rebuilding functional bridges" and
restoring state-to-state relations. 29
During the 1980s, the Soviets and Chinese, while separated by Beijing's insistence
on its three preconditions for normalization of relations, 30 continued to make incremental
progress toward cooperation on territorial issues. In 1982, the thalweg was accepted as
the line of demarcation for the riverine boundary between Russia and Manchuria, and the
unequal treaties issue was "quietly dropped." 31 By 1987, the two sides were discussing
cross-border cooperation, such as a joint dam project, and formal consultations began on
the issue of troop reductions along the Sino-Soviet border. This latter move was
facilitated by the Soviets' unilateral withdrawal of 10,000 troops from Outer Mongolia. 32
The 1987 exchanges, marking the resumption of border talks that had been broken off in
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1979 over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, were also the first in a regular series of
consultations that would lead to an unprecedented Sino-Soviet border agreement in 1991
covering the border east of Mongolia. This agreement nearly coincided with the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, but the post-Soviet Russian government quickly offered
assurances that it would observe this agreement, and it was approved by the Russian
parliament in 1992.
D. THE 1990'S RELATIONSHIP
The signing and ratification of the Sino-Soviet, later Sino-Russian, border
agreement in 1991 and 1992 was hailed at the time as "closing the past and opening the
future" in bilateral territorial affairs. 33 As Yeltsin would observe, "This is the first time in
the history of Russian-Chinese relations that nearly the entire boundary between the two
countries has been codified in the form of law." 34 As noted above, both the Russian
parliament and the Chinese National People's Congress ratified this agreement in early
1992. The two sides cooperated in boundary survey work, and teams of experts on
demarcation met frequently to resolve outstanding issues. In July of 1 992, an agreement
was reached on joint prospecting in the boundary region, further expanding the scope of
border cooperation. However, despite this apparent progress in territorial matters, there
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were some signs of resistance to the bilateral agreement. Western journalists reported
that some Chinese legislators were bitterly opposed to ratification of the agreement,
"arguing that it made too many concessions." Among the parties said to be in opposition
to the agreement were representatives from the affected province of Heilongjiang in
northeast China and the military. 35 The Russians also admitted at the time that one-tenth
ofthe disputed claims along the Sino-Russian border had been left unresolved by the
agreement, although the treaty itselfwas not made public. 36
In 1993, border talks were expanded to include the Central Asian republics of the
former Soviet Union. At mid-year, Chinese efforts to control smuggling led to a number
of "skirmishes" between Russian merchant ships and Chinese civilian and military vessels,
prompting speculation that Chinese assertiveness in the waters off its northeast coast
represented a corollary of its 1992 moves against Vietnamese ships in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Meanwhile, in August, local Russian resentment at the pending return to China of a parcel
of Russian territory boiled over. The Governor of Russia's Maritime Krai, the Far Eastern
border region that stood to lose the parcel of land, was joined by his regional parliament in
condemning the Russian Foreign Ministry's plan to cede the territory to China. This issue
simmered for two years until, in early 1995, the Governor's complaints became the subject
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of open debate in Moscow over the wisdom of implementing the agreement with China.
Many prominent Russian political figures, including the Deputy Chairman of the
Federation Council, weighed in on the side of the local official. Yeltsin administration
officials were obligated to reassure their Chinese counterparts repeatedly that the Russian
government would stand by its agreement.
This issue may have been made more volatile by admissions on both sides during
1994 that illegal migration and trafficking in various types of contraband made necessary a
tightening of border controls. 1994 also saw an initial agreement on the relatively short
and almost inaccessible western border area; this agreement was ratified in 1995.
Another significant development was the signing of a bilateral agreement between Russian
and Chinese defense authorities aimed at preventing border incidents. The agreement
included provisions concerning notifications, the prevention of airspace violations, and the
use of lasers and jamming equipment in the border region. 37 At least in the Western press,
there were increased reports in 1994 and 1995 concerning poaching, illegal fishing, and
other, apparently non-systematic, territorial violations on both sides of the border.
In 1996, China, Russia, and the bordering Central Asian republics of the former
Soviet Union signed a formal agreement regarding the demilitarization of their common
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border. The agreement, formally entitled "Mutual Military Confidence-Building
Measures," created a buffer zone about 100 kilometers wide and 8,000 kilometers long
between China and the former Soviet republics. The Chinese Foreign Ministry stressed
that the treaty "was not a military alliance and was not aimed at any third party," touching
only on cross-border cooperation among the signatory nations. Details of the treaty
clearly indicated that it was principally aimed at preventing misapprehension over military
activities in the border areas. 38 Also in 1996, Yeltsin ordered that the region of the
Maritime Krai that had been the subject of domestic debate in recent years be demarcated
"in strict conformity with the 1991 border agreement." 39
E. COOPERATION IN THE 1990'S: POSITIVE FACTORS
Many aspects of Sino-Russian border affairs in the 1990s appear conducive to
continuing cooperation between the two sides. The existence of a bilateral treaty
concerning border affairs is by itself an unprecedented step forward in territorial relations.
Substantive consultations over the demarcation of the border places this aspect of the
relationship on a rational basis that conforms more closely to international conventions
than in the past. In this sense, one can be far more optimistic about the future of
Sino-Russian territorial relations than during the 1950s, when problems in this area of the
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relationship were not in a process of resolution but merely submerged beneath the
requirement for socialist solidarity.
As shown in the preceding section, the two sides are in almost constant contact
regarding some aspect of territorial affairs. While some bilateral consultations always
took place over border issues—even at the nadir of the Sino-Soviet conflict, a joint
commission met to manage navigation and dredging on the Manchurian border rivers—the
post-Soviet period has seen a dramatic increase in bilateral exchanges over various aspects
ofborder affairs: prospecting, controlling migration, and surveying work are but a few
examples. Such practical exchanges and confidence-building measures tend to reduce the
likelihood of misperceiving the other side's intentions. The regime of military notifications
and observer missions established under the 1996 accord is probably the best insurance
available to date against accidental conflict.
The growth ofboom towns along the Sino-Soviet border has also created
incentives for amicable border relations. While the dramatic growth of the early 1990s has
subsided following changes in the forms of trade permitted by the two governments,
Manchurian border cities like Suifenhe retain several times the population they held before
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the boom. At least for the present, the importance of cross-border commerce for the
continued economic growth of the border regions remains undeniable for both countries. 40
Finally, the Russian government has not yielded to domestic pressure against the
implementation of border concessions to China, even when local protests found
national-level adherents in Moscow. By historic standards, agreements between the two
sides are accorded unusual respect, and there is little evidence on either side of efforts by
central authorities to modify, let alone abrogate, territorial treaties.
F. COOPERATION IN THE 1990'S: NEGATIVE FACTORS
Despite admirable progress in putting many aspects of their conflict-prone
territorial relationship behind them, it appears that many factors will make continued
improvement of this relationship highly problematic. While any territorial relationship
between two states may be termed successful if actual conflict over contested areas is
avoided, the effect of unresolved territorial issues may still color the overall relationship in
important ways. The emergence of an alliance between two states that have numerous
outstanding disputes over their common border might well be a very short-lived
phenomenon if it were able to develop at all.
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Quite obviously from the perspective of alliance-building, the confidence-building
measures that China, Russia, and their Central Asian neighbors have agreed to pursue
offer only "negative assurances" to the participants. All of the activities identified in the
common program are clearly intended to prevent provocative activities in the sensitive
border areas, and to reassure all parties that their territorial status quo is not being
challenged. "Positive assurances" characteristic of an alignment of security
doctrines—joint exercises, for example—are manifestly not part of the treaty provisions.
For the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that either side would be able to manage a
large-scale joint exercise even if this were deemed desirable: Russia because of its
impoverished military, China because it is only just learning the basics of combined forces
warfare. In any case, both militaries appear occupied with internal concerns at present,
not a recipe for the external commitments that alliance-building would necessitate.
While the Russian government has so far successfully resisted domestic pressure
against territorial concessions to China, the strength of this resistance and its resonance for
many national-level political figures suggests that Sino-Russian territorial issues will
remain a rallying point for Russian nationalist politicians. It may become increasingly
difficult to implement border agreements calling for an exchange of territory when
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everyone from the local Cossack formations to the regional governor is calling for
protection of the motherland. As Paine suggests,
regardless of the ostensibly friendly public statements issued by the
Russians and the Chinese, the border issue has not been consigned to the
past. The dispute has been far too long-standing and bitter, and too
recently a source of hostilities, to have disappeared without a trace.
Already, local officials in Siberia are refusing to sign the border agreement
signed by China and Russia in 1991 but are hanging on to territory to be
ceded to China under the agreement... the border issue does indeed live
on.
41
The centuries-old fear of the "Yellow Peril" is still clearly alive in Russian
geopolitical thinking, and the arrival of millions of Chinese in communities throughout the
Russian Far East since 1990 has only increased suspicions, both locally and in Moscow,
that the Chinese are either pursuing a long-term plan to take over the Russian Far East or
will soon do so in any case by force of numbers. However this concern manifests itself in
Russian political life in the future, it is certain to have much the same chilling effect on
bilateral cooperation in territorial affairs that it has already had in the 1990s. The Russian
government will at least need to offer additional reassurances to the Chinese that it will
fulfill its promises; at worst, suspicions may grow that the opposite side is not negotiating
in good faith, or a new government less well disposed to territorial concessions may seek
to reverse previous commitments.
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China is not immune to such domestic pressures. As already noted, the National
People's Congress ratification of the 1991 agreement provoked dissent from the military
and northeastern representatives. Only the relatively more open political process in
post-Soviet democratic Russia has made the Chinese appear less divided on the resolution
of territorial issues with Moscow. Still, some authors argue that a solidly united China,
now in the ascendancy over a weakening, disintegrating Russia, will soon begin to apply
pressure against its northern neighbor over territorial issues. As Paine suggests at the
conclusion ofImperial Rivals.
Great powers flex their muscles abroad. Quite ominously, from the
Russian point of view, China remains an unsatisfied power, determined to
prove itself a great power—presumably at some other power's
expense—and will be increasingly in a position to do so as its economic
development proceeds... China was again faced with a weak and unstable
Russia. This time, however, China was an internally unified, economically
flourishing nuclear power. 42
This interpretation is reinforced by Paine's observation that, especially in terms of
territorial issues, Russia and China have had an historical relationship that can only be
described as consistently unfriendly. In fact, she argues that this relationship appears
unusually conflict-prone by international standards: "It is important to note that Russia's
and China's often casual attitude toward the sanctity of treaties is highly unusual in
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international politics."
43 This disregard for conventions that promote international peace
hardly bode well for the future of territorial cooperation. This contention obviously
contradicts the argument, advanced in the preceding section on "positive factors," that the
two sides were displaying uncharacteristically good behavior in the 1990s. This debate is
taken up in the next section, which discusses essential questions about the outlook for
territorial cooperation.
As noted in the previous section, one-tenth of the disputed claims along the
Sino-Soviet border remained unresolved following the 1991 agreement. Although the
resolution of nine-tenths of bilateral territorial disputes is a remarkable accomplishment (if
that has in fact occurred), this achievement does not necessarily bode well for the
resolution of the remaining tenth. These remaining disagreements are likely to be the most
intractable and long-standing of the disputes under negotiation before 1991, and will
probably make further progress painfully slow. In like manner, cooperative efforts to
tighten control of the border against smuggling and other illegal activity since 1993 may
be causing more incidents—such as gunplay between smugglers and border troops—to
occur, generating greater potential friction in bilateral relations.
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Other factors that may add to the challenges of maintaining good territorial
relations over the next several years include the resurgence of ethnonational movements
along the Sino-Soviet border, particularly in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia. Although
mentioned earlier as a persistent factor in Sino-Russian border relations, it is worth
considering whether the ethnonational issue may not have become significantly more
salient as a potential source of bilateral friction in the 1990s. The "double" demonstration
effect of Eastern European liberation in the late 1980s and the independence of former
Soviet republics in 1991 have given new life to these movements, a resurgence also driven
by increasing awareness of the marginal positions many cross-border groups have been
forced into over the past century. The cross-border activities of these groups are likely to
remain a sore point in bilateral relations, and could result in territorial incursions or other
insults to sovereignty by either side.
From Moscow's perspective, the continuing economic marginality of the RFE
raises certain pressures against the center. As Vladivostok and economic centers in north
China are seen to move ahead economically, the underdevelopment of the border region
could raise uncomfortable local pressure for greater integration with the Chinese
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economy. If it feels compelled to scotch these trends, Moscow could well face off with
Beijing over a political issue expressed through territorial conflict.
G. ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS ON THE TERRITORIAL RELATIONSHIP
The types of general questions posed at the end of the preceding chapters
regarding the potential ofgrowing cooperation in various fields are useful to consider for
the territorial relationship as well. As in the preceding cases, these questions are argued
positively or negatively on the basis of the available evidence, with a summation at the end
evaluating the significance of these findings for this area of the cooperative relationship.
How long will territorial cooperation remain attractive to the two sides?
In the absence of direct evidence about the actual extent of territorial agreement
between the two sides, any answer to this question must be somewhat speculative. What
may be said generally of countries engaged in such cooperation is that the cooperation will
continue so long as it serves the mutual interests of the two sides and does not interfere
with more important interests of the individual partners. This formula seems to apply
however one phrases the question: Do both countries continue to have something to
gain? Will they show respect for treaty arrangements? The answer appears to be "yes,"
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so long as it serves their mutual interests and does not interfere with more pressing
single-country interests.
In the case of Russia and China, it appears that much ofthe benefit of territorial
cooperation has been achieved, or at least that the most dramatic evidence of that benefit
has been seen. The relaxation of tensions has now evolved to confidence-building, but the
initial, major reduction of threat that was the reward for cooperation is not repeated with
every subsequent, incremental step in the progress of the cooperative relationship. Still,
maintaining the new status quo may be seen as a continuing reward in and of itself. The
advantages of a relatively businesslike and peaceful border not bristling with missiles and
overtly hostile forces gives both countries' leaderships much more breathing room than
they enjoyed a decade ago. Reductions in (or redirections of) defense spending that
accompanied the drawing down of border forces was another benefit, particularly for a
post-Soviet Russian state with severe liquidity problems. And the lessening of territorial
hostilities brings with it at least the possibility of greater prosperity for the border regions
of both countries.
At the same time, some scholars argue that "land hunger" is not a dead issue
between these continental states, even if it is papered over for the time being with treaties.
195
The status ofMongolia also remains an open question: it is not at all clear whether the
Mongols will be able to maintain their sovereignty in the post-Soviet era or be forced once
again to seek accommodation with a regional suzerain. In the short term, however, it
appears that territorial cooperation will remain a more attractive option than confrontation
or competition.
How important is the resolution of territorial issues to the two sides?
Some factors suggest that, at least in the near term, the two sides will continue to
perceive incentives to make progress toward the resolution of outstanding border issues.
During the current period of relatively cooperative relations, there is no doubt some
appreciation on both sides for the value of "striking while the iron is hot;" issues that
might yield to resolution today might very well be intractable in the future.
On the other hand, disagreement over territorial issues is something that the two
sides have lived with for many, many years, and neither side is likely to be so anxious to
eliminate sources of bilateral friction as to make unprecedented concessions of territory.
There is a natural hesitancy to make a final settlement of lands which have been in dispute
for decades or even centuries, especially given the normative interpretation which Chinese
and Russian scholarship has applied to the territorial dispute, in which all transgressions
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are simply the fault of the opposite side. In addition, most of the border territory remains
economically marginal, so there is little hurry to make the boundary precise in order to
facilitate the extraction of minerals or bring the land into cultivation. At the same time,
because of its contested status, much of the land still in question has probably not been
thoroughly assessed for mineral deposits, hydroelectric potential, or other resource
exploitation. Neither side would be served by agreeing to a hasty disposition of territory
that might contain exploitable wealth. Finally, there is considerable emotional force
behind the "frontier motif in Russian and Chinese nationalist thinking. By drawing a
precise line between the two territories, hard limits begin to sharply constrain the national
project of countries in which political legitimacy has derived substantially from territorial
expansion and the realization of irredentist claims.
Is this a special relationship?
Another way of phrasing this question would be, "Do Russia and China enjoy
better territorial relations with one another than they have with other countries on their
borders?" It appears not. Because normalization of relations between China and Russia
took so long—the process stretching from about 1960 to 1990—both countries were able
to develop rational border arrangements with many countries on their peripheries while
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their shared land border (the longest in the world) was more or less frozen in a state of
dispute. Recent progress in negotiating a settlement of border issues has merely placed
Russia and China on a footing similar to China's border relations with Vietnam: more
settled than in the past but still prone to dispute, with occasional confrontations and
testing at sea and on land. It would be quite surprising, given the special place that
territorial prerogatives hold in Russian and Chinese nationalism, if the two sides were able
to settle their boundaries firmly and permanently. One can expect that, even if they remain
at a low level, bilateral territorial disputes will remain a more prominent feature in
Sino-Russian relations than between either state and the majority of its neighbors.
In sum, it appears that cooperation between the two sides will continue to be seen
as a mutually beneficial option for the foreseeable future. At the same time, however,
there is little evidence to suggest that current cooperation is so profound as to render
obsolete the past tendency of the two sides to resolve their differences by resort to arms.
A number of factors make the quick resolution of remaining disagreements quite unlikely:
resurgent nationalism and interest in the natural resources of the border region will
probably provide sufficient incentives against clearing up outstanding problems. Russia
and China do not have especially good territorial relations; by international standards and
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even the standard of their relations with other neighbors, the relationship is fair at best and
probably capable of rapid disintegration.
H. COMPARING COOPERATION IN THE 1950'S AND 1990'S
The most obvious parallel between the 1950s and the 1990s in terms of
Sino-Russian territorial relations is that both decades are periods of unusually
well-maintained quiescence in the otherwise disputatious relationship. This does not mean
that the disputes that brought the two countries to the brink of war in the late 1960s are
now extinct, or that these states have suddenly become sweetly reasonable in their stance
toward one another. Similar periods of quiet have occurred in the more distant past when
neither side felt capable of pressing its case successfully or perceived that geostrategic
opportunity was lacking. During the early 1950s, the territorial aspect of bilateral
relations was sublimated for a time to the perceived necessity of socialist solidarity; this
was a policy option taken by both sides. It may be that the relative weakness of the
Russian military forces and the persistent backwardness of China's forces leave both sides
unwilling to engage in territorial adventures against the other. It may also be that the
appearance ofRusso-Chinese solidarity is more important than any potential gains from
more confrontational territorial competition.
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In geopolitical terms, China and Russia regard each other across an Asian land
mass that presents striking parallels with the 1950s. Mongolia was seen as a potential
field of competition in the 1950s and, the dramatic political evolution of that country since
1990 notwithstanding, it remains so today. 44 Today, however, the situation is complicated
by the fact that Inner Mongolia, inspired most directly by the newfound independence of
Outer Mongolia, has its own cross-border movement for the independence of greater
Mongolia. Despite a significant degree of sinification in these northern border regions,
Jackson noted in 1962, "foreign influence was often more decisive there than was
Chinese."45 Future Russian efforts to exert influence in Mongolia may ultimately come
into conflict with Chinese interest there, although the competition appears not to have
been joined as yet in the post-Soviet era.
The Sino-Soviet experience of the 1950s may be distinguished from the 1990s
relationship on the basis of the concessions made by each cooperative partner at the outset
of the two decades. In 1950, the obvious advantages possessed by the Soviet Union—its
leadership role in the world socialist movement, superior military forces by virtually every
measure, and a firmly established zone of influence in many parts of northern
China—ensured that Mao would make concessions to Soviet territorial prerogatives in his
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initial meetings with Stalin. In the early 1990s, it can be argued, it was the Soviets, then
the Russians, who probably made the most concessions to arrive at a fairly broad
agreement on territorial issues, yielding up Damansky/Zhenbao Island (scene of the
bloodiest fighting in the 1969-1970 border conflict) and the parcel of Maritime Krai land
that was to cause such bitter recriminations by mid-decade. Russia was clearly anxious to
relieve the pressures on its eastern border—both military and financial—that China could
apply merely by continuing to encourage settlement in its northeastern border provinces.
After decades of stonewalling on the territorial issue, Chinese leaders circa 1990 were no
doubt gratified to see the fruits of their endurance in the new conciliatory stance of the
Soviet and Russian negotiators. This Chinese advantage appears, however, to have been
transitional, and new pressures have arisen within the framework of territorial relations to
check the progress of conciliation: strident objections on both sides of the border to any
further concessions, a sense among many Russian politicians that something must be done
to stem the tide of Chinese immigration into the RFE, and—in both countries—popular
nationalist sentiment that still sees a greater territorial component in the national destiny.
All these factors will tend to limit cooperation and make alignment the most distant and
improbable of prospects.
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Moreover, many of the factors that limited cooperation in the 1950s are likely to
work in the same fashion, albeit at times with a reversal of roles, in the 1990s. Just as
Russian leaders have seen themselves for hundreds of years as Europe's bulwark against
the "Yellow Peril" from the east, they have also traditionally seen themselves as leading a
civilizing mission to Asia, serving as the intermediaries and translators for a more
advanced European culture. Now, however, it is the Chinese who are portrayed by
Russian political elites as the economic model upon which Russia should base its revival.
With regard to territorial affairs, there is a prevalent concern within the Russian media and
among many Russian political figures that the nation is being overrun and cheated in its
closer cooperation with the Chinese. As Russian leaders feared in the 1950s that China
might draw them into a nuclear conflagration, many Russians today fear that, in fields
from defense technology to trade relations and territorial affairs, the Chinese have lured
Russia into bilateral exchanges and arrangements that will ultimately strip Russia of its
remaining wealth and security. The tension between competing Russian visions of
China—as a potential bulwark against Western pressure and as an historic and unrepentant
foe—seems bound to make for uneasy bedfellows at the level of strategic relations and
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has argued that the main theoretical approaches taken to the study of
Russo-Chinese relations in the past fail to account for the current state of those relations
or predict their future course. The public statements of Russian and Chinese leaders on
the "strategic" relationship between the two countries since 1990 have been shown to
offer no reliable evidence that any sort of alliance is being established between them.
Scholarly analysis of the relationship has been found to argue that a strategic alliance may
be expected to emerge through greater and greater cooperation in security-related fields.
In order to test this assertion of a link between cooperation and alliance-building,
this thesis has posed two crucial questions about the nature of Sino-Russian cooperation:
- is cooperation between the two sides deepening over time?
- is this cooperation likely to lead to alignment?
To answers these questions, this thesis has examined the three forms of
cooperation cited most frequently in discussions of the strategic relationship: defense
technology, economic relations, and territorial affairs. This examination involved a
comparison between features of cooperation in the 1950s and 1990s in order to isolate
persistent features of Russo-Chinese relations which were likely to affect the progress of
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cooperation and the salience of that cooperation to alignment. Its aim was also to
identify changes in cooperation between the two periods that might make the outcome of
current cooperation very different from its 1950s incarnation. These assessments were
described at the end of the case studies that made up the three preceding chapters; the
following section describes broad areas of agreement among these comparative studies
that offer insight into the two central questions of this paper.
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
In each of the preceding case studies, the 1950s and 1990s have been shown to be
periods of unusually good relations between Russia and China from an historical
perspective. In each case, it has been established that, barring unforeseen developments,
current cooperation has the potential to continue for some time to come. Missing in the
1990s relationship is the ideological component that, ironically, drove both the dramatic
growth and sudden termination of the 1950s cooperative relationship. However, there is
a tendency, observable across all three cooperative fields in both decades, for cooperation
to decline somewhat after an initial burst of activity. It appears that, to some extent, the
potential for mutually beneficial relations—built up over decades of antagonism or other
obstructions—is responsible for the initially high levels of cooperation. The emergence of
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practical problems in cooperative enterprises, the satisfaction of the most pressing
requirements on each side, and the generally poor technical, economic, and territorial "fit"
between the two states all contribute to this phenomenon of slackening cooperation.
Legacies of early Sino-Soviet cooperation are visible throughout the 1990s
relationship. In the economic sphere, there are similar patterns of trade involving the same
types of goods. In the realm of defense technology exchange, the Soviet origins of many
Chinese weapons systems helped pave the way for the rapid re-establishment of
cooperative relations in that field. And in territorial affairs, cross-border exchanges
re-emerged along the same networks of physical and institutional links that had been
largely abandoned in 1960.
There is an argument to be made that the non-ideological cooperation in the
current period is particularly vulnerable to reassessments by either partner of the
cooperation's value. As soon as problems arose that made a particular form of
cooperation seem less than beneficial to either side, that side promptly applied the brakes
to further progress in that field. The preceding case studies abound in examples of this:
Russia's interruption of the Su-27 program when the goods received in payment appeared
to be substandard; the tightening of the border regime after an initial period of relative
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openness had led to questionable business deals, a perceived growth in criminal activity,
and other breaches of good order; China's decision to "cool off' its overheating economy
by restricting the availability of capital, thus obviating the demand for Russian building
materials. This may constitute a normal set of circumstances in bilateral relations, but the
very normalcy of the situation suggests that neither side places an overriding strategic
value on these ties.
In both the 1950s and 1990s, it can be argued, the desire to project a particular
image of Russo-Chinese relations has been a factor in the early success of bilateral
cooperation. The high profile events that took place over the first half of this
decade—advanced weapon sales, dramatic signings of territorial agreements, and economic
cooperation pacts—helped to create an image in line with the positions jointly adopted by
the two countries vis-a-vis the United States, one of solidarity among second tier powers
against the hegemon.
As they have in the past, geographic factors continue to play a role in limiting the
growth of cooperation in various fields. Daunting overland distances continue to inhibit
the growth of economic ties. Transportation costs, or even a lack of transportation
infrastructure, negate the potential benefits of trade between the industrial centers of the
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two countries. Territorial relations are negatively influenced by such factors as the
remoteness of the Russian Far East (RFE) from Moscow and the marginal capacity of the
border lands for economic exploitation. Expansion into and political control over the RFE
has given Russia an historical white elephant: too prestigious to lose but enormously
expensive to maintain. Geographic factors may in some ways have facilitated the growth
of cooperation in defense technology. China's geographic distance from the strategic
heart of Russia and the disparity between Russian and Chinese geostrategic concerns have
allowed Russia to provide China with systems that are regionally significant but do not
constitute a serious threat to Russian security. However, the disparity in their strategic
outlook promises to eventually serve as a limiting factor in all forms of cooperation.
The border lands between the two countries continue to be populated to a
substantial degree by people who are neither Chinese nor Russian, and this fact alone will
continue to make each side sensitive to appearances of cross-border influence by the
other. The main area of difficulty over these lands, however, appears to involve the ethnic
Chinese and Russians who are the main economic and political actors there. Many
Russian regional and national leaders argue that the tide of Chinese immigrants to the RFE
must be stemmed as a matter of both economic and territorial self-interest: economic
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because these immigrants—whether entrepreneur or laborer—are seen as a collective drain
on Russia's wealth; territorial because a preponderance of ethnic Chinese in the RFE is
generally seen as a de facto threat to the Russian character of these lands and Moscow's
long-term sovereignty over them.
In each of these fields of cooperation, there is considerable evidence that the
"cheating" problem in international relations theory applies to the Sino-Russian
cooperation in the 1950s and 1990s. Briefly stated, there is a debate among scholars of
international relations over whether states can overcome their "fear of cheating" by other
states and achieve international cooperation. The neo-liberal view is that this fear can be
effectively managed through international institutions and conventions to allow for
cooperation. Realists contend that the fear of cheating that obstructs cooperation is in
fact reinforced by another fear, that cooperation will be more beneficial to other states
than to oneself.
China and Russia exhibited considerable fear of cheating in the 1950s and appear
to be exhibiting a similar fear of one another's cooperative behavior in the 1990s. In the
1950s, this fear found expression over such issues as equipping the Chinese with nuclear
and advanced conventional weapons. The Soviets feared that China would use the
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benefits of further defense technology cooperation to support an activist revolutionary
agenda in the Third World, an interest distinct from its putative shared interests with
Moscow. In the 1990s, Russia appears to have grounds for similar concerns in its defense
technology cooperation with China: given a technological boost from the Russian defense
industries, might not the Chinese quickly become more robust competitors in the
international arms market? In economic affairs, Russia's perception that the Chinese were
benefiting more from bilateral deals by flooding the Russian market with low-quality
goods (i.e., "cheating" on the terms of the deals) led to a dramatic drop in bilateral trade.
And diatribes against exchanging strategic minerals for Chinese cassette recorders have
made regular appearances on the editorial pages of Russian newspapers. It appears that
the serious negative impact which fears of cheating have had and continue to have on
Sino-Russian cooperation reflect a basic feature of the relationship: Neither side is
willing to trust its security to the other, a situation which makes an alliance out of the
question.
The realist-neoliberal debate over cooperation and fear of cheating is not
meaningfully addressed by these case studies of Sino-Russian cooperation, since bilateral
cooperation does not test the effectiveness of multilateral institutions in reducing
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apprehension. However, the Sino-Russian case studies included in this paper do suggest
that future efforts to test realist and neoliberal approaches to the cheating phenomenon
would do well to avoid the field of economic relations as a test case. While such cases
would appear at first blush to be a fair test of these two approaches—since they involve the
sort of non-military issues that could be resolved most readily through
arbitration—economic ties are in fact among the most contentious and ultimatum-prone of
relationships precisely because trade wars do not usually involve the exchange of gunfire.
While the role of government in bilateral cooperation has changed significantly
between the 1950s and the 1990s, the Chinese and Russian governments continue to hold
sufficient sway in their respective economies—at least in the management of bilateral
trade—to make for a meaningful comparison between the two eras. The chapter in this
paper on economic relations suggests, in fact, that continuing government management of
the economy in both countries works most often to obstruct the growth of economic
cooperation. In the defense technology sector, the potential for cooperation between
Russian and Chinese manufacturers is, perhaps naturally, curtailed by the government's
national security prerogatives. Finally, cooperation in the 1990s differs significantly from
the experience of the 1950s in that, especially on the Russian side, central control is much
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less pervasive, dominant, or effective now than in the past. Reports of private
arrangements between Russian arms specialists and Chinese defense research
establishments, of informal economic arrangements that bring Chinese labor into the
Russian Far East in substantial numbers, and of disagreements between center and
periphery on territorial concessions all point to much increased difficulty for both states in
asserting control. It also suggests that cooperation may be taking place increasingly at
non-state levels, further weakening the argument for associating cooperation with the
state-level behavior of alignment or alliance.
B. PROSPECTS FOR THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP
How, then, to answer the questions posed at the outset of this thesis and restated
at the beginning of this chapter? First, is cooperation between the two sides deepening
over time? The evidence presented in the preceding case studies and briefly summarized
above indicates that it is not. Cooperation at or near current levels is, it has been argued
here, likely to continue for the foreseeable future. For various reasons, however, this
cooperation appears to have declined significantly after an initial burst of activity in the
early 1990s. The influence of the Sino-Soviet legacy is also tending to reproduce many
self-limiting features of the 1950s relationship. The absence of an ideological imperative
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toward alliance will encourage regular reassessments by each side of the cooperative
relationship's value. The prevalence of image over substance in bilateral relations may
lead to cooperative agreements that are devoid of substance. While possibly helpful in the
initial stages of cooperation, the disparity of strategic outlook between the two sides may
be expected to make cooperation more difficult over time, especially as it touches on areas
of mutual enmity rather than benefit. There is little evidence of cooperation between the
two sides to resolve cross-border ethnonational issues, and these issues have enormous
potential to disrupt cooperation in territorial affairs. Government intervention and
interference, this thesis has argued, is more likely to undermine than deepen bilateral
cooperation.
Second, is this cooperation likely to lead to alignment? A logical premise of the
argument that Sino-Russian cooperation is leading in this direction is that the absence of
an ideological basis for cooperation in the 1990s will make alignment more likely to
develop on the basis of actual mutual interests. Thus, cooperation can be seen as a natural
building-block of an^alliance based on practical considerations. However, if the arguments
presented in the preceding pages portray the relationship correctly, cooperation is unlikely
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ever to reach the "critical mass" necessary to warrant alignment on the basis of such
practical consideration: the bases of cooperation are simply too weak.
Cooperation may, of course, correlate positively with alliance formation: it did so
in the Sino-Soviet relationship of the 1950s. Cooperation in the 1950s, however, is best
understood as the product of the alliance relationship. In the 1990s, the assertion that
cooperation may lead to an alliance is an exact reversal of this historical pattern. Many
states cooperate without any form of alliance or alignment, and with no expectation that
cooperation will lead to a closer security relationship in the foreseeable future. Nationalist
Chinese-Soviet cooperation in the 1930s is an example of this phenomenon.
The central problem in contemporary Sino-Russian security relations is one of
trust. The confidence necessary for alliance formation appears, in Ralph Cossa's terms, 1 to
derive from three factors: common interests, common values, and common goals. Russia
and China appear to perceive mutual interest in conveying an impression of intensifying
"security partnership," even in suggesting that this may be a euphemism for alignment. On
a broad range of security issues, however, the two sides have precious few interests in
common, and cooperation has done little or nothing to change that situation. The leaders
of the two countries do not share common values, and no amount of pragmatic
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cooperation will change that situation either. To the extent that national goals can be
imputed for these two states, it appears that no amount of cooperation will transform their
separate agendas into a common set of goals. In those few areas where the two sides have
common goals (for example, a peaceful Central Asia, a peaceful and prosperous Korean
peninsula), the visions of Russian and Chinese leaders for their countries' role in a future
international order that will promote or ensure those interests is almost certainly not
shared and may not be mutually compatible.
From a theoretical perspective, it is interesting that these two states appear to
encourage others to perceive that they are balancing against a third party. At a time when
the security risks facing both states have been demonstrably and dramatically lessened by
the end of the Cold War, this sort of balancing behavior is relatively low-risk, especially in
the absence of any active challenge from the putative hegemon. In fact, when the Soviet
Union perceived a serious threat from its association with China around 1 960 and when
China faced a nuclear threat from the Soviet Union in the early 1970s, both countries
pursued ^"bandwagoning" behavior with the United States against their more seriously
threatening opponent. Perhaps it is the outsized effect which the appearance of alignment
seems to have on U.S. strategic thinking, particularly when this image is so easily
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generated through "cooperation" that carries with it none of the risks or potential costs
associated with actual balancing or alignment against a stronger state.
Further studies that might amplify or qualify the findings of this paper would
include an examination of the behavior of these countries in international organizations.
How do their voting records compare? Do they show more cooperation with one another
or with other nations or blocs? An examination of their behavior in crisis situations might
also be useful in testing for the tendency to balance or bandwagon.
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Implications for U.S. policy are fairly straightforward: First, the national security
community should not rush to judge these countries to be embarked on a journey toward
alliance. Such judgments, of course, run the risk of becoming self-fulfilling prophecies;
this is an unnecessary risk given the essentially benign character of the current
Sino-Russian "partnership." Most significantly, reacting to a nonexistent threat is a
potentially costly mistake both in terms of unnecessary expenditures and in the
misallocation of limited resources to address that nonexistent threat.
Second, given the basically positive influence which Sino-Russian territorial
cooperation has had on the East Asian security environment, it would seem to be in the
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U.S. interest to support the continued settlement of outstanding border issues between the
two sides. This need not be done in a way that either side would regard as an attempted
intrusion into their bilateral affairs. For example, a U.S. statement commending the two
sides for the contribution that Sino-Russian cooperation has made to the reduction of
tensions in Asia would, on the one hand, explicitly encourage the substitution of
cooperation for hostility across a sensitive border. On the other hand, it would implicitly
signal that the United States does not regard Sino-Russian cooperation as threatening,
perhaps reducing the propaganda leverage which the two states appear to be employing
against the "unipolar hegemon."
Third, to the extent that cooperation does affect security within the international
system, it is not by providing bases for alliance but by generating inducements for
continued cooperation and disinclination to disrupt a range of mutually beneficial
arrangements through conflict, embargo, or retaliation. It is for this reason that the United
States should do what it can to promote Russian and Chinese integration into the world
.economic system, emphasizing the domestic reforms necessary to achieve that integration.
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